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EXPECTATIONS AND EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS UNDER MANAGED FLOATING 
AN ASSET MARKET APPROACH by M.T. H a d j i m i c h a e l .
ABSTRACT
T h i s  t h e s i s  a n a l y s e s  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  i n  a 
managed f l o a t i n g  exchange  r a t e  r e g i m e ,  u n d e r  two a l t e r n a t i v e  
s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  p r i v a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s :  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s
and l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t . T h e  whole  a n a l y s i s  f o l l o w s  t h e  
a s s e t  m a r ke t  a p p r o a c h  t o  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
A b u i l t - i n  gove rnment  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i s  i n c o r p o r a t e d  
i n  a n e o c l a s s i c a l  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o r t f o l i o  b a l a n c e  model .
The i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  employed ,  r e f l e c t s  b o t h  t h e  " r e f e r e n c e  
r a t e  p r o p o s a l "  o f  E t h i e r  and B l o o m f i e l d  (1975)  and t h e  3rd  
g u i d e l i n e  o f  t h e  IMF f o r  t h e  management  o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange  
r a t e s .  The gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n e s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m ar k e t  
i n  o r d e r  t o  m in im ize  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  o f  t h e  s p o t  exchange  
r a t e  f rom t h e  gove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  ( e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g -  
r un  exchange  r a t e ) ,  a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t im e .
I t  i s  shown t h a t  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  s u c c e s s  a t  which  
gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  m o d e r a t e s  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
v a r i a b i l i t y  depends  on t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e c i s i o n  w i t h  which  t h e  
governmen t  forms i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h .  Any p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s  l e a d  t o  dynamic  i n s t a b i l i t y .  A 
g e n e r a l i s a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  l e a d s  t o  a s t a b l e  l o n g -  
r un  e q u i l i b r i u m  even  i f  t h e  gove rnmen t  u s e s  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  
o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  ( c o m p e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  
p o l i c i e s ) .  However ,  t h e  s u s t e n a n c e  o f  t h e s e  e q u i l i b r i a  c r e a t e s  
c r i s e s  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  and t h e  sy s tem u l t i m a t e l y  
r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  l o n g - r u n  p o s i t i o n .
P e r s u a n c e  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s  i n ­
c r e a s e s  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  r e s e r v e  u se  and c o u l d  l e a d  t o  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
a t  c r o s s  p u r p o s e s ,  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  need  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
l i q u i d i t y .
A r e - i n t e r p r é t â t i on  o f  ou r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  t o  r e f l e c t  
s p e c u l a t i v e  b e h a v i o u r  l e a d s  t o  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  as government  
i n t e r v e n t i o n .  The l i q u i d a t i o n  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  p r o f i t s ,  however ,  
c r e a t e s  a d d i t i o n a l  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y ,  en ­
h a n c i n g  t h e  n o n - p r o f i t  making n a t u r e  o f  government  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
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The f o l l o w i n g  c h a p t e r s  a t t e m p t  t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  
n a t u r e  o f  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  und e r  a r eg im e  o f  managed 
f l o a t i n g ,  f o r  two a l t e r n a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  p r i v a t e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s :  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t
f o r e s i g h t .  The whole  a n a l y s i s  f o l l o w s  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  
a p p ro a c h  t o  ex change  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
In  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  
exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  t h e  e s s e n c e  o f  t h e  a s s e t  m a rk e t  
t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  a r e l a t i v e  a s s e t  p r i c e ^
- t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  a t  which  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  money,  bonds 
and o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  and r e a l  a s s e t s  o f  a c o u n t r y  a r e  w i l l ­
i n g l y  h e l d  by d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  a s s e t  h o l d e r s ,  a t  e v e r y  
moment i n  t i m e .  The a s s e t  m a r k e t  a p p r o a c h  i s  an e x t e n s i o n  
o f  t h e  m o n e t a r y  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  t o  t h e  
r eg ime  o f  f l e x i b l e  exchange  r a t e s .  I n  t e rms  o f  t h e  a s s e t  
m a r k e t  a p p r o a c h ,  dynamic  exchange  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r  i s  a f f e c t e d  
by t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  s u p p l y  and demand f o r  t h e  v a r i o u s  a s s e t s  
t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o v e r  t i m e .
For  t h e  a s s e t  m a r ke t  a p p r o a c h  s e e  t h e  v a r i o u s  a r t i c l e s  
a p p e a r i n g  i n  t h e  S c a n d i n a v i a n  J o u r n a l  o f  Economics ,  
Vo l .  78,  No. 2,  1976.  1 s a rd  (1978) p r o v i d e s  a
s h o r t  s u r v e y  o f  p o p u l a r  v i ews  and r e c e n t  mode l s  f o r  
exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
Dur ing  t h e  r e c e n t  p e r i o d  o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange  
r a t e s ,  i t  h a s  been  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  exchange  r a t e s  d i s p l a y
c o n s i d e r a b l e  s h o r t - r u n  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  The c o n se ns us  i n  t h e
2l i t e r a t u r e  seems t o  be t h a t  t h e  a s s e t  m a rk e t  a pp roa ch  
p r o v i d e s  t h e  mos't t h e o r e t i c a l l y  s a t i s f a c t o r y  e x p l a n a t i o n  
o f  t h i s  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .  The a s s e t  
m a r k e t  t h e o r y  a l l o w s  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
i n  e x c e s s  o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  u n d e r l y i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .
However ,  t h e  v a r i o u s  models  o f  exchange  r a t e  
dy na mi cs ,  e . g .  Kour i  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  Dornbusch ( 1 97 6 b ) ,  assume a 
f r e e l y  f l e x i b l e  exchange  r a t e  r e g i m e ,  i g n o r i n g  t h e  a c t i v e  
gove rnmen t  i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t s .  
Whi l e  i n  t h e  r e a l  w o r l d  c e n t r a l  banks  do i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  
f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t s  on a r e g u l a r  b a s i s  i n  o r d e r  t o  
c o r r e c t  d i s o r d e r l y  m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  work 
on exchange  r a t e  dynamics  unde r  managed f l o a t i n g  i s  s t i l l  
i n  i t s  i n f a n c y .  G i r t o n  and Hender son  (1976 ,  1977) a n a l y s e  
c e n t r a l  bank  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  f o r e i g n  and d o m e s t i c  a s s e t s  i n  
a s h o r t - r u n  p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o r t f o l i o  b a l a n c e  mode l .  
More s i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  Kour i  (1976) and Hende rson  (1978) 
examine  t h e  i m p a c t ,  l o n g - r u n  and dynamic e f f e c t s  o f  a once  
and f o r  a l l  f o r e i g n  exchange  marke t  o p e r a t i o n ,  i n  a g e n e r a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p o r t f o l i o  b a l a n c e  model .  A more r e a l i s t i c  
model  s h o u l d  a l l o w  c o n t i n u o u s  government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( no t  
j u s t  a once  and f o r  a l l  f o r e i g n  exchange  m ar k e t  o p e r a t i o n ) .
2. For  a b r i e f  s u r v e y  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e  s e e  
S c h a d l e r  ( 1 9 7 7 ) .
t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  an e x p l i c i t  
a n a l y s i s  o f  p r i v a t e  s p e c u l a t i o n  co u ld  h e l p  i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  
i m p o r t a n c e  o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  o r  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n  f o r  
s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .
I n  o u r  t h e s i s ,  we i n c o r p o r a t e  a b u i l t - i n  g o ve rn ­
ment  i n t e r v e n t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i n  a g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o r t ­
f o l i o  b a l a n c e  model .  C r e a t i n g  a shock i n t o  t h e  sy s t em ,  we 
c o m p a r a t i v e l y  examine  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  exchange  r a t e  dynamics 
u n d e r  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g .  The i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  we 
employ,  r e f l e c t s  b o t h  t h e  " r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  p r o p o s a l "  o f  
E t h i e r  and B l o o m f i e l d  (1975)  and t h e  3 rd  g u i d e l i n e  o f  t h e  
IMF f o r  t h e  management^ o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange  r a t e s .  The 
go ve rnme n t  i n t e r v e n e s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  mar ke t  i n  
o r d e r  t o  m in i m iz e  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  o f  t h e  s p o t  exchange 
r a t e  f rom t h e  "g ove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e "  ( e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e )  a t  ev e r y  moment i n  t i m e ,  m in im iz i ng  
i n  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  w e l f a r e  c o s t s  o f  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .
We i n v e s t i g a t e  a l s o  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s ^  o f  gov­
e rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  as  a means o f  m o d e r a t i n g  s h o r t - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  we examine t h e
3.  The d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e s  p r o p o s e d  i n  t h e  l i t e r ­
a t u r e  a r e  a n a l y s e d  i n  d e t a i l  i n  s e c t i o n  3 .1  o f  c h a p t e r  3
4.  I n  ou r  t h e s i s ,  however ,  we a r e  n o t  t r y i n g  t o  de f end  
managed f l o a t i n g  r e l a t i v e  t o  e i t h e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  o r  
f i x e d  exchange  r a t e s .  We a r e  s im p l y  p r o v i d i n g  a p o s i t ­
i v e  economics  a n a l y s i s  o f  a managed f l o a t i n g  sy s t em.
For  t h e  f i x e d  v e r s u s  f l e x i b l e  exchange  r a t e  d e b a t e ,  see  
I s h i y a m a  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  Tower and W i l l e t t  (1976)  and A r t u s  and 
Young ( 1 97 9 ) .
d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  r e s e r v e  u s e  and t h e  p o s s i b l e  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  
o f  gove rnm en t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  on i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i q u i d i t y  i n  
g e n e r a l .  I n  a w o r l d  o f  more t h a n  two c o u n t r i e s ,  managed 
f l o a t i n g  may l e a d  t o  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a t  c r o s s  p u r p o s e s ,  
i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  need  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  n a t ­
i o n a l  excha nge  r a t e  p o l i c i e s .
A r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  ou r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  t o  
r e f l e c t  s p e c u l a t i v e  b e h a v i o u r ,  a l l o w s  u s  t o  examine t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  s t a b i l i z i n g  and d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n  on 
excha nge  r a t e  dynamics  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g ,  
w i t h  no change  i n  ou r  f o r m a l  a n a l y s i s .  A s p e c i a l  f e a t u r e  
o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  b e h a v i o u r  ha s  p a r t i c u l a r  i m p o r t a n c e  f o r  
exchange  r a t e  dynamics .  S p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  d r i v e n  by p r o f i t  
ma x im iz in g  o b j e c t i v e s .  I n  o r d e r  t o  r em a in  i n  b u s i n e s s ,  s p e ­
c u l a t o r s ,  u n l i k e  t h e  gove rnm en t ,  need  t o  u n c o v e r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  
and t a k e  t h e i r  p r o f i t s .  An a c t i o n  t h a t  by i t s e l f  c r e a t e s  an 
endogenous  s o u r c e  o f  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u n c t u a t i o n s .
Because  o f  t h e i r  n a t u r e ,  e x p o s i t i o n  o f  our  r e s u l t s  
a t  t h i s  s t a g e ,  even  i n  summary form,  p r e s u p p o s e s  f o rmal  
e x p o s i t i o n  o f  a f ramework o f  a n a l y s i s .  I n s t e a d ,  we w i l l  v e ry  
b r i e f l y  h i g h l i g h t  t h e  main i s s u e s  d e a l t  w i t h  i n  e v e r y  c h a p t e r .
A summary o f  o u r  r e s u l t s  i s  p r o v i d e d  i n  t h e  c o n c l u d i n g  s e c t i o n s  
o f  c h a p t e r s  3 and 4.
In  c h a p t e r  2 we d e v e l o p  a g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o r t f o l i o  b a l a n c e  model  o f  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n
un d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  I t s  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r e  i s  an e x t e n t i o n  
o f  K o u r i ' s  (1976) model  t o  i n c l u d e  d o m es t i c  and f o r e i g n  
b o n d s ,  m o d i f y i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  a c c o r d i n g l y  t o  a l l o w  
f o r  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t .  Our model  p r o v i d e s  an e x p l a n a t i o n  
o f  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  ex ce s s  o f  f l u c t u a ­
t i o n s  i n  u n d e r l y i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  ( o v e r s h o o t i n g ) , f o r  b o t h  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .
I n  c h a p t e r  3,  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  i n t r o d u c e d .  
The government  forms  an e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h  and i n t e r v e n e s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  marke t  on 
t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  o f  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  
f rom i t s  e x p e c t e d  l o n g - r u n  v a l u e .  The e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  
gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  m o d e r a t i n g  s h o r t - r u n  exchange 
r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i s  shown t o  depend on t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e ­
c i s i o n  w i t h  which  t h e  gove rnmen t  forms i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h .  Any d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  e s t i m a t e  from i t s  t r u e  v a l u e  l e a d s  t o  dynamic i n s t a b i ­
l i t y .  A r e - i n t e r p r é t â t i on  o f  ou r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  t o  
r e f l e c t  s p e c u l a t i v e  b e h a v i o u r  y i e l d s  s i m i l a r  r e s u l t s .
I n  c h a p t e r  4,  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i s  m o d i f i e d ,  
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  c o n c l u s i o n s  r e a c h e d  i n  c h a p t e r  3,  g i v i n g  
r i s e  t o  a g e n e r a l i s e d  gove rnmen t  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n .  I n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  l e a d s  now t o  a s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  
even  i f  t h e  go v e rn m en t ,  due t o  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s ,  f o l l o w s  
c o m p e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s .  However ,  s u s t e n a n c e  o f  
a l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n  o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  one t h a t  would
p r e v a i l  i n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r e q u i r e s  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  t o  a c c u m u l a t e  o r  t o  d e c u m u la t e  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  
o v e r  t i m e ,  c r e a t i n g  a c r i s i s  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  pa ymen t s .
Due t o  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  on i t s  a c t i o n s ,  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  
f o r c e d  e i t h e r  t o  mod i fy  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
ex change  r a t e  p a t h  o r  t o  g i v e  up i n t e r v e n t i o n  a l t o g e t h e r .  
U l t i m a t e l y  t h e  sy s t em  r e t u r n s  t o  i t s  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  s t a t ­
i o n a r y  s t a t e  p o s i t i o n .  S i m i l a r  r e s u l t s  a r e  o b t a i n e d ,  when 
p r i v a t e  s p e c u l a t i o n  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n s t e a d .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  
t h o u g h ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  c h a p t e r s  3 and 4 shows t h a t  p r o f i t ­
a b l e  s p e c u l a t i o n  can  o n l y  be s t a b i l i z i n g .
CHAPTER 2
THE ASSET MARKET APPROACH TO EXCHANGE RATE 
DETERMINATION
2 . 1 I n t r o d u c t i o n
In t h i s  c h a p t e r  we d e v e l o p  a model  o f  s h o r t - r u n  
and l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i n  t e rm s  o f  t h e  
a s s e t  m a r k e t  a p p r o a c h .  We examine  a l s o  t h e  dynamic 
r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em t o  exogenous  ch ang es  and p r o v i d e  
an e x p l a n a t i o n  o f  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .
The a s s e t  m a r ke t  a p p r o a c h  f o c u s e s  on t h e  e q u i ­
l i b r a t i n g  r o l e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i n  b a l a n c i n g  t h e  
f o r e i g n  demand f o r  d o m e s t i c a l l y  i s s u e d  f i n a n c i a l  and 
r e a l  a s s e t s  and t h e  d o m e s t i c  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  
w h i l e ,  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  i t  doe s  n o t  n e g l e c t  t h e  r o l e  o f  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  i n  t h e  goods m a r k e t .  The b a s i c  a n a ­
l y s i s  i s  an e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  m o n e t a r y  a p p r o a c h  t o  t h e  
b a l a n c e  o f  payment s  ( F r e n k e l  and  J o h n s o n ,  1976) t o  t h e  
r eg ime  o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange  r a t e s . ^  The e s s e n c e  o f
1. For  r e c e n t  work t h a t  s h a r e s  some o f  t h e  p r e s e n t  emphas i s  
s e e  B lack  (1973,  1 9 7 5 ) ,  He nde r son  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  Dornbusch 
( 1 9 7 6 a , 1 9 7 6 b ) , Kour i  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  F r e n k e l  ( 1 9 76 ) ,  Myrhman 
( 1 9 76 ) ,  Mussa (1 97 6 ) .  The c l a s s i c s  r ema in  Fleming 
(1962)  and Munde l l  ( 1 9 6 3 ) .  For  a b r i e f  s u r v e y  see  
S c h a d l e r  (1977)  and B i l s o n  ( 1 97 9 ) .
t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  t h e o r y  i s  t h a t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  a 
r e l a t i v e  a s s e t  p r i c e  - t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  a t  which  t h e  
s t o c k s  o f  money,  bonds and o t h e r  f i n a n c i a l  and r e a l  a s s e t s  
o f  a c o u n t r y  a r e  w i l l i n g l y  h e l d  by d o m es t i c  and f o r e i g n  
a s s e t  h o l d e r s .  The a s s e t  m a r ke t  a pp roa ch  h i g h l i g h t s  
t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  f a c t o r s  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  d e s i r e d  r e l a ­
t i v e  s t o c k s  o f  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i n  t h e  s h o r t -  
r un  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n .  Exchange r a t e  
b e h a v i o u r  i s  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  su p p l y  and 
demand f o r  t h e  v a r i o u s  a s s e t s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  
o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o v e r  t i m e .  T h i s  i s  i n  d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  
t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  a p p r o a c h  t o  f l e x i b l e  exchange  r a t e s  
which  f o c u s e s  a t t e n t i o n  on t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  f l ows  o f  
e x p o r t s ,  i m p o r t s  and o f  c a p i t a l  f l ows  be tween  c o u n t r i e s  
(Rob in son ,  1 9 47 ) .
Th roughou t  t h e  t h e s i s  we assume c o n t i n u o u s  
t ime  and we p o s t u l a t e  t h a t  a l l  m a r k e t s  c l e a r  i n s t a n ­
t a n e o u s l y .  The s t o c k  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  our  model  i s  
a l o n g  t h e  l i n e s  o f  t h e  work o f  Fo l e y  (19 75 ) ,  Turnovsky  
and B u r m e i s t e r  ( 1 9 77 ) ,  B u r m e i s t e r  and Turnovsky  (1977 ) ,  
B u i t e r  and Woglom (1977)  and Tu rnovsky  (1977 ) .  The 
m a i n t a i n e d  h y p o t h e s i s  o f  t h e  s t o c k  a p p ro a c h  i s  t h a t  
a s s e t  m a r k e t s  c l e a r  v e r y  f a s t  compared t o  t h e  goods mar ­
k e t s .  P r i c e s ,  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n ,  t h e  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  
i n  g e n e r a l  a d j u s t ,  so a s  t o  make t h e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  c o n ­
t e n t  t o  h o l d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k  o f  a s s e t s  a t  e v e r y  
p o i n t  i n  t i m e .  Th i s  i s  b a s e d  on t h e  e m p i r i c a l  a s s u m p t io n  
t h a t  t h e
" . . .  s pe ed  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  p o r t f o l i o  
i m b a l a nc e  i s  h i g h ,  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  t h e  
c o s t s  o f  p o r t f o l i o  a d j u s t m e n t s  a r e  low.
A s s e t  m a r k e t s  a r e  i n  f a c t  among t h e  
mos t  o r g a n i s e d  o f  m a r k e t s ;  i n f o r m a t i o n  
a b o u t  p r i c e s  o f  many ( e s p e c i a l l y  f i n a n c i a l )  
a s s e t s  i s  d i s s e m i n a t e d  w i d e l y  and r a p i d l y ,  
and t h e  g r e a t  b u l k  o f  t h e  t o t a l  w e a l t h  i n  
i n d u s t r i a l i s e d  c a p i t a l i s t  economies  i s  
h e l d  i n  v e r y  l a r g e  p o r t f o l i o s  f o r  which  
f i x e d  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s  w i l l  be n e g l i g i b l e  
i n  r e l a t i o n  t o  p o r t f o l i o  s h i f t s .  These  
o b s e r v a t i o n s  s u g g e s t  t h a t  t h e  v i s i o n  o f  
s t o c k  e q u i l i b r i u m  may be a good a p p r o x i ­
m a t i o n  t o  t h e  r e a l  s i t u a t i o n .  E m p i r i c a l  
e v i d e n c e  o f  l a r g e  t r a n s a c t i o n  c o s t s ,  o f  
c o u r s e ,  w i l l  u p s e t  t h i s  c o n c l u s i o n . "
( F o l e y ,  1975 ,  p .  319) .
I n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  a p p r o a c h ,  t h e  u s u a l  s i n g l e  
b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t  (Wa l ra s  Law) o f  t h e  end o f  p e r i o d  
f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t s  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  two c o n ­
s t r a i n t s :  one s t o c k  and one f l ow  c o n s t r a i n t .
The a s s e t  m a r k e t  a p p r o a c h  i s  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e ­
v a n t  t o  c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  w e l l  d e v e l o p e d  c a p i t a l  and money 
m a r k e t s ,  where  exchange  c o n t r o l s  a r e  f r e e  enough t o  
a l l o w  a r b i t r a g e  be tw een  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  a s s e t s .
For  l e s s  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  however ,  where  t h e s e  c o n ­
d i t i o n s  a r e  l e s s  l i k e l y  t o  e x i s t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  
d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  s u p p l y  and demand c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  
goods  m ar k e t  and by t h e  e x t e n t  o f  government  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
In  t h e  s h o r t - r u n ,  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  t h e  v a r i o u s  
a s s e t s  a r e  g i v e n  and a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  o t h e r  exogenous  
v a r i a b l e s  t h e y  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  q u o t a t i o n s  o f  t h e
2. For  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e tw e e n  exchange  r a t e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  
and  t h e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  b a c k g r o u n d s  o f  d o m es t i c  p o l i c y  
i n  l e s s  d e v e l o p e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  s ee  B l ack  (1975 ) .
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endogenous  v a r i a b l e s .  The a c c u m u l a t i o n  o r  d e c u m u l a t i o n  
o f  a s s e t s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  c h a n g i n g  e x p e c t a t i o n s  move t h e  
sy s t em  o v e r  t i m e .  The dynamics  o f  our  model  a r e  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h o s e  o f  F o l e y  and S i d r a u s k i  ( 197 1 ) .  F r e n k e l  
and  R od r ig ue z  ( 1 9 7 5 ) ,  Kour i  (1976) and Dornbusch  ( 19 75 ) .
The b a s i c  model  i s  de v e l o p e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2 . 2 ,  t h e  
s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  o f  wh ich  i s  a n a l y s e d  i n  2 . 3  and 
i n  2 . 4  we examine  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .
S e c t i o n  2 .5  a n a l y s e s  t h e  dynamic s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  sy s t em  
b o t h  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and un d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  
and S e c t i o n  2 .6  d e a l s  w i t h  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  
model  t o  exogenous  s h o c k s .  We c o n c l u d e  w i t h  S e c t i o n  2 . 7 ,  
which  d e a l s  w i t h  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  v a r i a b i l i t y  and 
p r o v i d e s  t h e  s e t t i n g  f o r  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  government  
i n t e r v e n t i o n .
2 .2  The b a s i c  model
Our b a s i c  model  i s  an e x t e n s i o n  o f  K o u r i ' s
(1976)  model  t o  i n c l u d e  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  b o nd s ,  
m o d i f y i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  a c c o r d i n g l y  t o  a l l o w  f o r  
t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t .  We assume a one s e c t o r  n e o c l a s s i ­
c a l  sm a l l  open economy,  p r o d u c i n g  a f u l l y  t r a d e d  o u t ­
p u t ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e  o f  which  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  
w o r l d  m ar k e t  f o r c e s  ( l aw o f  one p r i c e )  -  t r a n s a c t i o n  
c o s t s  i n  w o r l d  t r a d e ,  t a r i f f s  o r  any o t h e r  imped imen ts  
t o  t r a d e  a r e  a ssumed away.  The w o r l d  p r i c e  l e v e l  i s
assumed c o n s t a n t ,  n o r m a l i z e d  e q u a l  t o  one so t h a t  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  l e v e l  (P) i s  i d e n t i c a l ^  t o  t h e  exchange  
r a t e ,  d e f i n e d  as  t h e  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  p r i c e  o f  t h e  u n i t  
o f  f o r e i g n  money.  L abo u r ,  o u r  on ly  f a c t o r  o f  p r o d u c t i o n ,  
i s  i n e l a s t i c a l l y  s u p p l i e d  so t h a t  r e a l  o u t p u t  i s  con ­
s t a n t .  Domes t i c  a b s o r p t i o n  i s  e q u a l  t o  p r i v a t e  r e a l  
c o ns um pt io n  (C) and  r e a l  gove rnment  e x p e n d i t u r e s  ( G ) . 
F o l l o w i n g  t h e  l i f e - c y c l e  h y p o t h e s i s ,  we p o s t u l a t e  r e a l  
co n su m pt io n  a s  a p o s i t i v e  f u n c t i o n  o f  r e a l  l a b o u r  d i s ­
p o s a b l e  income (Y^) and r e a l  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  (W), i . e .
C = CCY°, W); 0 < C JJ < I ,  C,, > 0 ( 2 . 1 )
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The b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  s u r p l u s  (BT) i s  d o m es t i c  o u t p u t  
minus  d o m e s t i c  a b s o r n t i o n :
BT = Y -  C(Y®, W) - G ( 2 . 2 )
Our s m a l l  open  economy i n c l u d e s  f o u r  a s s e t s :  
do m e s t i c  money (M), h e l d  o n l y  by d om es t i c  r e s i d e n t s  and 
b e a r i n g  a z e r o  n o m in a l  y i e l d ,  f o r e i g n  exchange  ( F ) , 
d o m e s t i c  bonds  (B) - a s su m in g  no d i s c o u n t i n g  o f  f u t u r e
3. The law o f  one p r i c e  a s s u m p t i o n  makes t h e  d o m e s t i c  
p r i c e  l e v e l  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  exchange  r a t e .  The u se  
o f  t h i s  s t r o n g  a s s u m p t i o n ,  however ,  d i c t a t e d  by 
r e a s o n s  o f  m a t h e m a t i c a l  t r a c t a b i l i t y  does  n o t  a l l o w  
i n d e p e n d e n t  dynamics  o f  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e s  and t h e  
exchange  r a t e .  See Dornbuscn (1976b)  f o r  a
model  o f  i n d e p e n d e n t  p r i c e  and exchange  r a t e  dynamics
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t a x  l i a b i l i t i e s - a n d  f o r e i g n  b on ds .  Domes t ic  bonds a r e  
d e no m in a t e d  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  and a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  as 
p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s  t o  f o r e i g n  b o n d s . ^  Both a r e  
v a r i a b l e  coupon bonds  so t h a t  t h e i r  v a l u e  i s  i n d e p e n ­
de n t  o f  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .  The r e a l  v a l u e  o f  bond 
h o l d i n g s  - b o t h  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  - and o f  t h e  
h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  a r e  i n v a r i a n t  t o  changes  i n  
t h e  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  l e v e l  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  o f f s e t  by 
i d e n t i c a l  ch an ge s  i n  t h e  exchange  r a t e .  F o r e i g n  exchange  
i s  assumed t o  b e a r  a z e r o  nomina l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t .
The assumed f o u r  a s s e t s  a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e d u c e d  t o  t h r e e  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s  a s s u m p t i o n  be tween  
d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  b o n d s .  Our a n a l y s i s ,  though,  w i l l  
r em a in  b a s i c a l l y  i n v a r i a n t  i f  d o m es t i c  bonds  were  i s s u e d  
i n  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  b u t  s t i l l  c o n s i d e r e d  a s  p e r f e c t  
s u b s t i t u t e s  t o  f o r e i g n  b on ds ;  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  c o m p l e x i t y  
o f  t h e  model  w i l l  i n c r e a s e  t hough ,  as  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t  
w i l l  have  t o  be  p r o p e r l y  a d j u s t e d  and i n t e r e s t  r a t e  
p a r i t y  s h o u l d  h o l d  be tw ee n  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s .  F can  n o t  o n l y  r e p r e s e n t  f o r e i g n  money b u t  i t  
m igh t  a l s o  s t a n d  f o r  any  f o r e i g n  n o n - i n t e r e s t  b e a r i n g  
a s s e t .
Domes t ic  r e a l  w e a l t h  can  be w r i t t e n  as
4. S i n c e  b o t h  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  bonds  a r e  den omi na t ed  
i n  t h e  same c u r r e n c y  t h e r e  i s  no r e l a t i v e  exchange  
r a t e  r i s k  d i f f e r e n t i a l .  The a s s u m p t i o n  o f  p e r f e c t  
s u b s t i t u t e s ,  i n  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  G i r t o n  and Hender son
( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  i m p l i e s  t h a t  b u s i n e s s  and p o l i t i c a l  r i s k s  i n  
t h e  d o m e s t i c  economy and  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  a r e  
p e r f e c t l y  c o r r e l a t e d .
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W = ^  + F + b ( 2 . 3 )
where  b i s  d o m e s t i c  r e a l  bond h o l d i n g s  and P i s  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  l e v e l  ( exchange  r a t e ) . D e f i n i n g  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (v) a s  t h e  sum o f  bond h o l d i n g s  and 
h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c ha n ge ,  i . e .
V  = F + b ( 2 . 4 )
( 2 . 3 )  c an  a l s o  be w r i t t e n  as
W =  M +  V  ( 2 . 3 ' )
P r i v a t e  a s s e t  demand f u n c t i o n s  (demand f o r  
s t o c k s )  a r e  p o s t u l a t e d  a s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  r e a l  i ncome,  r e a l  
w e a l t h  and  t h e  e x p e c t e d  r e a l  r a t e  o f  r e t u r n s  o f  t h e  
v a r i o u s  a s s e t s . ^  A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  i n s t a n t a n e o u s  (momen­
t a r y )  a s s e t  m a r k e t  e q u i l i b r i u m  t h a t  we p o s t u l a t e ,  t h e  
e x i s t i n g  s t o c k s  o f  a s s e t s  a r e  w i l l i n g l y  h e l d  a t  e v e r y  
p o i n t  i n  t i m e .  Thus ,  t h e  a s s e t  m a rk e t  e q u i l i b r i u m  can 
be d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s : ^
5. For  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  a s s e t  demand 
f u n c t i o n s  s e e ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  Tobin  (1 9 6 9 ) ,  F o l e y  and 
S i d r a u s k i  ( 1971,  Ch. 3 ) ,  and Tobin  and B r a i n a r d  ( 1 9 6 8 ) .
6.  To s i m p l i f y  ou r  a n a l y s i s  we do n o t  assume any e x p l i c i t  
b a n k i n g  s y s t e m ,  so t h a t  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k  (M)
i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  h i g h  power  money.  Our a s s e t
demand f u n c t i o n s ,  how ev e r ,  i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  
comm erc i a l  and c l e a r i n g  b a n k s ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  and p r i v a t e  
a s s e t  h o l d e r s .  In  o t h e r  words ,  e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 5 )  - 
( 2 . 7 )  a r e  t h e  r e d u c e d  form e q u a t i o n s  t h a t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
a s s e t  m a r k e t  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .
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= £ l ( Y ,  w,  i ,  IT, u) = ^  ( 2 . 5 )
= £ , ( Y ,  W, i ,  I T ,  u) = F ( 2 . 6 )
W ,  i ,  TT,  u )  =  V  -  F ( 2 . 7 )
W = p  + V ( 2 . 3 ' )
where  i  i s  t h e  nom ina l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t  on b o n d s ,  f i x e d  
f o r  t h e  d o m e s t i c  economy by t h e  wo r l d  m arke t  f o r c e s  
b e c a u s e  o f  o u r  s m a l l  c o u n t r y  a s s u m p t i o n ;  tt i s  t h e  
e x p e c t e d  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  f o r  t h e  d o m es t i c  economy which  
i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  e x p e c t e d  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n ;  
and u i s  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r i s k  
r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  d o m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y .
F o l l o w i n g  Tobin- ( 1 96 9 ) ,  we assume t h a t  a l l  
a s s e t s  a r e  s t r i c t  g r o s s  s u b s t i t u t e s  w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e i r  n a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i v e s :
f .  > 0 ;  0 < f  < 1 ;  f  < 0 ;  f  < 0 ;  f  > 0
y w i  TT u
fg < 0 ;  0 < f -  < 1; f 2  < 0;  f ^  > 0;  f% < 0 (2 .8 )
y w i  TT u
f  7 < 0 ;  0 < f% < 1 ; f  ^  > 0 ;  f  ? > 0 ; f  ? < 0
y w i  TT u
and s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  ad d i n g  up p r o p e r t i e s :
+ ^2  + ^ 3  " 1 + ^2  + ^3  " °
W W W  y  y  y
f  1 + fo + f-z = 0 f \  + f ?  + f ?  = 0 ( 2 .9 )
i  i  i  TT TT TT
15
f ,  + f .  + £ .  = 0  (2 .9 )
u u u
B e s i d e s  t h e  above c o n v e n t i o n a l  r e s t r i c t i o n s  on t h e  p a r t i a l  
d e r i v a t i v e s  we w i l l  need  t o  assume t h e  f o l l o w i n g  a d d i ­
t i o n a l  ones  r e f e r r i n g  t o  t h e i r  r e l a t i v e  m ag n i tu d es  w i t h  
v a r i o u s  d e g r e e s  o f  s t r i n g e n c y :
(-C g + > 0 ( 2 . 9 a )
y
- (1 - c' ) i  > 0 ( 2 . 9 b )
y
The r e l a t i v e  i m p o r t a n c e  and meaning  o f  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  w i l l  
be d e v e l o p e d  i n  due c o u r s e ,  we m e n t i o n  them a t  t h i s  s t a g e
s i m p l y  t o  p r o v i d e  a s y s t e m a t i c  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  our  main ­
t a i n e d  h y p o t h e s i s .
The gove rnment  i s  f i n a n c i n g  i t s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  by 
lump sux t a x e s  (lump sum so t h a t  t h e y  do n o t  a f f e c t  a s s e t  
p r e f e r e n c e s )  , by i s s u i n g  bonds  and by o u t s i d e  money c r e a t i o n .  
In  p a r t i c u l a r  we assume t h a t  t h e  gove rnmen t  f i x e s  t h e  l e v e l  
o f  i t s  r e a l  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  t h e  l e v e l  o f  r e a l  t a x e s  (T) and t h e  
r a t e  o f  g r ow th  o f  t h e  nom ina l  money s t o c k  (m) , and v a r i e s  t h e
i s s u e  o f  new d e b t  t o  c o v e r  t h e  r e m a i n i n g  b u dg e t  d e f i c i t  o r  
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s u p l u s :
Under  t h i s  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  gove rnmen t  bu d ge t  co n ­
s t r a i n t ,  B v a r i e s  o v e r  t im e  s i n c e  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  e n d o g e n o u s l y  ( s ee  S e c t i o n  
2 . 3 ) .  The gove rnmen t  by do i n g  so  a v o i d s  f r e q u e n t  
ch an g e s  i n  i t s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  and t a x e s  and m a i n t a i n s  a 
f i x e d  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  no m in a l  money s t o c k  - 
t y p e  o f  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y ,  w h i l e  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  b o t h  G 
and T can  e a s i l y  be  a d j u s t e d  t o  make t h e  i s s u e  o f  new 
d e b t  z e r o  ( s e e  S e c t i o n  2 . 4 ) .
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G + i B = T + B + m p  ( 2 . 1 0 )
where  B i s  t h e  s t o c k  o f  o u t s t a n d i n g  gove rnment  de b t  and 
B i s  t h e  i s s u e  o f  new de b t  (a d o t  o v e r  a v a r i a b l e  d e n o t e s  
a t ime  d e r i v a t i v e ) . Whenever B i s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h e  
d o m e s t i c  bond h o l d i n g s ,  b ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  s a t i s f i e s  
i t s  e x c e s s  demand ( su pp ly )  f rom t h e  w o r l d  m a r k e t .
S i n c e  our  model  a l l o w s  v a r i a b l e  o u t p u t  p r i c e s ,  
r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  income must  be  a p p r o p r i a t e l y  d e f i n e d ,  
a c c o r d i n g  t o  Turnovsky  ( 19 77 ) ,  so t h a t  c o n s i s t e n c y  o f  
t h e  s y s t e m  i n  r e a l  t e rms  i s  p r e s e r v e d ;  i . e .  r e a l  p l a n n e d  
( a c t u a l )  s a v i n g s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  d e s i r e d  ( a c t u a l )  accumu­
l a t i o n  o f  w e a l t h .  Thus ,  r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  income i s  
d e f i n e d  t o  i n c l u d e  e x p e c t e d  c a p i t a l  g a i n s  ( ' fïp),^ i . e .
Y® = Y -  T + i ( v  - F) -  TTp (2 .1 1 )
The c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  (S) o f  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  i s  
d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  p l u s  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t .  
I t  i s  a l s o  e q u a l  t o  t o t a l  d o m e s t i c  s a v i n g s ,  i . e .  t h e  sum 
o f  g r o s s  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  (S^) and gove rnment  s a v i n g s  (S^) 
Thus :
S = S  + S  = BT + i ( v  -  F - B) ( 2 . 1 2 )  p g
I f  e x p e c t e d  c a p i t a l  g a i n s  a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  r e a l  d i s ­
p o s a b l e  i ncome,  t h e y  a f f e c t  ex a n t e  con sum pt i on  and 
s a v i n gs  a l i k e  ; u n e x p e c t e d  c a p i t a l  g a i n s ,  however  
a f f e c t  ex p o s t  s a v i n g s  o n l y .
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where  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  government  b u d g e t  s u r p l u s ,  i . e .
S = T - (G + iB)  = - (B + mp) (2 .1 3 )
S u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  f rom ( 2 . 2 )  i n  ( 2 . 1 2 )  
we have
S = Y -  C(Y®, W) -  G + i ( v  -  F - B) ( 2 . 1 4 )
A c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  ( d e f i c i t )  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  
d o m e s t i c  economy i s  a c c u m u l a t i n g  ( d e c u m u la t i n g )  f o r e i g n  
a s s e t s  ( f o r e i g n  exchange  a n d / o r  bonds )  f rom t h e  r e s t  o f  
t h e  w o r l d .  Because  o f  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  f l e x i b l e  exchange  
r a t e s ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  ( d e f i c i t )  i s  e q ua l  
t o  t h e  c a p i t a l  a c c o u n t  d e f i c i t  ( s u r p l u s )  so t h a t  t h e  
b a l a n c e  o f  payments  i s  a lways  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  The a c c u ­
m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  by t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  
i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  and t h e  
i s s u e  o f  new government  b o nd s .  The a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  
f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  p o s i t i o n  
and h e n c e ,  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (v) 
i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  and t h e  
i s s u e  o f  new d o m e s t i c  b o n d s ,  f o r m a l l y  g i v en  by t h e  t ime  
d e r i v a t i v e  o f  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 4 ) ,  i . e .
v = F + b = S + B  (2 .1 5 )
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2 .3  The s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
For  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a l l  m a rk e t s  o f  t h e  
sy s t e m  s h o u l d  c l e a r ,  g i v e n  o u r  a s s u m p t io n  o f  c o n t i n u o u s  
m a r k e t  c l e a r i n g .  The e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
t h r e e  a s s e t  m a r k e t s  - money,  f o r e i g n  exchange  and bonds 
- a r e  g i v e n  by e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 5 ) ,  ( 2 . 6 )  and ( 2 .7 )  r e s p e c ­
t i v e l y ,  and t h e y  a r e  a l l  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  s t o c k  c o n s t r a i n t  
( 2 . 3 ’ ) .  For  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  goods m a r k e t ,  a g g r e g a t e  
s u p p l y  s h o u l d  e q u a l  a g g r e g a t e  e x p e n d i t u r e ,  i . e .  e q u a t i o n  
( 2 . 2 )  s h o u l d  h o l d .  S i n c e ,  t h o u g h ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a cc ou n t  
i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  p l u s  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t ,  
by s u b s t i t u t i o n  we d e r i v e  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 1 4 )  which  i n c o r ­
p o r a t e s  now t h e  f l ow  c o n s t r a i n t  o f  t h e  model .  S u b s t i ­
t u t i n g  r e a l  w e a l t h  f rom ( 2 . 3 ’ ) and r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  income 
f rom ( 2 .1 1 )  and d r o p p i n g  t h e  bonds  m ar k e t  as  r e d u n d a n t  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  s t o c k  c o n s t r a i n t ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n d i t i o n s  o f  t h e  model  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
£ l  [Y, c |  + v) , i ,  TT, u ]  = p  ( 2 .1 5 a )
£2 [Y, (p + v ) ,  i ,  IT, u ]  = F ( 2 . 16b)
S = Y -  C [ (Y -  T + i ( v  -  F) -  Up ) , (p + v) ] -  G + i (V-F-B)  (2 .1 6
G + i B = T + B + m p  (2 .16d )
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where  P,  F, S and B a r e  t h e  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s ,  w h i l e  
M, V, i ,  7T, u ,  Y, T,  B, G and m a r e  ex ogenous .  M, v 
and B a r e  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  nom ina l  money b a l a n c e s ,  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and o u t s t a n d i n g  government  d e b t  r e s p e c ­
t i v e l y ,  wh ich  a l t h o u g h  t h e y  change  o v e r  t i m e ,  t h e y  a r e  
p r e d e t e r m i n e d  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  p o i n t  i n  t i m e ,  g i v en  by 
p a s t  a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  i . e .
t .  t  . t  .
M(t )  = /  M ( t ) d t ,  v ( t )  = /  v ( t ) d t ,  B ( t )  = /  B ( t ) d t  
o o o
No te ,  t h o u g h ,  t h a t  b e c a u s e  bonds  a r e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  
t r a d e d ,  t h e y  can be  ex changed  w i t h  f o r e i g n  exchange  or  
v i c e  v e r s a ;  t h u s  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  i s  n o t  f i x e d ,  b u t  r a t h e r  i s  e nd o ge n o us ly  d e t e r ­
mined .
E x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  i n f l a t i o n  and exchange  r a t e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  a r e  e x o g e n o u s l y  g i v e n  f o r  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  The p r e c i s e  mechanism o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
f o r m a t i o n  w i l l  r ema in  u n s p e c i f i e d  f o r  t h e  moment,  b u t ,  
i n  S e c t i o n  2 .5  where  t h e  dynamics  o f  t h e  sy s t em w i l l  be.  
d e a l t  w i t h ,  we c o m p a r a t i v e l y  examine a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
and p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  - t h e  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  
r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s .
Tak ing  t o t a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l s  o f  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s ,  we o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e  j a c o b i a n  
m a t r i x  i s  r e c u r s i v e ;  t h i s  i s  t o  be e x p e c t e d  g iv en  
o u r  s t o c k  e q u i l i b r i u m  a s s u m p t i o n  f o r  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t s .
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The exchange  r a t e  ( p r i c e  l e v e l )  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t h e  
money m ar k e t  a l o n e ,  g i v e n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  exogenous  
v a r i a b l e s ,  wh ich  i n  t u r n  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  h o l ­
d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t ;  
g i v e n  t h e  v a l u e s  o f  P and F,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  
i s  d e t e r m i n e d ;  and  f i n a l l y ,  g i v e n  t h e  exchange  r a t e  
t h e  i s s u e  o f  gove rnmen t  d e b t  i s  deduced from t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  bu d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t .  The s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  i s  
e x c l u s i v e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t h e  a s s e t  m a rke t  so t h a t  
t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k s  o f  a s s e t s  a r e  w i l l i n g l y  h e l d ;  i t s  
s h o r t - r u n  q u o t a t i o n  r e f l e c t s  t h e  demand f o r  d o m e s t i c  
c u r r e n c y  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  
( f o r e i g n  exchange  and  b o n d s ) . The c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  
p o s i t i o n  a f f e c t s  t h e  exchange  r a t e  on ly  ov e r  t i m e ,  t h r o u g h  
i t s  e f f e c t s  on a s s e t  a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  u n l e s s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  a f f e c t e d  such  as  i s  t h e  c a se  un d e r  
r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  I t  i s  f o r  t h i s  p r o p e r t y  - exchange  
r a t e  as  a r e l a t i v e  a s s e t  p r i c e  - t h a t  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  
a p p r oa ch  l i e s  i n  d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  
ap p ro a ch  t o  f l e x i b l e  exchange  r a t e s  (Rob inson ,  194 7 ) ,  
which  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  m a i n l y  d e t e r ­
mined by t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  p o s i t i o n ,  p e r c e i v e d  as  t h e  

















( 2 . 1 7 )
The s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  can a l s o  be 
i l l u s t r a t e d  g e o m e t r i c a l l y .  The MM^  s c h e d u l e  i n  F i g u r e
2 .1  shows t h e  l o c u s  o f  c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  exchange  r a t e s  
and s t o c k s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  f o r  which  t h e  money m arke t  
i s  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m ;  MM^  i s  p e r f e c t l y  e l a s t i c  be ca u se  F, 
as ( 2 . 1 7 )  shows,  does  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  money m ar k e t  e q u i ­
l i b r i u m  f o r  a g i v e n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  ( v ) . 
T ab l e  2 . 1  shows how t h e  MM c u rv e  i s  s h i f t e d  as  t h e  exo ­
genous v a r i a b l e s  o f  t h e  model  i n c r e a s e .
T ab l e  2 . 1
S h i f t s  o f  t h e  MM s c h e d u l e  as  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s  i n c r e a s e
Exchange r a t e Exogenous v a r i a b l e s
(F = c o n s t .) M V 7T u Y
P ( + ) ( - ) (+) ( - ) ( - )










F i g u r e  2 . 1 . S h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ;







F i g u re  2 . 2 .  S h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ;
E f f e c t s  o f  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u.
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The FF^ s c h e d u l e  shows c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  exchange  
r a t e s  and s t o c k s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  f o r  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  
t h e  f o r e i g n  ex change  m a r k e t ,  and t o g e t h e r  w i t h  MM^  t h e y
9
r e p r e s e n t  a s s e t  m a r k e t  e q u i l i b r i u m .  I t  i s  downwards 
s l o p i n g  b e c a u s e  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  r e d u c e s  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and c a u s e s  a f a l l  i n  r e a l  w e a l t h ;  
t h i s  i n d u c e s  a d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  money 
and f o r  e q u i l i b r i u m  t o  be  m a i n t a i n e d ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  
h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  s h o u l d  f a l l  as  w e l l .
Tab l e  2 . 2 ,  s i m i l a r l y ,  shows how FF i s  s h i f t e d  f o l l o w i n g  
i n c r e a s e s  i n  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s .
T a b l e  2 .2
S h i f t s  o f  t h e  FF s c h e d u l e a s  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s i n c r e a s e
Exchange r a t e  
(F = c o n s t . ) M
Exogenous v a r i a b l e s  
V  TT u Y
P ( + ) (+) (+) ( - ) ( - )
(+) means upwards and ( - ) downwards
9.  The FF s c h e d u l e  i s  downwards s l o p i n g  b e c a u s e  f rom 
(2 .16 b )  we have
dP
dF PP = - ---------—  < 0 ;  s i n c e  f y  > 0 by ( 2 . 8 )
F
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The CC^ s c h e d u l e  o f  F i g u r e  2 .1  shows t h e  
c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  p o s i t i o n  a g a i n s t  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  q u o t a t i o n s .  An i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  
d e c r e a s e s  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and t h r o u g h  a f a l l  i n  
c o n su m pt io n ,  d e c r e a s e s  d o m e s t i c  a b s o r p t i o n  and improves  
t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  p o s i t i o n .  The i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
p r i c e  l e v e l ,  h o w e v e r ,  d e c r e a s e s  t h e  e x p e c t e d  c a p i t a l  
l o s s  (TTp) and  h e n c e ,  i t  c a u s e s  a r i s e  i n  r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  
income w h i c h  t e n d s  t o  c o u n t e r a c t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  a 
d e c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  P o s t u l a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  
n e t  e f f e c t  o f  a p r i c e  r i s e  i s  a d e c r e a s e  i n  d o m e s t i c  
a b s o r p t i o n  ( r e s t r i c t i o n  2 . 9 a ) ,  t h e  CC s c h e d u l e  i s  
upwa rds^^  s l o p i n g .  Tab l e  2 . 3 ,  i n  t u r n ,  shows how t h e  
CC c u r v e  moves a s  i t s  s h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e s  i n c r e a s e .  Note 
t h a t  CC i s  a f f e c t e d  by  changes  i n  G, T and B, i n  c o n t r a s t  
t o  MM and  FF wh i ch  r em a in  un ch ang ed ,  and by changes  i n  
one endog enou s  v a r i a b l e  ( F ) .




wh ic h  i s  p o s i t i v e  i f  (-C _w+C ) > 0 .  R e s t r i c t i o n  
( 2 . 9 a ) ,  wh ich  s u g g e s t s  y ^  t h a t  t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  
o f  a r i s e  i n  p r i c e s  ( exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n )  i s  
an improvemen t  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t ,  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
t h e  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  a d e c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  o u t w e i g h t s  t h e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  a r i s e  i n  
r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  income,  i . e .  C^ > C T^T and t h u s  t h e  
above  f r a c t i o n  i s  p o s i t i v e .  y
25
T a b l e  2 . 3
S h i f t s  o f  t h e  CC s c h e d u l e  as  i t s  s h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e s  i n c r e a s e
Exchange S h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e s
r a t e •
( S = c o n s t . ) M V TT u Y G T B F B
P C+) ( + ) ( - )  0 ( - )  ( + ) C-) C + 3 ( + 3 0
(+) means upwa rd s ,  ( - )  downwards and (0) unchanged .
F i g u r e  2 .1  d e p i c t s  a p a r t i c u l a r  momentary e q u i l i b r i u m  
whe re  t h e  exchange  r a t e ,  P^ ,  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  MM^  s c h e d u l e  and t h e  v e r t i c a l  a x i s ,  c o m p l e t e l y  
d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  money m ark e t  c o n d i t i o n . , as  t h e  r e c u r ­
s i v e n e s s  o f  t h e  m a t r i x  s u g g e s t s .  The s h o r t - r u n  e q u i ­
l i b r i u m  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  by 
t h e  i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  NIM^ and FF^ s c h e d u l e s ,  d e n o t i n g  
a s s e t  m a r k e t  e q u i l i b r i u m .  At t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  a s s e t  mar ­
k e t  q u o t a t i o n s  t h e r e  c o r r e s p o n d s  a z e r o  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  
s u r p l u s  a s  t h e  CC^ s c h e d u l e  i n t e r s e c t s  t h e  v e r t i c a l  a x i s  
a t  . T h i s  s p e c i f i c  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  was d e l i ­
b e r a t e l y  drawn t o  c o i n c i d e  w i t h  an i n s t a n t a n e o u s  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  where  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i s  i n  b a l a n c e  
and w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t .  As w i l l  be shown i n  S e c t i o n  2 . 4 ,  
t h o u g h ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  n e e d  n o t  be e q u a l  t o  z e r o  i n  
t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i f  t h e  i s s u e  o f  gove rnment  d e b t ,  B, 
i s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom z e r o .  To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  we w i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  co ns eq u e nc e s
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o f  two s p e c i f i c  d i s t u r b a n c e s  i n  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t :  an
exogenous  r i s e  i n  e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n  ( e x p e c t e d  exchange  
r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n )  and an exogenous  f a l l  i n  t h e  s u b j e c ­
t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r i s k  r e l a t i v e  t o  domes­
t i c  c u r r e n c y .
(a)  Exogenous  r i s e  i n  e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n : Given ou r
g r o s s  s u b s t i t u t e s  a s s u m p t i o n ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p e c t e d  
i n f l a t i o n  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  h o l d i n g  
money b a l a n c e s  and i n d u c e s  a s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  w i t h  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  -  b o t h  f o r e i g n  ex ­
change  and bonds  - i n  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s ,  i . e .  i t  
c r e a t e s  an e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and an 
e x c e s s  demand f o r  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .  The p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r ,  howeve r ,  c an n o t  c o l l e c t i v e l y  d i s p o s e  o f  i t s  
e x c e s s  nom ina l  money s t o c k ,  and f o r  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  t o  be 
r e d u c e d  t o  t h e i r  new lower  demand,  p r i c e s  have  t o  r i s e  
i n d u c i n g  an exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n .  T h i s  i s  shown 
i n  F i g u r e  2 .1  by t h e  upward s h i f t  ( s ee  T ab l e  2 . 1 )  o f  t h e  
MM^  s c h e d u l e  t o  MM^, d i s t u r b i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
and d e p r e c i a t i n g  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  P^ .  The e x c e s s  
demand f o r  f o r e i g n  exchange  s h i f t s  t h e  FF^ s c h e d u l e  t o  
FF^ and t h e  new s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  
exchange  i n c r e a s e  t o  F^ ; b u t  t h i s  i s  n o t  an unambiguous 
r e s u l t ,  b e c a u s e ,  as  i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x  and i n  
T ab l e  2 . 4 ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t  o f  
an i n c r e a s e  i n  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s  on t h e  h o l d i n g s
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o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  i s  u n c e r t a i n .  T h i s  i s  so b e c a u s e  
t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  i t on t h e  one han d ,  l e a d s  t o  a s u b s t i ­
t u t i o n  o f  d o m e s t i c  money w i t h  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  b u t  on 
t h e  o t h e r ,  t h e  r i s e  i n  p r i c e s  d e c r e a s e s  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  w e a l t h  and t h u s  r e d u c i n g  t h e  demand 
f o r  a l l  a s s e t s .  The f a l l  i n  r e a l  w e a l t h  r e d u c e s  
a b s o r p t i o n  as  w e l l ,  t h r o u g h  a r e d u c t i o n  i n  consumpt ion  
g i v i n g  r i s e  t o  a c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s .  The CC^ 
s c h e d u l e  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  c o u n t e r a c t i n g  s h i f t i n g  e f f e c t s  
o f  r i s e s  i n  tt and F i s ,  w i t h o u t  any l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  
shown t o  s h i f t  downwards t o  CC^, a l l o w i n g  f o r  a c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s ,  as  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  
r e q u i r e  ( s e e  Tab l e  2 . 4 ) .
The exogenous  shock  i n  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t ,  i n  
t h e  form o f  a r i s e  i n  i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  l e t s  
t h r o u g h  a change  i n  p r i c e s  t o  an i n s t a n t a n e o u s  r e - e v a l u ­
a t i o n  o f  t h e  s t o c k  o f  w e a l t h  and t h u s  a f f e c t s  d o m es t i c  
a b s o r p t i o n .  Cooper  (1976)  q u e s t i o n s  w h e t h e r  changes  
i n  t h e  m ar k e t  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  w e a l t h  r e s u l t i n g  from 
s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  ch ang es  s h o u l d  be e x p e c t e d  t o  
a f f e c t  e x p e n d i t u r e  d e c i s i o n s .  I f  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  he a r g u e s ,  
i s  a p o s i t i v e  f u n c t i o n  o f  e x p e c t e d  w e a l t h ,  changes  i n  t h e  
m a r k e t  e v a l u a t i o n  o f  c u r r e n t  w e a l t h  m igh t  n o t  a f f e c t  
e x p e n d i t u r e  d e c i s i o n s .  I n  such  a f o r m u l a t i o n ,  t h o ug h ,  
i n d i v i d u a l s  s t a b i l i z e  p l a n n e d  co n su m p t i o n  l e a v i n g  
s a v i n g s  t o  a b s o r b  a l l  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  
w e a l t h ;  an a s s u m p t i o n  no l e s s  a r b i t r a r y  t h a n  l e t t i n g
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11b o t h  c o n s u m p t i o n  and s a v i n g s  t o  be s i m i l a r l y  a f f e c t e d
(b) Exogenous  f a l l  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  
f o r e i g n  exchange  r i s k  ( u ) : A r e l a t i v e l y  more i n t e r e s ­
t i n g  example  o f  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e s  i s  t h e  c a s e  o f  a
d e c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  
12r i s k  (u) wh ic h ,  a s  w i l l  be a r g u e d  i n  S e c t i o n  2 . 7 ,  i s  
one o f  t h e  main c a u s e s  o f  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a ­
b i l i t y .  A f a l l  i n  u i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  s p e c u l a t o r s  come 
t o  e x p e c t  a g r e a t e r  r i s k  i n  h o l d i n g  do m e s t i c  c u r r e n c y  
r e l a t i v e  t o  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  due s a y ,  t o  new e x p e c t a t i o n s  
a b o u t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p u r c h a s i n g  power  o f  d o m es t i c  money; 
( i . e .  a change  i n  t h e  d e g re e  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  be tween 
d o m e s t i c  and  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ) • T h i s  w i l l  i n d uc e  an
11.  For  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tween  r e a l  
and f i n a n c i a l  s e c t o r s  i n  o t h e r  model s  d e a l i n g  w i t h  
excha nge  r a t e  dynamics  s e e  S c h a d l e r  ( 1977 ) .
12.  The c o n v e n t i o n a l  method  o f  m o d e l l i n g  s u b j e c t i v e  a r g u ­
ment s  i n  a s s e t  demand f u n c t i o n s ,  b e h a v i o u r a l  f u n c t i o n s  
i n  g e n e r a l  ( suc h  as  t a s t e s ,  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  e t c . )  i s
t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  them i n  t h e  f u n c t i o n a l  form;  l e a v i n g  
as e x p l i c i t  a rg u m en t s  i n  t h e  b e h a v i o u r a l  e q u a t i o n s  
v a r i a b l e s  such  as  p r i c e s ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  income o r  
w e a l t h .  The main  r e a s o n  why u i s  p r e s e n t e d  as  an 
e x p l i c i t  v a r i a b l e  i n  o u r  model,  i s  t h e  need  t o  i l l u s ­
t r a t e  i t s  i m p o r t a n c e  i n  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
v a r i a b i l i t y  a s  one o f  t h e  main f a c t o r s  a c c o u n t i n g  
f o r  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  d i s t u r b a n c e s .  u ,  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  
e s t i m a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r i s k  r e l a t i v e  t o  domes­
t i c  c u r r e n c y ,  r e f l e c t s  ch an g es  i n  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s ’ 
r i s k  a v e r s i o n  wh ich  m ig h t  a r i s e  e i t h e r  f rom a change  
i n  t h e i r  t a s t e s  and s e n s i t i v e n e s s  t o  r i s k  o r  from a 
change  i n  t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  p r o s p e c t i v e  de ve l op me n t s  
i n  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p u r c h a s i n g  power  o f  c u r r e n c i e s .
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e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and an e x c e s s  
demand f o r  f o r e i g n  exchange  and bo nds ,  an e x c e s s  demand 
f o r  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i n  g e n e r a l .  To c l e a r  t h e  money mar ­
k e t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  s h o u l d  d e p r e c i a t e  [ p r i c e s  s h o u l d  
r i s e )  and hence  t h e  MM^  s c h e d u l e  i n  F i g u r e  2 .2  i s  s h i f t e d  
upwards  t o  MM^; t h e  FF^ s c h e d u l e ,  s i m i l a r l y ,  moves t o  FF^ 
w i t h  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e m a in i n g  
t h e  same.  The f a l l  i n  u i n c r e a s e s  t h e  demand f o r  
f o r e i g n  ex ch a n ge ,  w h i l e  on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  t h e  f a l l  i n  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  c a u s e d  by t h e  r i s e  i n  p r i c e s  d e ­
c r e a s e s  t h e  demand f o r  a l l  a s s e t s .  To f a c i l i t a t e  our  
e x p o s i t i o n  w i t h o u t  a l t e r i n g  a n y t h i n g  o f  t h e  fun da m e n t a l  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  mode l ,  we w i l l  assume t h a t  t h e  two 
c o u n t e r a c t i n g  e f f e c t s  o f f s e t  e ach  o t h e r ^ ^  - i . e .  r e s ­
t r i c t i o n  [ 2 . 9 c )  - so  t h a t  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  h o l d i n g s  o f  
f o r e i g n  exchange  r em a in  unc h an ge d  a t  F^.  The r e d u c t i o n  
i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  a s  a r e d u c t i o n  i n  r e a l  w e a l t h ,  
d e c r e a s e s  a b s o r p t i o n ,  and  g i v e n  r e s t r i c t i o n  [ 2 . 9 a ) ,
l e a d s  t o  a c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r o l u s .  The CC s c h e d u l eo
r e m a in s  unc hanged  s i n c e  u i s  n o t  a s h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e  [ s ee  
T ab l e  2 . 3 )  and F does  n o t  c h a n g e .
13.  As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  
f o r  t h i s  i s
h  ^2 " ^3
a = - u =  Î1 .
'w
T a b l e  2 . 4
S h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s
Endogenous
v a r i a b l e s M V
Exogenous  v a r i a b l e s  
7T u Y T G B
p ( + ) ( - )  (+) ( - ) 0 0 0
F 0 (+) (?) Oa (?) 0 0 0
S 0 ( - ) b  (+) C-)a (?) (+) ( - ) ( - )
V 0 ( - )  (+) ( - ) (?) ( - ) 0 0
B 0 ( - )  (+) ( - ) ( - ) (+) (+)
No te s :  (a)  Given r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c ) ;
(b)  g i v e n  r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 b ) .
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The s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  o f  
changes  i n  t t ,  u  and a l l  o t h e r  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
f o r m a l l y  d e r i v e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x  and summar ised  i n  
T ab l e  2 . 4  a b ove .  The c o m p a r a t i v e - s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  on t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ’ s a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
a r e ,  g i v e n  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 1 5 ) ,  t h e  a l g e b r a i c  sum o f  t h e  
e f f e c t s  on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  and on t h e  i s s u e  
o f  new d e b t .  I n  d e r i v i n g  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a change i n  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (v) on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e ,  
as  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  we make u se  o f  r e s t r i c t i o n  
( 2 . 9 b ) .  Namely,  we a r e  a s su m in g  t h a t  t h e  p o s i t i v e  
e f f e c t  o f  a r i s e  i n  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  on a b s o r p t i o n  
(C^ + C n ' i )  t h a t  comes a b o u t  t h r o u g h  an i n c r e a s e  i n
yD
r e a l  w e a l t h  and d i s p o s a b l e  i ncome,  o v e r o f f s e t s  t h e  p o s i t i v e
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e f f e c t  o f  a r i s e  i n  v on t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t  ( i ) ; t h i s  
q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  v e r y  p l a u s i b l e  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  i . e .
(C^ + C p i  “ i )  > 0 ,  i s  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r
y
d S / d v  t o  be  p o s i t i v e .  (See Ando and M o d i g l i a n i ,  1963)
As can  be s e e n  f rom Ta b l e  2 . 4 ,  changes  i n  t h e  
l e v e l  o f  gove rnmen t  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  s t o c k  
o f  gove rnmen t  d e b t  and t h e  l e v e l  o f  r e a l  t a x e s ,  have  no 
e f f e c t  w h a t s o e v e r  on t h e  s h o r t - r u n  a s s e t  m a r k e t  e q u i l i ­
b r i u m ,  a f f e c t i n g  o n l y  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  and 
t h e  i s s u e  o f  gove rnmen t  d e b t .  Changes i n  G and B i n  
p a r t i c u l a r ,  do n o t  even  a f f e c t  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ' s  
a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and h e n c e ,  we 
would  e x p e c t  them n o t  t o  a f f e c t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  
s t a t e  a s  w e l l .
The exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  s h i f t  
t h e  s y s t e m  away f rom i t s  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n ,  
and t h r o u g h  a s e q u e n c e  o f  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  i t  r e t u r n s  
t o  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  p r o v i d e d  t h e  sy s tem i s  dynami ­
c a l l y  s t a b l e .  B e fo re  ex am in in g  t h e  dynamics ,  t h o u g h ,  
we a n a l y s e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .
2 .4  The l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e
Assuming f o r  t h e  moment t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  
d y n a m i c a l l y  s t a b l e ,  t h e  s e q u e n c e  o f  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  
w i l l  l e a d  t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  where  r e a l  
w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t ,  h e l d  i n  t h e  d e s i r e d  p r o p o r t i o n s  and
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where  a l l  no m in a l  v a r i a b l e s  grow a t  t h e  same r a t e ;  
e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  r a t e ,  e q u a l  
t o  t h e  r a t e  o f  g rowth  i n  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k .
For  r e a l  w e a l t h  t o  be  c o n s t a n t ,  n e t  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  
[ d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  sum o f  g r o s s  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  and c a p i t a l  
g a i n s ,  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  e q u a l  t o  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  
r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  income and  consumpt ion )  must  be  z e r o  
and h e n c e ,  r e a l  p r i v a t e  c on su m p t io n  ha s  t o  be e q u a l  t o  
r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  i ncome,  p r o p e r l y  d e f i n e d ;  t h u s  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  m a r g i n a l  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  consume i s  e q u a l  t o  
u n i t y .  S i n c e ,  howeve r ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  i n  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  i s  p o s i t i v e  and e q u a l  t o  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  
i n  no m in a l  b a l a n c e s  (m) , r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  d e p r e ­
c i a t i n g  e v e r y  p e r i o d  by
wh ich  r e p r e s e n t s  an i n f l a t i o n  t a x  o r  a c a p i t a l  l e v y  on 
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  To make up f o r  t h i s  c a p i t a l  l o s s ,  
t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  s a v i n g  a t  e v e r y  p e r i o d  a p a r t  o f  
i t s  income e q u a l  t o  t h e  e x p e c t e d  c a p i t a l  l o s s  (tt^) ; 
e q u a l  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  c a p i t a l  loss (m^) s i n c e  m = t t ,  e q u a l  
t o  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  t a x  l e v i e d  by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t .
14.  Consumpt ion  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i s  e q u a l  t o
C = CCY°, W) = Y® = Y -  T + i ( v - F )  -  Up
Real  d i s p o s a b l e  income i s  d e f i n e d  t o  e x c l u d e  t h a t  p a r t  
o f  p r i v a t e  income (Y - T + i ( v  - F) )  t h a t  i s  u s e d  t o  
compensa t e  c a p i t a l  l o s s e s ,  i . e .  ttM/P.
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Hence,  g r o s s  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  a r e
Sp = Y -  T + i ( v  -  F) -  C(Y®, W)
Y -  T + i ( v  -  F) -  [Y -  T + i ( v - F )  -  Up]
np = mp ( 2 . 1 8 )
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (2 .1 8 )  and gove rnment  s a v i n g s  
f rom ( 2 . 1 3 )  i n t o  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  a cc ou n t  
( 2 . 1 4 ) ,  we deduce  t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  i n  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  i s  e q ua l  t o  minus  t h e  i s s u e  o f  new go ve rn ­
ment  d e b t , ^ ^  i . e .
S = nip -  (B + mp)
= -  B (2 .1 9 )
The i s s u e  o f  new gove rnment  d e b t  i n  t h e  l o ng -  
r u n  can  be p o s i t i v e ,  n e g a t i v e  o r  z e r o  de pen d i ng  on t h e  
go ve rnmen t  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t ,  i . e .
15.  T h i s  c an  a l s o  be  s e e n  f rom e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 1 5 ) ,  i . e .
V  = S + B
S i n c e  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n  t h e  long- 
r u n  i s  c o n s t a n t ,  v = 0 ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  
i s  e q u a l  t o  minus t h e  i s s u e  o f  new gove rnment  d e b t .
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G + i B = T + B +  lïïM* ( 2 .2 0 )
where  M* a r e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  ove r  which  
t h e  gov e rnmen t  ha s  no c o n t r o l .  I f  r e a l  t a x e s  ( lump-sum) 
and t h e  i n f l a t i o n  t a x  r ev en ue  e x a c t l y  o f f s e t  t h e  t o t a l  
gove rnm en t  e x p e n d i t u r e s  (G + i B ) , t h e  r e m a i n i n g  bu d g e t  
d e f i c i t  t o  be  f i n a n c e d  by i s s u e  o f  bonds  i s  z e r o ;  i f  
" t o t a l  t a x  r e v e n u e "  (T + mM*) f a l l s  s h o r t  o r  exce eds  t h e  
t o t a l  gove rnmen t  e x p e n d i t u r e s ,  B i s  p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e  
and  i n c r e a s i n g  o r  d e c r e a s i n g  o v e r  t im e  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Of c o u r s e ,  as  w i l l  be shown be lo w ,  t h e  gove rnment  can 
a lways  a d j u s t  t h e  l e v e l  o f  i t s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  o r  i t s  t a x e s  
o r  b o t h  t o  s t a b i l i z e  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  gove rnment  d e b t .
The e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :
f ^  [Y, (M + v) , i ,  TT, u ]  = M ( 2 . 2 1 a )
[Y, (M + v ) ,  i ,  TT, u ]  = F ( 2 . 21b )
Y = C[(Y -  T + i(v-F)-TTM) , (M+v) ] + G - i ( v - F - B )  - B (2 .2 1 c )
16.  The f a c t  t h a t  a s s e t  h o l d e r s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  h o l d  
b o t h  f o r e i g n  exchange  w i t h  a z e r o  nomina l  r e t u r n  
and  d o m e s t i c  o r  f o r e i g n  bonds  b e a r i n g  a p o s i t i v e  
y i e l d  and b o t h  s u b j e c t  t o  t h e  same exchange  r a t e  
r i s k ,  i m p l i e s  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  c e r t a i n  d i f f e r e n c e s  
i n  t h e i r  i n h e r e n t  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  t h a t  make t h e  p r i ­
v a t e  s e c t o r  w i l l i n g  t o  d i v e r s i f y  i t s  p o r t f o l i o  i n  
s p i t e  o f  t h e i r  d i f f e r e n t  r e a l  r e t u r n s .
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G + i B = T + B + m M  (2 .21d )
T T = p  = m ( 2 .2 1e )
E q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 2 1 a )  and (2 .2 1b )  r e p r e s e n t  e q u i l i ­
b r i u m  i n  t h e  money and f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t s  r e s p e c ­
t i v e l y ;  t a k e n  t o g e t h e r  t h e y  imp ly  a s s e t  ma r ke t  e q u i l i ­
b r i u m  and t h a t  r e a l  w e a l t h  i s  h e l d  i n  t h e  d e s i r e d  p r o p o r ­
t i o n s .  E q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 1 c ) ,  which  i s  d e r i v e d  from ( 2 .1 6 c )  
and ( 2 . 1 9 ) ,  shows t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  i n  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  and r e f l e c t s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  n e t  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  
a r e  z e r o ,  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  t h a t  p r i v a t e  r e a l  w e a l t h  i s  
c o n s t a n t .  E q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 1 d )  r e p e a t s  t h e  government  bu d ge t  
c o n s t r a i n t ,  w h i l e  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 1 e )  shows t h a t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
a r e  r e a l i s e d  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n .  From t h e  above e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n d i t i o n s  we can  s o l v e  f o r  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  (M), h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  (F) 
and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  [ v ) , t h e  i s s u e  o f  new g o v e r n ­
ment  de b t  (B) a t  e v e r y  p o i n t  i n  t im e  and f o r  e x p e c t e d  
i n f l a t i o n  ( t t )  ; a l l  i n  t e r m s  o f  t h e  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s  
o f  t h e  sy s t e m ,  i . e .  Y, T,  G, m, i ,  u and  B.
As an i n t e r e s t i n g  b y - p r o d u c t  o f  ou r  a s s u m p t i o n  
t h a t  d o m e s t i c  bonds  a r e  p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s  f o r  f o r e i g n  
b o n d s ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
d o m e s t i c  de b t  b e i n g  c o n s t a n t ,  i n c r e a s i n g  o r  d e c r e a s i n g  
o v e r  t i m e .  T h i s  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  r e s u l t  r e a c h e d  by 
McKinnon and Oa t e s  (1966)  who showed t h a t  t h e  c u r r e n t
36
a c c o u n t  d e f i c i t  i n  t h e  l o n ^ - r u n  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  budge t  
d e f i c i t ,  e q u a l  t o  t h e  i s s u e  o f  new d e b t .  The o n ly  d i f ­
f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  i n  our  model  t h e  i s s u e  o f  government  deb t  
can  be i n c r e a s i n g  o r  d e c r e a s i n g  ov e r  t ime  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
e x p l i c i t  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  a s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t ,  whe rea s  
t h e  government  pays  i n t e r e s t  y i e l d s  on t h e  e x i s t i n g  bond 
h o l d i n g s .  Both i n  our  model  and i n  McKinnon and Oat es  
( 1 9 6 6 ) ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  e q u i l i b r i u m  (when 
B ^ 0) depends  on t h e  w i l l i n g n e s s  o f  t h e  government  t o  
go on i n c r e a s i n g  o r  d e c r e a s i n g  i t s  d e b t  o ve r  t ime  and 
on t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r ld  t o  a b s o r b  t h e
i s s u e s  o f  new d e b t  w i t h o u t  any change  i n  i t s  p o r t f o l i o
17a l l o c a t i o n  d e c i s i o n s .  As can  be s e en  from t h e  l o n g - r u n
c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s ,  d e r i v e d  i n  t h e  ap pe nd ix  and 
shown i n  summary form i n  T a b l e  2 . 5 ,  changes  i n  t h e  o u t ­
s t a n d i n g  government  d e b t  (B f  0)  have  no e f f e c t s  w h a t s o ­
e v e r  on t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  as  t h e  a s s e t  marke t
17.  The f a c t  t h a t  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  w or ld  i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  
ou r  model  t o  be c o m p l e t e l y  u n a f f e c t e d  by t h e  d e v e l o p ­
ment s  i n  t h e  sm a l l  d o m e s t i c  economy can be j u s t i f i e d  
by e i t h e r  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h r e e  r e a s o n s :
( i )  The r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  m a i n t a i n s  an a c t i v e  p o l i c y
o f  p r e s e r v i n g  a c o n s t a n t  p r i c e  l e v e l ,  P*,  eq u a l  t o  u n i t y  
a f i x e d  nomina l  i n t e r e s t  r a t e  i  and a p e r f e c t l y  
e l a s t i c  demand and s u p p l y  o f  bonds  a t  t h e  g i v e n  
nomina l  y i e l d .
( i i )  The r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  i s  i n  a s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  
whe rea s  t h e  de v e l op m e n t s  i n  t h e  do m e s t i c  economy,  
b e i n g  a s m a l l  c o u n t r y ,  c an  be i g n o r e d ,  o r
( i i i )  The r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  i s  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m  and t h e  
r e p e r c u s s i o n s  o f  t h e  a c t i v i t i e s  o f  t h e  d o m es t i c  economy 
a r e  o f f s e t  by de v e l o p m e n t s  i n  o t h e r  s m a l l  c o u n t r i e s  
among whom t h e r e  a r e  no economic  l i n k a g e s .
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e q u i l i b r i u m  and t h e  l o n g - r u n  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  r ema in  
u n a f f e c t e d .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  government  
d e b t  c a n n o t  go on i n c r e a s i n g  o r  d e c r e a s i n g  f o r  e v e r  and 
t h e  gove rnment  ha s  u l t i m a t e l y  t o  a d j u s t  i t s  r e a l  ex pe n ­
d i t u r e s  o r  i t s  t a x e s  so t h a t  t h e  s t o c k  o f  d o m es t i c  
bonds  i s  s t a b i l i z e d ;  i . e .  B = 0 .  As can  be s e en  from 
Ta b l e  2.. 5 (column 4), t h e  gove rnment  c an  v e r y  e a s i l y  b r i n g  
t h i s  a d j u s t m e n t  ab o u t  by v a r y i n g  a n a l o g o u s l y  t h e  l e v e l  
o f  i t s  e x p e n d i t u r e s  w i t h o u t  d e v i a t i n g  t h e  sy s tem from 
i t s  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  p o s i t i o n .  T h i s  does  n o t  h o l d ,  
t h o u g h ,  i f  t a x e s  a r e  a d j u s t e d  i n s t e a d  s i n c e ,  a s  column (3) 
shows,  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  d i s t u r b e d .
Tab l e  2 . 5  
Long - run  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s
Endogenous
v a r i a b l e s Y
Exogenous v a r i a b l e s  
u T G B
M ( + ) ( + ) ( - ) 0 0
V (?)  ■ ( - ) a ( - ) 0 0
F (?) ( - ) a ( - ) 0 0
B ( - ) ( - ) ( - ) (+) ( + )
No t e s :  (a)  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h i s  i s  r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c )
The l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  can  be  i l l u s t r a t e d  





( - ) ( + )
FF* (F)
F i g u r e  2 . 3 .  The l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e
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s c h e d u l e ,  d e r i v e d  from e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 1 a ) ,  shows combi ­
n a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h
f o r  which  t h e  money m a r k e t  i s  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m ;  i t  i s
18upwards  s l o p i n g  b e c a u s e  an i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  p r o d u c e s  an i n c r e a s e d  demand f o r  r e a l  b a l a n c e s .  
T a b l e  2 . 6  shows how t h e  MM* c u rv e  i s  s h i f t e d  a s  o t h e r  
v a r i a b l e s  i n c r e a s e .
T ab l e  2 . 6  
S h i f t s  i n  t h e  MM* s c h e d u l e
(+) = up wa rd s ,  0 = unchanged .
The FF* s c h e d u l e ,  d e r i v e d  f rom ( 2 . 2 1 b ) ,  shows 
c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  f o r e i g n  exchange  marke t  
e q u i l i b r i u m  f o r  a g i v e n  s t o c k  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange ;  i t  i s
Re a l  money S h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e s
(v = c o n s t . ) Y u T G F B
M ( + ) ( + ) 0 0 0 0





1- f . > 0
w
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19downwards s l o p i n g ,  s i n c e  f o r  a g i v e n  s t o c k  o f  f o r e i g n  
e x c ha n ge ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n c r e a s e s  
w e a l t h  and l e a d s  t o  an e x c e s s  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  exchange ;  
t o  o f f s e t  t h i s  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  have  t o  f a l l  by 
e x a c t l y  t h e  same amount  ( t h e  a b s o l u t e  s l o p e  o f  FF* i s  
u n i t y ) .  How FF* i s  s h i f t e d  i s  shown i n  Tab l e  2 . 7 .
T ab l e  2 . 7  
S h i f t s  i n  t h e  FF* s c h e d u l e
Rea l  money S h i f t i n g v a r i a b l e s
(v = c o n s t . ) Y u T G F B
M (+) (+) 0 0 ( + ) 0
(+) = upwards . 0 = unch ang ed .
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  CC* s c h e d u l e ,  d e r i v e d  from ( 2 . 2 1 c ) ,  
shows t h e  l o c u s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  f o r  which  p r i v a t e  n e t  s a v i n g s  a r e  z e ro  and hence  
r e a l  w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t ;  i f  B = 0 t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i s  
b a l a n c e d  as  w e l l  (S = 0 ) .  Given r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 b ) ,  
name ly ,  t h a t  an i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n c r e a s e s  
d o m e s t i c  a b s o r p t i o n  by more t h a n  i t  improves  t h e  s e r v i c e






2 0a c c o u n t ,  t h e  CC* s c h e d u l e  i s  downwards s l o p i n g ,  s i n c e  
an i n c r e a s e  i n  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  l e a d s  t o  d i s s a v i n g  
and a f a l l  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  i s  needed  t o  o f f s e t  
i t .  Tab l e  2 . 8  shows how t h e  CC* s c h e d u l e  i s  s h i f t e d ;  
n o t e  t h a t  b o t h  t h e  s t o c k  o f  gove rnmen t  bonds and t h e  
i s s u e  o f  new government  d e b t  a r e  s h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e s .
T ab l e  2 . 8  
S h i f t s  i n  t h e  CC* s c h e d u l e
Real  money S h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e s
(v = c o n s t . ) Y u T G B B F
M ( + ) 0 ( + ) ( - ) ( - ) ( + ) ( - )
(+) = u pw ar ds ,  ( - )  = downwards and 0 = unchanged .
Th i s  does  n o t  mean,  ho we ve r ,  t h a t  CC* i s  s h i f t i n g  ove r
t ime  as  B ch an g e s ;  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a r i s e  i n  t h e  s t o c k  o f
governmen t  bonds  is. e x a c t l y  o f f s e t  by t h e  r i s e  i n  t h e
21i s s u e  o f  new d e b t  t h a t  i t  c a u s e s .




C* -  (1 - CyD)i  
( -  C j^ TT + < 0
y w
s i n c e  b o t h  t h e  n u m e r a t o r  and d e n o m i n a t o r  a r e  assumed 
p o s i t i v e  by r e s t r i c t i o n s  ( 2 . 9 a )  and (2 .9b )  r e s p e c t i v e l y
21.  I f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t  and t h e  s t o c k  o f  
government  d e b t  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by dB, i t s  e f f e c t s  on 
t h e  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n  o f  CC* depend  on t h e  change  i n  
t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  Thus l i n e a r i z i n g  
( 2 . 2 1 c )  we have :
/ C o n t i n u e d  ove r
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The i n t e r s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  t h r e e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
s c h e d u l e s  i n  F i g u r e  2 . 3  d e t e r m i n e s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i ­
b r i um s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h .  The l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  two exogenous  d i s ­
t u r b a n c e s  examined i n  S e c t i o n  2 . 3 ,  w i l l  be a n a l y s e d  
a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s tem t o  them 
i n  S e c t i o n  2 . 6 .
The l a s t  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ,  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 1 e ) ,  
d e f i n e s  a d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n  i n  t e rms  o f  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  ( p r i c e  l e v e l ) ,  i . e .
p -  m ( 2 .2 2 )
w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s o l u t i o n :
P ( t )  = P(o)e™t  (2 .2 3 )
But s i n c e  M* = M ( t ) / P ( t ) ,  P (o )  becomes M(o)/M*.  Hence,  
e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 3 )  can be w r i t t e n  as
F o o t n o t e  21 c o n t i n u e d  f rom p r e v i o u s  p ag e .
( -  C jjTT + C^)dM - I®.  dB + (1 - C p ) i  I I  . dB = - i dB
From t h e  l o n g - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  ( s ee  a p p e n d i x ) , 
we have :  9B/9B = i  and  9F/9B = 0 .  S u b s t i t u t i n g
above we g e t
( -  C pTT + C^)dM = idB - idB = 0 
Thus t h e  CC* s c h e d u l e  r e m a i n s  unchanged .
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I n P ( t )  = InM(O) + mt - InM* ( 2 . 2 4 )
where  M(0) i s  t h e  n o m in a l  money s t o c k  a t  t ime  t  = 0 ,
t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  we s t a r t e d  f rom.  E q u a t i o n
( 2 . 2 4 ) ,  which  i s  e x a c t l y  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  one d e r i v e d  by
Kour i  ( 1976,  p .  291 ) ,  d e f i n e s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e
p a t h ;  a l o n g - r u n  ex ch an g e  r a t e  ha s  no meaning  s i n c e  t h e
r a t e  i s  s t e a d i l y  d e p r e c i a t i n g .  Note  a l s o ,  t h a t  t h e r e
i s  a one t o  one c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  be tw ee n  t h e  l o n g - r u n
exchange  r a t e  p a t h  and t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ;
t h e  l o we r  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  t h e  " h i g h e r "
t h e  excha nge  r a t e  p a t h .  A f u r t h e r  c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  can
be drawn f rom e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 4 ) ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  l o n g - r u n
e f f e c t  o f  an once  and f o r  a l l  m o n e t a r y  e x p a n s i o n  i s  an
2 2e q u i p r o p o r t i o n a t e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  exchange  r a t e  (and 
p r i c e s ) ,  w h i l e  m a i n t a i n i n g  t h e  same r a t e  o f  d e p r e c i a t i o n  
(m) b u t  f rom a d i f f e r e n t  l e v e l ;  t h u s ,  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  r em a in  u n a f f e c t e d ,  i . e .  t h e  sy s t e m  i s  
n e u t r a l  t o  ch an g e s  i n  t h e  money s u p p l y .  The same l o n g -  
r un  n e u t r a l i t y  r e s u l t  was a l s o  r e a c h e d  by Kour i  (1976)  
and Dornbusch  (1976b).  Dor nb us ch  assumes  a s l u g g i s h  
a d j u s t m e n t  i n  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e s  and t h u s  an i n c r e a s e  i n
22. From ( 2 . 2 4 )  we have
d In  P ( t )  ^ 1 
d I n  M(0)
i.e . an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  no m in a l  money s t o c k  d e p r e c i a t e s  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  i n  t h e  same p r o p o r t i o n .
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money s u p p l y ,  w h i l e  n e u t r a l  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  ha s  r e a l  
e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n .  In ou r  model ,  however ,  an 
i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  money s u p p l y  ( h e l i c o p t e r  money) i s  
n e u t r a l  even i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n ,  as  can  be s e en  from t h e  
s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  summarized i n  Tab l e  2 . 4 ;  
an i n c r e a s e  i n  money s u p p l y  i n c r e a s e s  p r i c e s  ( d e p r e c i a t e s  
t h e  exchange  r a t e )  i m m e d i a t e l y ,  l e a v i n g  t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  
sy s t e m  c o m p l e t e l y  u n a f f e c t e d l
The dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  
t h e  v a r i o u s  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e s  can e a s i l y  be e s t a b ­
l i s h e d ,  as  i n  Kour i  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  f rom t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  b a l a n c e s .  An i n c r e a s e  i n  M*, f o r  
a g i v e n  nomina l  s t o c k ,  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  
has  a p p r e c i a t e d  and i t s  p a t h  ha s  s h i f t e d  downwards;  
a d e c r e a s e  i n  M*, on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  s u g g e s t s  a l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  w i t h  an upward s h i f t  o f  i t s  
p a t h .  The dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i s  
no l o n g e r  i d e n t i f i e d  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s t o c k  o f  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l l y  t r a d e d  d o m e s t i c  b on ds .  As e q u a t i o n  ( 2 .1 5 )  
i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  
d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  and t h e  i s s u e  o f  d o m e s t i c  bonds .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  
t h e  impac t  e f f e c t  on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i s  g i v e n  from 
t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s ,  w h i l e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
e f f e c t  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  exo ­
genous  shock  on t h e  l o n g - r u n  i s s u e  o f  new government  d e b t ,
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as  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  i s  a lw ay s  z e r o .
2 .5  Dynamic S t a b i l i t y
What moves t h e  sy s t em ove r  t ime  i s  t h e  change  
i n  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and  t h e  change  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  abo u t  
i n f l a t i o n .  Dynamic s t a b i l i t y ,  i n  t h i s  c o n t e x t ,  r e q u i r e s  
t h e  c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  t h e  s equ enc e  o f  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  
t o  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  where  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s ,  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  w e a l t h  i n  g e n e r a l ,  a r e  
c o n s t a n t  and whe re  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  b o t h  c o n s t a n t  and 
f u l l y  r e a l i z e d .
Tak i ng  t h e  t o t a l  d i f f e r e n t i a l  o f  ( 2 . 1 6 a )  i n  
r e s p e c t  t o  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
and e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n ,  we have :
- ( 1  - f  )dM + f  dv + f  dTT = 0 (2 .2 5 )
3w Iw Tf
S inc e  dM/dv > 0 and dM/dir < 0 ,  ( 2 . 2 5 )  can  be w r i t t e n  
as  an i m p l i c i t  f u n c t i o n  o f  v and tt, i . e .
M = e ( v ,  t t )  ; 6^ > 0 ,  6^ < 0 (2 .2 6 )
D e f i n i n g  x as  t h e  l o g a r i t h  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  
X  = In  M, we can  t r a n s f o r m  (2 . 2 6 )  i n t o
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X = g ( v ,  t t ) ;  gy > 0,  g^ < 0 (2 . 2 7 )
The a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
w h i ch ,  f rom e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 1 5 ) ,  i s  made up by t h e  accumu­
l a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c ha n ge ,  d o m e s t i c  and  f o r e i g n  b on d s ,  
can  a l s o  be w r i t t e n  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  From 
t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s ,  d e r i v e d  f o r m a l l y  i n  
t h e  a p p e n d i x  and summar i sed  i n  Ta b l e  2 . 4 ,  an i n c r e a s e  
i n  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a p p r e c i a t e s  t h e  exchange  r a t e  
and i n c r e a s e s  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ;  g i v e n  r e s t r i c t i o n s  
( 2 . 9 a )  and  ( 2 . 9 b )  t h e  i n c r e a s e s  i n  v and M i n c r e a s e  
a b s o r p t i o n ,  r e d u c e  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  and 
d e c r e a s e  t h e  i s s u e  o f  d o m e s t i c  b o n d s ,  e x e r t i n g  t h u s  a 
n e g a t i v e  i n f l u e n c e  o v e r  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n ­
c i a l  w e a l t h .  An i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand ,  as  i t  was shown i n  S e c t i o n  2 . 3 ,  l e a d s  t o  an improve ­
ment  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  and t o  an i n c r e a s e d  i s s u e
o f  new d e b t ,  s p e e d i n g  up t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n -
2 3c i a l  w e a l t h .  Hence ,  we can  w r i t e  V as
V  = h ( v ,  t t )  ; hy < 0 ,  h^ > 0 (2 .2 8 )
To i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  t h e  model  t o  
t h e  way e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  fo rmed ,  we a r e  ex am in in g  two
23.  For  a s i m i l a r  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s
o u t  o f  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  s ee  B r a ns o n  (1976)
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t y p e s  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s  g e n e r a t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  - a d a p t i v e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  and  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  - t h e  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  
o f  wh ich  w i l l  p ro d u ce  r e m a r k a b l y  d i f f e r e n t  r e s u l t s  b o t h  
t o  excha nge  r a t e  dynamics  and t o  t h e  dynamic s t a b i l i t y  
o f  t h e  whole  s y s t e m .  Thus ,  we have  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  two 
a l t e r n a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  f o r m a t i o n  o f  e x p e c ­
t a t i o n s  mechanism:
(a)  A d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s :
fr = g (p - i t )  = g (m - X  -  tt )  ( 2 . 2 9 a )
(b) P e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t :  tt = ^  = m - x ( 2 . 2 9b )
(a)  A d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s : The dynamic e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e
sy s t e m  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  i s  d e s c r i b e d  by e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 2 9 a ) ,  
( 2 . 2 7 )  and ( 2 . 2 8 ) ,  i . e .
Tr = g ( m - x - T T ) ;  0 < g  < 1 ( 2 . 3 0 a )
X = g ( v ,  t t )  ; g y  > 0 ,  g ^  < 0 ( 2 . 30 b )
V  = h ( v ,  t t )  ; hy < 0 ,  h^ > 0 ( 2 . 3 0 c )
As i s  p r o v e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  a s u f f i c i e n t  con ­
d i t i o n  f o r  a l o c a l l y  s t a b l e  s o l u t i o n  i s  t h a t  t h e  p r o d u c t  
o f  t h e  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n  e l a s t i c i t y  
o f  t h e  demand f o r  money (g^)  and t h e  sp e e d  o f  r e v i s i o n  o f  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  (g)  i s  l e s s  t h a n  u n i t y  - a c o n d i t i o n  i d e n t i c a l
t o  t h a t  o f  Kour i  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  i . e .
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B'g, < 1 ( 2 . 3 1 )
The c o n v e r g e n c e  t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  
a s y m p t o t i c  i f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  a r e  r e a l  and 
o s c i l l a t i n g  i f  comp lex .  I t  i s  n o t  p o s s i b l e  t hough  t o  
p r o v e  f o r m a l l y  t h e  one o r  t h e  o t h e r  and h e n c e ,  we a r e  
go in g  t o  assume t h r o u g h o u t  o u r  a n a l y s i s  t h a t  t h e  dynamic 
a d j u s t m e n t  i s  a s y m p t o t i c .
F i g u r e  2 .4  d e p i c t s  t h e  p h a s e  d i a g r a m s  un de r  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  The x = o c u rv e  shows c o m b i n a t i o n s  
o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  ( i n  l o g s )  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
f o r  wh ich  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  i s  c o n s t a n t .  S i m i l a r l y ,  
t h e  V = o c u r v e  shows t h e  l o c u s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and 
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a c o n s t a n t  s t o c k  o f  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .  The e q u a t i o n s  o f  b o t h  c u r v e s  a r e  
d e r i v e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x  f rom e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 3 0 ) .  The s l o p e  
o f  t h e  X = o l o c u s  i s  ambiguous ,  s i n c e
dx
dv x=o
( + ) (  + ) ( + ) ( - ) ( - )  ( + ) ( - )
SyCSy-K - - Bgyg^
(+ ) ( + )  ( - )





















u n s t a b l e
X
v=0
0 V( d )





s t a b l e
F i g u r e  2 . 4 .  Phase  d i ag ram u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s
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X = o i s  upwards  s l o p i n g ,  b u t  i f  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  s i g n  i s  
r e v e r s e d ,  i t s  s l o p e  can be p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e .  D e v i a t i o n s  
o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  f rom t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  
a lw ays  s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g  ( v e r t i c a l  a r r o w s ) , s i n c e
9x
9x v = c o n s t
(+ ) (+ )  ( - )  
( g y - \  - eg^)
( - )  c + )
< O ( 2 . 3 3 )
g i v e n  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  ( 2 . 3 1 ) .  The s l o p e  o f  t h e  v = o 
c u r v e  and t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  a r row s  depend  on 
i n e q u a l i t y  ( 2 . 3 2b )  a s  w e l l ,  f o r
dx
dv












(2 .3 4 a )
dv










g  >  &v <
TT
TT
( 2 . 34 b )
F i g .  2 . 4  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  f u l l  r an g e  o f  p o s s i b i l ­
i t i e s .  I f  i n e q u a l i t y  ( 2 . 3 2 b )  h o l d s ,  t h e  s l o p e s  o f  b o t h
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X = o and v = o a r e  p o s i t i v e  and d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  f i n ­
a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f rom i t s  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  c u m u l a t i v e .  The 
V = o c u rv e  can  be e i t h e r  f l a t t e r  ( F i g .  2 . 4 ( a ) )  o r  s t e e p e r  
( F i g .  2 . 4 ( b ) )  t h a n  t h e  x = o l o c u s .  The l a t t e r  c a s e ,  
however ,  i s  u n a c c e p t a b l e  b e c a u s e ,  as  t h e  v e r t i c a l  and 
h o r i z o n t a l  a r ro w s  show, i t  i m p l i e s  an u n s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m .  I f  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  s i g n  i n  ( 2 .32b )  i s  r e v e r s e d ,  
t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  v = o c u r v e  becomes n e g a t i v e  and d e v i a t i o n s  
o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f rom i t s  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  s e l f -  
c o r r e c t i n g ,  w h i l e  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  x = o l o c u s  can be 
p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e .  Diagrams c ,  d and e o f  F i g .  2 .4  
i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  s u b c a s e s . S u b c a s e  d,  
t h o u g h ,  s h o u l d  be d i s m i s s e d ,  f o r  i t  i m p l i e s  an u n s t a b l e  
l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m .
The X = 0 and v = o c u r v e s  do n o t  c o i n c i d e  w i t h  
t h e  MM* and CC* s c h e d u l e s  o f  F i g .  2 . 3 .  Along t h e  MM* 
s c h e d u l e  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  c o n s t a n t  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  
a r e  f u l f i l l e d ,  i . e .  t t  = m. The CC* s c h e d u l e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  
hand ,  shows c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  c o n s t a n t  r e a l  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  and e x p e c t a t i o n s .  Along 
CC*, t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  
o f f s e t  by t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  so 
t h a t  n e t  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  a r e  z e r o .  The r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s
24.  The p rob l ems  o f  m u l t i p l e  e q u i l i b r i a  a r e  assumed away.
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o f  t h e  two s c h e d u l e s ,  u n l i k e  t h e  x = o and t h e  v = o 
c u r v e s ,  depend  on endogenous  v a r i a b l e s :  MM* depends  on tt ,
w h i l e  ch ang es  i n  tt , F and B s h i f t  t h e  CC* s c h e d u l e .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  
as  i s  shown i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n ,  t o  enhance  t h e  i n t u i t i v e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  o u r  a n a l y s i s ,  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  
t h e  sy s t e m  to  exogenous  ch an ge s  i s  f i r s t  f o r m a l l y  d e r i v e d  
i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x  and t h e n  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  M, v space  
a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  t h r e e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  s c h e d u l e s  MM*,
CC* and FF*.
(b) P e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t : The a s s u m p t i o n  o f  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t
a p p e a r s  u s u a l l y  i n  two f o r m s :  p e r f e c t  myopic f o r e s i g h t
and l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .  The fo r m er  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  
economic  a g e n t s  c an  s u c c e s s f u l l y  p r e d i c t  t h e  r e l e v a n t  
e conomic  v a r i a b l e  i n  e v e r y  s u c c e s s i v e  p e r i o d .  In  our  
model  f o r  ex amp le ,  p e r f e c t  myopic  f o r e s i g h t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
p e o p l e  can  f u l l y  p r e d i c t  t h e  r a t e  o f  exchange  r a t e  de p ­
r e c i a t i o n  ( e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n )  a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t i m e ,  
i . e .  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 9 b )  h o l d s .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  a s s u m p t io n  
o f  p e r f e c t  myopic  f o r e s i g h t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  economic a g e n t s  
know t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y .
L on g - ru n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  means t h a t  
p e o p l e  o v e r  and  above  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  t h e y  have  u n d e r  
myopic  f o r e s i g h t ,  a l s o  know t h e  l o n g - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  
e f f e c t s ;  t h u s  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  exogenous  
shock  p r o d u c e s  an i m pa c t  e f f e c t  d i f f e r e n t  e i t h e r  i n  
m a g n i t u d e  o r  i n  d i r e c t i o n  o f  change  f rom t h e  l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t .
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economic  a g e n t s  a d j u s t  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  
r e d u c i n g  t h u s  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  b e tw een  impac t  and l o n g - r u n  
e f f e c t s ,  w h i l e  a t  t h e  same t im e  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  
f u l f i l l e d  a t  e v e r y  p o i n t  i n  t i m e .  Long- run  p e r f e c t  f o r e ­
s i g h t  i s  t h e  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  t h e  r a t i o n a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a s s u m p t i o n  f o r  s t o c h a s t i c  mod e l s ,  where  
economic  a g e n t s ’ s u b j e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  economic  v a r i a b l e  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h e  o b j e c t i v e  
d i s t r i b u t i o n ;  h e n c e ,  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t
v a r i a b l e  d i f f e r s  f rom i t s  a c t u a l  v a l u e  o n l y  by an e r r o r
2 5t e r m ,  o r t h o g o n a l  t o  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  i t s e l f .  In  a 
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  model  t h e r e  a r e  no e r r o r  t e rms  and e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  and a c t u a l  v a l u e s  o f  economic  v a r i a b l e s  c o i n c i d e  
w i t h  t h e  means o f  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  p r o b a b i l i t y  d i s t r i b ­
u t i o n s .  In  t e r m s  o f  o u r  mode l ,  u n d e r  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e  
s i g h t ,  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 .2 9 b )  s t i l l  h o l d s .
The dynamic  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  sy s tem u n d e r  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t  ( b o t h  myopic  and l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t )  i s  
d e s c r i b e d  by e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 2 9 b ) ,  ( 2 . 2 7 )  and ( 2 . 2 8 ) .  
S u b s t i t u t i n g  t h e  f i r s t  i n t o  t h e  o t h e r  two,  we d e r i v e  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  s y s t e m  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s :
X = g ( v ,  m -  x ) ; gy > 0 ,  g^ < 0 ( 2 . 3 5 a )
V = h ( v ,  m - x ) ; h^ < 0 ,  h^ > 0 ( 2 .3 5 b )
25. For  a c r i t i c a l  s u r v e y  o f  t h e  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
mode l s  w i t h  an e x p l i c i t  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  
r e q u i r e m e n t s ,  s e e  S c h i l l e r  (1978)  and Fr iedman ( 19 79 ) .
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As i n  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
r o o t s  o f  t h e  above  s y s t e m ,  l i n e a r i s e d  a round  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  
s t a t e ,  a r e  r e a l  and o f  o p p o s i t e  s i g n s  which  i s  a s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  t o  be l o c a l l y  a s a d d l e  
p o i n t .
The p h a s e  d i ag r a m  u n d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  i s  
d e p i c t e d  i n  F i g .  2 . 5 .  The x = o and v = o l o c i  a r e  d e r i v e d  
from e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 3 5 a )  and (2 .35 b )  r e s p e c t i v e l y  and have  
t h e  same i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  a s  i n  F i g .  2 . 4 .  The s l o p e  o f  t h e  
V  = o c u rv e  and  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  a r ro w s  
a r e  a g a i n  amb iguous ,  g i v e n  by t h e  same e x p r e s s i o n s  as  u n d e r  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( s e e  ap p en d ix  f o r  d e t a i l s ) . T h e r e  
i s ,  however ,  a n o t a b l e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  
o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  The x = o l o c u s  i s  now un am bi g ­
u o u s l y  upwards  s l o p i n g ,  s i n c e
dx
dv
= g > 0 ( 2 . 3 6 a )
X  = o
Moreover ,  u n d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  f rom t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  become c u m u l a t i v e ;  
i n i t i a l  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  t e n d  t o  be e x a c e r b a t e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  




= - —  > 0  (2 . 36b)





F i g u r e  2 . 5 .  Phase  d i ag ram un d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t
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The r e a s o n  f o r  t h i s ,  i s  t h a t  t o  i n d u ce  p e o p l e  
t o  h o l d  a l a r g e r  ( l ow er )  money s t o c k ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n f l a t i o n  
- wh i ch  i s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  c o s t  o f  h o l d i n g  money - has  t o  
d e c l i n e  ( i n c r e a s e ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  r i s e  
( f a l l )  a t  a f a s t e r  r a t e  t h a n  b e f o r e ,  d e v i a t i n g  even f u r t h e r  
f rom e q u i l i b r i u m .
The s l o p e  o f  t h e  v = o c u r v e  and t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  a r row s  depend  on i n e q u a l i t y  ( 2 . 3 2 b ) .
F i g .  2 . 5  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  two s u b c a s e s .  I n  d i ag ra m  ( b ) , 
i n e q u a l i t y  ( 2 . 3 2b )  h o l d s  and v = o i s  p o s i t i v e l y  s l o p i n g  
b u t  f l a t t e r  t h a n  t h e  x = o c u r v e ;  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f rom i t s  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  s e l f  - 
c o r r e c t i n g .  In  d i ag ra m  ( a ) ,  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  s i g n  o f  ( 2 . 32b )  
i s  r e v e r s e d  and t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  v = o l o c u s  becomes 
n e g a t i v e .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  f rom i t s  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  c u m u l a t i v e .  I n  b o t h  
c a s e s ,  t h ou g h ,  we have  a s a d d l e  p o i n t  e q u i l i b r i u m .
Under  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  we hav e  i n d e t e r m i n a c y  
( t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  a s a d d l e  p o i n t ) ; f rom 
any i n i t i a l  exchange  r a t e  t h e r e  i s  a r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  p a t h  such  t h a t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  
c o n t i n u o u s l y  f u l f i l l e d  and a l l  m a r k e t s  a r e  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
T he r e  i s ,  however ,  o n l y  one p a t h  t h a t  c an  t a k e  t h e  sy s t em 
to  i t s  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  ( t h e  QQ t r a j e c t o r y ) .  I t  
i s  e x a c t l y  a t  t h i s  j u n c t u r e  t h a t  p e r f e c t  myopic  f o r e s i g h t
26.  For  a more d e t a i l e d  a n a l y s i s  od t h i s  phenomenon i n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  m o d e l s ,  s e e  S t e i n  ( 1 9 7 0 ) ,  Ch. 1.
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and l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  r e a l l y  d i f f e r .  I f  we 
p o s t u l a t e  s i m p l y  myopic  f o r e s i g h t ,  t h e  economy can embark 
on t h e  e q u i l i b r a t i n g  p a t h  o n l y  by c h a n c e .  With l o n g - r u n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  however ,  f o r  a g i v e n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n ­
a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (Vq ) p e o p l e  on t h e  impac t  o f  any exogenous  
sho ck ,  a d j u s t  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  f a s h i o n  e x p l a i n e d  
above  so t h a t  by a f f e c t i n g  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  s h i f t  
t h e  economy on t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  QQ t h a t  l e a d s  t o
t h e  new l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  The p rob l em o f  i n d e t e r m i n a c y ,
27w e l l  known i n  mode l s  o f  money and g r ow th ,  became r e c e n t l y  
a f a m i l i a r  f e a t u r e  i n  mode l s  o f  exchange  r a t e  dy n a mi cs ,  
e . g .  Dornbusch  (1976b)  and Kour i  ( 1 97 6 ) .  E t h i e r  (1979)  
p r o v i d e s  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  i n  mode l s  i n c o r p o r a t i n g  t h e  a s s e t  ma r ke t  
a p p r o a c h .
By a ssuming  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  
( r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s ) , we a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  i g n o r i n g  t h e  
d i v e r g i n g  dynamic  p a t h s  and c o n c e n t r a t i n g  on t h e  s t a b ­
i l i z i n g  QQ t r a j e c t o r y .  An i m p o r t a n t  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h i s  
a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h ,  e x t e n s i v e  u s e  o f  which  i s  g o i n g  t o  be 
made i n  t h e  s e c t i o n  on t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  
o f  t h i s  and  t h e  n e x t  two c h a p t e r s ,  i s  t h a t  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  a lways  moves m o n o t o n i c a l l y  and i n  t h e  same 
d i r e c t i o n  as  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .
27. For  a d i s c u s s i o n  on t h e s e  p ro b l em s  i n  model s  o f  
money and g r o w t h ,  s e e  Hahn ( 1 96 9 ) ,  Brock (1975)  




F i g u r e  2 . 6 Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sys tem to  an exogenous  r i s e  
i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  unde r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .
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2 .6  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t e m  t o  exogenous  changes
The dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  t o  t h e  exogenous 
s h o c k s ,  t h e  imp ac t  e f f e c t s  o f  which  were  d i s c u s s e d  in  
S e c t i o n  2 . 3 ,  do ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  r e f l e c t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  
dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  t h e  two e x p e c t a t i o n s  g e n e r a t i o n  
m e c h a n i s m s .
Under  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  an exogenous  
sh o c k  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  u n j u s t i f i e d  by e x i s t i n g  economic 
c o n d i t i o n s ,  h a s  no mean ing ;  h e n c e .  F i g u r e  2 .6  a n a l y s e s  
t h e  dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  o n l y .
S t a r t i n g  f rom an i n i t i a l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o s i t i o n  ( p o i n t  A) ,  t h e  exogenous  r i s e  i n  i n f l a t i o n a r y  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  p r o d u c e s  an i n s t a n t a n e o u s  exchange  r a t e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  i n d u c e s  an  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h ,  i . e .  v > o ,  and g i v e s  r i s e  t o  a c u r r e n t  a cc ou n t  
s u r p l u s ,  f o r  a g i v e n  nomina l  money s t o c k  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h .  The l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  d i s t u r b e d  and 
t h e  economy moves t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
( p o i n t  B) , c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  new e x p e c t a t i o n s .  The 
exch an ge  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  r e d u c e s  i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y  t h e  
s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  t o  , w h i l e  t h e  s t o c k  o f  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  r e m a in s  t h e  same.  Over  t i m e ,  
ho wev e r ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  t o  r i s e  a g a i n  t o  t h e i r  
p r e v i o u s  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  l e v e l ,  s i n c e  t h e  change  i n
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e x p e c t a t i o n s  r e p r e s e n t s a  s p e c u l a t i v e  e r r o r  t h a t  does  n o t
a f f e c t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  Hence,  t h e  exchange
r a t e ,  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  which  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e
2 8r e s p o n s e  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  i s  a p p r e c i a t i n g  f rom 
p o i n t  B onwards  t i l l  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  r e - e s t a b l i s h e d  
T r a j e c t o r y  BCA i s  t h e  dynamic  p a t h  t h a t  b o t h  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  
and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f o l l o w  to  r e a c h  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l ­
i b r i u m  a g a i n .  N o t e ,  t h a t  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n i t i a l l y  
r i s e s  and f rom p o i n t  C onwards  s t a r t s  f a l l i n g  a g a i n  t o  i t s  
i n i t i a l  l e v e l .
The c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  moves i n t o  s u r p l u s  on t h e  
impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  c h a n g e ,  f a l l i n g  g r a d u a l l y  u n d e r  
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  an a p p r e c i a t i n g  exchange  r a t e  and a 
r i s i n g  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ;  i t  even  moves 
i n t o  d e f i c i t  ( p o i n t  C onwards )  r e t u r n i n g  f i n a l l y  t o  i t s  
i n i t i a l  p o s i t i o n  a t  p o i n t  A. The n e t  sum o f  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s e s  and d e f i c i t s  added t o  t h e  sum o f  n e t
28.  The exchange  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  l o n g -  
r u n  p a t h  i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  i t  i s  e i t h e r  f a l l i n g  i n  
a b s o l u t e  t e rm s  o r  i n c r e a s i n g  a t  a l owe r  r a t e  t h a n  
t h e  money s t o c k  ( n om in a l )  i s  growing  (m) - m i s  
e q u a l  t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  r a t e  o f  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c ­
i a t i o n  - so t h a t  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  r i s i n g .
See t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  f o r  a d e t a i l e d  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  
exchange  r a t e  dynamics  and t h e  a p pe n d i x  f o r  t h e  
f o rm a l  d e r i v a t i o n .
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29c han ge s  i n  gove rnmen t  bonds sh o u l d  be z e r o ,  a s  t h e  
s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  
r e t u r n s  t o  i t s  p r e v i o u s  l e v e l .
I f  i n s t e a d  o f  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  w e a l t h  
h o l d e r s  a r e  assumed t o  p o s s e s s  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t
29.  As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  r a t e s  
o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s :
x ( t )  = A ^ ( x ( t )  - x) 
( " )  ( " )
_g„(^ 2 - \  • gy
( - )  (?) ( + ) ( + ) ( + )
( it -  T T ) e ^ 2 ^  O
v ( t )  = X ^ ( v ( t )  -  V * )  +  -  i r )e^2^
( - )  (?)  (+) (+)
where  and a r e  t h e  two n e g a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
r o o t s  and  x = InM*. Given t h e  p h a se  d i a g r a m  a n a l y s i s
o f  F i g u r e  2 . 4 ,  p o i n t  B l i e s  be low t h e  x = o c u r v e ,  so 
t h a t  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  i n c r e a s i n g  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  ( u n l e s s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  i s  o s c i l l a t o r y )  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  i n c r e a s e s  i n i t i a l l y  and f a l l s  a f t e r w a r d s .
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such  exogenous  shock s  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  a v o i d e d  and 
t h e  e xch an ge  r a t e  i s  c u s h i o n e d  a g a i n s t  u n r e a s o n a b l e  
s p e c u l a t i v e  e r r o r s .
The dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  t o  an 
exogenous  f a l l  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  
exchange  r i s k  r e l a t i v e  t o  do m es t i c  money ( u ) , shown in  
F i g u r e  2 . 7 ,  i l l u s t r a t e s  q u i t e  c l e a r l y  t h e  s e n s i t i v i t y  o f  
t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  t o  t h e  way e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  
f o rmed .  S t a r t i n g  f rom an i n i t i a l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
a t  E^,  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u s h i f t s  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  
s t a t e  t o  E2 whe re  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  i n c r e a s e d  
and r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  r e d u c e d ,  r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  
i n c r e a s e d  r i s k  o f  h o l d i n g  d o m es t i c  money r e l a t i v e  t o  
f o r e i g n  money.
Under  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t h e  im pa c t  e f f e c t  
o f  a f a l l  i n  u i s  a r e a r r a n g e m e n t  o f  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o  
h o l d i n g s  so t h a t  t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
r e l a t i v e  t o  d o m e s t i c  r e a l  money i s  h i g h e r  t h a n  b e f o r e .
I n t h e  s h o r t - r u n ,  however ,  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  c a n n o t  i n c r e a s e  
t h e i r  h o l d i n g s  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y  
and h e n c e ,  a t  t h e  new s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e i r  a s s e t  p r e f e r ­
en ce s  ( p r o d u c e d  by t h e  f a l l  i n  u) t h e y  have  e x c e s s  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s ;  t h e i r  e f f o r t s  t o  d i s p o s e  o f  t h e  e x c e s s  
money s t o c k  d r i v e  p r i c e s  up ( t h e  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e ­
c i a t e s  i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y ) , r e d u c i n g  t h e  v a l u e  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  w e a l t h .  The r e d u c t i o n  i n  w e a l t h  








F i g u r e  2. 7 Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s tem t o  an exogenous  
f a l l  u ,  b o t h  un de r  a d a p t i v e  and r a t i o n a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s .
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s u r p l u s ,  i n i t i a t i n g  a p r o c e s s  o f  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .  I n  c o n t r a s t  t o  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t ,  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  a r e  g i v e n  by 
t h e  p a s t  h i s t o r y  o f  p r i c e s ,  and h e n c e ,  t h e  imp ac t  e f f e c t s  
o f  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u a r e  t h o s e  a n a l y s e d  i n  
S e c t i o n  2 . 3 .  The v e r y  f a c t  t h a t  i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  c o n s t r a i n e d  by t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k  o f  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  v^* i n  F i g u r e  2 . 9 ,  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
t h e  h o l d i n g s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  have  t o  f a l l  c o n s i ­
d e r a b l y  more on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change  t h a n  
i n  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  a t  E2 , where  t h e  l e v e l  o f  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  h i g h e r .  Thus i n  t h e  s h o r t -  
r un  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  d r a s t i c a l l y  r e d u c e d  below 
t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  ( p o i n t  E ^ ) , f o r c i n g  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  t o  o v e r s h o o t  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  
o v e r s h o o t i n g  un d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i s  shown by 
t h e  n e g a t i v e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  l o n g - r u n  and  s h o r t -  
r un  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  o f  a f a l l  i n  u on r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s ,  i . e .
dM
du
dM dM ^ M dP
LR dü SR du LR V ' du SR
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From p o i n t  onwa rd s ,  t h e  economy,  f o l l o w i n g  
t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  £ ^ £ 2 » a p p ro a c h e s  t h e  new 
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  ( t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  i s  assumed asymp­
t o t i c ) .  On t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  ch ang e ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  moves i n t o  s u r p l u s ,  i n i t i a t i n g  a p r o c e s s  o f  accum­
u l a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  (v > o ) . Given t h e  pha se  d i agram 
a n a l y s i s  o f  F i g u r e  2 . 4 ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  p o i n t  l i e s  
be low t h e  v = o l o c u s  and t h a t  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  
m o n o t o n i c a l l y  i n c r e a s i n g  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s .  
The dynamic  e v e o l u t i o n  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  however ,  
depend s  on two c o u n t e r a c t i n g  f o r c e s :  on t h e  one hand ,
g i v e n  t h e  e r r o r - l e a r n i n g  mechani sm,  t h e  i n i t i a l  exchange  
r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  w i l l  l e a d  t o  an i n c r e a s e  i n  e x p e c t e d  
i n f l a t i o n  ( tt r i s e s )  , wh i ch  i n  t u r n  t e n d s  t o  d e c r e a s e  r e a l  
b a l a n c e s  even  f u r t h e r .  The i n c r e a s i n g  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n ­
a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  on t h e  o t h e r  han d ,  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  demand f o r  
a l l  a s s e t s .
I f  t h e  f i r s t  e f f e c t  p r e v a i l s  o ve r  t h e  s eco n d^ ^ .
30.  A n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  t h i s  i s  t h a t  
p o i n t  E. l i e s  above t h e  x=o c u r v e  i n  f i g u r e  2 . 4 .  F o r ­
m a l l y ,  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  r a t e s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  
a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( s e e  a p pe n d i x  
f o r  d e t a i l s )  :
x ( t )  = ( x ( t )  - x)
( “ ) ( " )
X-)
(?) (?) (+) (?)
(Vo*-Vi*)e^2^
( - )
v ( t )  = (v( t ) -Vj^*)  -  (X j - h^ )  (v^*-Vj^*)e^2^
( - )  (?)  ( - )
where  x = l i # ^ * .
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r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  d e c r e a s e  even f u r t h e r  t h an  a t  t h e  impac t  
e f f e c t .  Over  t i m e ,  however ,  as  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  c a t c h  up w i t h  
t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  s t a r t  r i s i n g  a g a i n ,  a l o n g  w i t h  
t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .
Under  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  however ,  t h e  p i c t u r e  
i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  Economic a g e n t s  p r e d i c t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and t h e  e n s u i n g  l o n g - r u n  e x ­
change  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  and knowing t h a t  t h e  impac t  e f f e c t  o f  
a f a l l  i n  u i s  t o  d e c r e a s e  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  be low t h e i r  l o n g -  
r u n  p a t h  ( i . e .  d e p r e c i a t i n g  t o o  much) ,  t h e y  a r e  l e d  t o  e x p e c t  
an exchange  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n .  T h i s  change  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
wh ich  o c c u r s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  t h e  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e ,  
c u s h i o n s  t h e  f a l l  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and m o d e r a t e s  t h e  
exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  ( p o i n t  E ^ ' ) .  Thus,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  
i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  
on t h e  impa c t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change  i n  u a r e  lower^^
31.  By s o l v i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  d e s c r i b i n g  
t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  u n d e r  t h e  two e x p e c t a t i o n s  
mechan i sms ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  b e tw een  t h e  s t o c k  of  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  ( i n  l o g s )  u n de r  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a ­
t i o n s  (Xq ’ ) and u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s
(x^) a t  t im e  t  = o ( i m p a c t  e f f e c t ) ,  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  i . e
( + ) ( - )  ( - )
g„ - • A
( X»'  -  x j  = -  -------------------------  ( v  * -  V , * )  > 0
° °  (1 + g^X) ^
( - ) ( - )  (")
See a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n .
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Under  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  however ,  t h e  
p i c t u r e  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t .  Economic a g e n t s  p r e d i c t  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  r e d u c t i o n  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and t h e  e n su i n g  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  and knowing t h a t  t h e  
impac t  e f f e c t  o f  a f a l l  i n  u i s  t o  d e c r e a s e  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  be low t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  w i t h  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h  ( i . e .  d e p r e c i a t i n g  
t oo  m u c h ) , t h e y  a r e  l e d  t o  e x p e c t  an exchange  r a t e  a p p re c  
i a t i o n .  T h i s  change  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  which  o c c u r s  s im­
u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  t h e  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e ,  c u s h i o n s  t h e  
f a l l  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and m o d e r a t e s  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  ( p o i n t  E ^ ' ) .  Thus ,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  
on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change  i n  u a r e  l ower^^
31.  By s o l v i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  d e s c r i b i n g  
t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  u n d e r  t h e  two e x p e c t a t i o n s  
mechani sms ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  s t o c k  o f  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  ( i n  l o g s )  u nd e r  r a t i o n a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( x ^ ' )  and u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s
(x^)  a t  t im e  t  = o ( im p a c t  e f f e c t ) ,  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  i . e
(+) ( - )  ( - )
g„ • g,r • ^
( x  ' -  X  )   ------------------------------------------ ( V  * -  V , * )  > 0
° ° (1 + °  1
See a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n .
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t h a n  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( E ^ ' > E^) . The 
c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  t h o u g h  i s  l o w e r ,  as  t h e  f a l l  
i n  u i s  a ccompanied  by an e x p e c t e d  exchange  r a t e  
a p p r e c i a t i o n  t h a t  m o d e r a t e s  t h e  impac t  e f f e c t ;  ov e r  
t i m e ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  r e m a in s  i n  s u r p l u s  t i l l  t h e  
new l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .
With  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  t h e  economy 
i s  s h i f t e d  on t h e  e q u i l i b r a t i n g  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  
p a t h  E ^ ’E2 ( t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  o f  t h e  QQ t r a j e c t o r y  o f  
F i g u r e  2 .5 )  t h a t  would  l e a d ,  t h r o u g h  a g r a d u a l  and 
mo no ton i e  i n c r e a s e  i n  b o t h  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  t o  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .
F o r m a l l y ,  b o t h  a s s e t s  a r e  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  r i s i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  s i n c e ,  f rom t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 3 5 )  we have ( s ee  ap pe nd ix  
f o r  d e t a i l s ) :
x ( t )  = X ( x ( t )  - x) > 0 ( 2 . 3 8 a )
( " )  ( " )
v ( t )  = X (v* - v * ) e ^ ^  > 0 ( 2 .3 8 b )
( - )  ( - )
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where  X i s  t h e  n e g a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t .  Hence ,  
d u r i n g  t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  w i l l  be  
g r a d u a l l y  a p p r e c i a t i n g  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h  
t i l l  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  
t o  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  
f o r e i g n  exchange  r i s k ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  mechanism o f  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r m a t i o n ,  i n v o l v e s  an o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  and t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ;  
t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  i s  
a lways  i n  s u r p l u s .
The m a j o r  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  a d j u s t m e n t  be tw een  
t h e  two e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechanisms  i s  t h a t  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  
o f  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  w i t h  t h e  knowledge o f  t h e  
s h o r t - r u n  and l o n g - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  t h a t  i t  
e n t a i l s ,  c u s h i o n s  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  exogenous  c h a n g e s ,  
r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  on a s s e t  
h o l d i n g s ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  and t h e  economy i n  g e n e r a l ,  
m o d e r a t i n g  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  from t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i ­
b r i um p o s i t i o n .  . The f u n d a m e n ta l  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  dynamic 
a d j u s t m e n t  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  and r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i s  
r e f l e c t e d  i n  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o v e r  t im e  o f  t h e  whole  sy s t e m  
( n o t i c e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  a r r ow s  a t  
p o i n t s  E ^ ’ and o f  F i g u r e  2 . 7 ) .  While  u n d e r  r a t i o n a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  
m o n o t o n i c a l l y  i n c r e a s i n g  t o w a rd s  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  
w i t h  t h e  exchange  r a t e  e x h i b i t i n g  an unambiguous  g r a d u a l
70
a p p r e c i a t i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h ,  un de r  ad ap ­
t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  we have  i n i t i a l l y  an even f u r t h e r  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  and a f u r t h e r  exchange  r a t e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  b e f o r e  e v e n t u a l l y ,  as s p e c u l a t o r s  c a t c h  up 
w i t h  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e y  s t a r t  r i s i n g  and a p p r e c i a ­
t i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
I t  i s  t o  be e x p e c t e d  t h a t  be c a u s e  o f  t h e  c o r r e c t  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  and  t h e  c u s h i o n i n g  t h a t  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t s  p r o v i d e s  t o  t h e  sy s t e m ,  t h e  sp e ed  o f  dynamic 
a d j u s t m e n t  m ig h t  be g r e a t e r  t h a n  unde r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c ­
t a t i o n s  and h e n c e ,  i t  would l e a d  t o  a s h o r t e n i n g  o f  t he  
a d j u s t m e n t  p e r i o d .
2 .7  Exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  and t h e  a s s e t  ma r ke t  app roa ch
Dur ing  t h e  r e c e n t  p e r i o d  o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange  
r a t e s ,  1973 onw ards ,  i t  h a s  n o t a b l y  been  o b s e r v e d  t h a t  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  e x c e s s i v e  s h o r t - r u n  
v a r i a b i l i t y ,  p o s i n g  some t r o u b l i n g  and s t i l l  p u z z l i n g  
a s p e c t s  o f  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange  r a t e s .  
F r i edman ( 1 9 5 3 ) ,  one o f  t h e  e a r l y  s u p p o r t e r s  o f  a f l e x i b l e  
exchange  r a t e s  r e g i m e ,  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  exchange  r a t e  
v a r i a b i l i t y  s h o u l d  n o t  s u r p r i s e  us  s i n c e  i t  would s im p ly  
r e f l e c t  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  u n d e r l y i n g  economic  f o r c e s .  
The m o n e t a r y  model s  o f  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  ( such  
as  F r e n k e l  (1976)  and Myrhman ( 1 9 7 6 ) ) ,  as  B i l s o n  (1979) 
a r g u e s ,  a p p e a r  t o  be u n a b l e  t o  a cc o u n t  f o r  t h e  c u r r e n t  
s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r
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somewhat  l o n g - r u n  n a t u r e .  In  a r e c e n t  s u r v e y  o f  t h e
r e l e v a n t  t h e o r e t i c a l  and e m p i r i c a l  l i t e r a t u r e ,  S c h a d l e r
(1977,  p .  225) n o t e s :
" . . .  t h e  l a s t  f o u r  y e a r s ’ e x p e r i e n c e  w i t h  
f l o a t i n g  r a t e s  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  t h e r e  may be 
more t o  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  t h a n  t h e  
s i m p l e  m o n e t a r i s t  a rgument  i m p l i e s .  There  
i s  f o r  examp le ,  c o n c e r n  t h a t  v a r i a t i o n s  o f  
f l o a t i n g  exchange  r a t e s  have  been  l a r g e r  t h a n  
t h o s e  o f  d e t e r m i n i n g  f a c t o r s .  A l s o ,  ch anges  
i n  exchange  r a t e s  have  o f t e n  ex cee de d  d i f ­
f e r e n c e s  be tween  c o u n t r i e s ’ r a t e s  o f  
i n f l a t i o n . ’’
The economic  c o s t s  o f  t h e s e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n d i c a t e  t h e i r  
i m p o r t a n c e  and p u t  t h e  p r ob l em i n  p e r s p e c t i v e .  The main 
c o s t s  o f  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e s  v a r i a b i l i t y ,  S c h a d l e r  
( 1 9 77 ) ,  A r t u s  and C r o c k e t t  (1978) and A r t u s  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  can  
be summar i sed  as  f o l l o w s :  F i r s t ,  a r i s e  i n  t h e  c o s t s  o f
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  r i s k  o f  
exchange  r a t e  ch ang es  d u r i n g  t h e  c o n t r a c t  p e r i o d ;  t h e s e  
c o s t s ,  how eve r ,  a r e  n o t  so s e r i o u s  as  was i n i t i a l l y  t h o u g h t  
and ,  m o r e o v e r ,  h e d g i n g  mechanisms e x i s t  a t  m o d e r a t e  c o s t s  
( C r o c k e t t  and G o l d s t e i n ,  1976) .
Second ,  more p r o l o n g e d  d e v i a t i o n s  f rom t h e  l o n g -  
r un  e q u i l i b r i u m  exchange  r a t e  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  p r o d u c e  m i s -  
a l l o c a t i o n  o f  r e s o u r c e s  on a w o r l d  s c a l e ,  c r e a t e  u n c e r ­
t a i n t y  and weaken i n c e n t i v e s  f o r  a c t i v i t i e s  i n  i n t e r ­
n a t i o n a l  t r a n s a c t i o n s  u n l e s s  p r o p e r  c o m pe n sa t i on  i s  p r o ­
v i d e d .
T h i r d ,  and  more s e r i o u s ,  a c c o r d i n g  t o  A r t u s  and 
C r o c k e t t  ( 1 9 7 8 ) ,  a r e  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  c o s t s  o f  e v e n t u a l l y
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c o r r e c t i n g  a d i s e q u i l i b r i u m .  These i n v o l v e  s h i f t s  o f  
r e s o u r c e s  f rom t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  o f  t r a d e d  t o  t h e  p r o d u c t i o n  
o f  n o n - t r a d e d  goods o r  v i c e  v e r s a ,  w i t h  c o n s e q u e n t  i n  
a w or ld  o f  r i g i d i t i e s  t r a n s i t i o n a l  unemployment  o f  
b o t h  l a b o u r  and c a p i t a l  which  e n t a i l  c o n s i d e r a b l e  
s o c i a l  and p o l i t i c a l  c o s t s .  Changes i n  t h e  d o m e s t i c  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  p r o d u c t i o n  w i l l  a l s o  a f f e c t  f o r e i g n  com­
p e t i t o r s  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  r e l a t i v e  s h a r e s  i n  wo r l d  
m a r k e t s  a r e  a f f e c t e d .
F o u r t h ,  t h e  p o s s i b l e  i n c o m p a t i b i l i t i e s  i n  
n a t i o n a l  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  r e c o n ­
c i l i n g  m echan i sm s ,  m ig h t  p r od u ce  p o l i t i c a l  c o n s e q u e n c e s  
o f  u n q u a n t i f i a b l e  c o s t s .  F i n a l l y ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  g i v e  r i s e  t o  d o m e s t i c  p r i c e  
v a r i a b i l i t y ;  and even  more s e r i o u s l y ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  d o m e s t i c  m o n e t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  a r e  n o t  c a p a b l e  o f  
c o n t r o l l i n g  t h e  money s u p p l y  be c a u s e  o f  e conomic ,  s o c i a l  
and p o l i t i c a l  c o s t s ,  exchange  r a t e  changes  may be s e l f ­
v a l i d a t i n g  l e a d i n g  t o  i n f l a t i o n  o r  d e f l a t i o n  r e s p e c ­
t i v e l y .
The s i m p l e  m o ne t a ry  a p p ro a c h  t o  exchange  r a t e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  somewhat  l o n g - r u n  n a t u r e  
c a n n o t  a d e q u a t e l y  e x p l a i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
v a r i a b i l i t y .  The a s s e t  m a rk e t  a p p r o a c h ,  how eve r ,  i s  
c u r r e n t l y  t h e  p r e v a i l i n g  f ramework i n  which  s h o r t - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  r e c e i v e s  a more s a t i s f a c t o r y  
e x p l a n a t i o n .  The exchange  r a t e ,  as  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r i c e
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o f  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  i n  t h e  
s h o r t - r u n  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  i n  t h e  a s s e t  m a r ke t  by a s s u m p t i o n ,  
so t h a t  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k  o f  a s s e t s  a r e  w i l l i n g l y  h e l d  
by a s s e t  h o l d e r s  a t  e v e r y  p o i n t  i n  t i m e .  F o r m a l l y ,  
t h i s  i s  shown i n  our  model  by t h e  r e c u r s i v e n e s s  o f  
m a t r i x  i n  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 1 7 ) ;  changes  i n  t h e  goods 
s e c t o r  a f f e c t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  ove r  t ime  t h r o u g h  t h e
32a c c u m u l a t i o n  o r  d e c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  
u n l e s s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  t h e y  a f f e c t  e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( e . g .  p e r ­
f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ) .
Hence ,  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  i s  s i m p ly  due 
t o  ch ang es  i n  a l l  t h o s e  f a c t o r s  t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  demand 
f o r  and s u p p l y  o f  a l l  r e l e v a n t  f i n a n c i a l  and r e a l  a s s e t s ,  
such  as  c h a n g e s  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  changes  i n  i n t e r e s t  
r a t e s  and o t h e r  r a t e s  o f  r e t u r n ,  changes  i n  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  
o f  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s ,  changes  i n  t a s t e s ,  o r  ch ang es  i n  
gove rnmen t  p o l i c i e s  t h a t  a f f e c t  a s s e t  s u p p l i e s  o r  demands 
o r  impinge  on e x p e c t a t i o n s .  A r t u s  and C r o c k e t t  (1978) 
p r o v i d e  a t h o r o u g h  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  some o f  
t h e  above  f a c t o r s  f o r  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  t h e  
c o n t e x t  o f  an a s s e t  m a r ke t  a p p r oa ch ;  S c h a d l e r  (1977) 
p r o v i d e s  a s u r v e y  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e .
32.  In  a model  t h a t  a l l o w s  f o r  t r a d e d  and n o n - t r a d e d  goods ,  
t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  p r i c e s  o f  t h e  n o n - t r a d e d  goods 
a r e  f l e x i b l e ,  t h e  goods m arke t  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i l l  a f f e c t  
t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  and he n ce ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  s i n c e  n o n - t r a d e d  goods p r i c e s  a r e  
i n c l u d e d  i n  t h e  d e f l a t o r  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .
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More i n t e r e s t i n g ,  however ,  i s  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  
t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  a p p ro a c h  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  more t h a n  
p r o p o r t i o n a t e  r e s p o n s e s  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  exogenous  
a s s e t  m a r k e t  d i s t u r b a n c e s ;  i . e .  a " m a g n i f i c a t i o n "  o f  
t h e  o r i g i n a l  sh oc k .  One such  common d i s t u r b a n c e  
examined  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e ,  i s  a d i s c r e t e  change  i n  money 
s u p p l y  w h i c h ,  as  Kour i  (1976)  and Dornbusch  (1976b)  show, 
p r o d u c e s  an o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  above i t s  
l o n g - r u n  p a t h  w i t h o u t  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  
In t e r m s  o f  ou r  mode l ,  we have  s e en  i n  S e c t i o n s  2 .3  and
2 . 6 ,  how a s p e c u l a t i v e  e r r o r  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  l e a d s  t o  a 
s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n  w i t h o u t  a f f e c t i n g  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .  On t h e  im pa c t  o f  t h e  
exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e  i n  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  d e p r e c i a t e s  i n s t a n t a n e o u s l y  and d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t ­
ment  p r o c e s s ,  i t  g r a d u a l l y  a p p r e c i a t e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  
l o n g - r u n  p a t h  u n t i l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  r e s t o r e d .
T h i s  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  
i n  F i g u r e  2. 8 wh ich  d e p i c t s  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  ( i n  l o g s )  ove r  t i m e ;  t h e  PP l i n e  r e p r e s e n t s  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  d e s c r i b e d  by e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 2 4 ) .  
S t a r t i n g  f rom an i n i t i a l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a t  A, 
t h e  d i s c r e t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  s h i f t s  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  B 
and o v e r  t i m e ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  EC 
i t  a p p r e c i a t e s  t o w a rd s  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h  a t  C.
As t h e  exchange  r a t e  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i s  d e p r e ­




F i g u r e  2 Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  an exogenou 
r i s e  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .
D to  t /  time.
F i g u r e  2 . 9 .  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  an exogenou
f a l l  i n  u ,  bo t h  un d e r  a d a p t i v e  and r a t i o n a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s .
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r a t e s  d i f f e r e n t i a l  be tween  t h e  d o m e s t i c  economy and t h e
r e s t  o f  t h e  w o r l d  - a g r a d u a l  exchange  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n
r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h ,  i m p l i e s  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  r i s i n g  a t  a
l o we r  r a t e  ( even  n e g a t i v e  i n i t i a l l y )  t h a n  i n  t h e  l ong  -
r u n .  In  t h e  c a s e  o f  F i g u r e  2 . 8 ,  a f t e r  t h e  impact
exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  a t  B, t h e  r a t e  f a l l s  i n i t i a l l y
i n  a b s o l u t e  t e rms  and t h e n  i t  s t a r t s  r i s i n g  a g a i n  a t  a
33r a t e  l ower  t h a n  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h .
One o f  t h e  p r e d o m i n a n t  f a c t o r s  t h a t  a f f e c t s  t h e  
a s s e t  m a r k e t  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  
be tween  t h e  v a r i o u s  a s s e t s  i n  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s .  The 
h i g h e r  ( l o we r )  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  be tween 
a s s e t s  t h e  l e s s  (more) exchange  r a t e s  have  t o  a d j u s t  t o
33.  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  
BC ( v a r i a b l e  o v e r  t im e )  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
e x p r e s s i o n  ( s ee  a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n ) :
D l n P ( t )  = m - A ^ ( x ( t )  - x) 
( - )  ( - )
( - )  (?)  (+) (+ ) “  (+)
( tt^  -  ir)e'
where  (tt^  - tt) i s  t h e  i n i t i a l  r i s e  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s .
Given t h e  p h a se  d i ag ra m a n a l y s i s ,  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t ­
ment  p r o c e s s  D l n P ( t )  i s  a lways  l e s s  t h a n  m. At t h e  
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  t h o u g h ,  a t  C, D l n P ( t )  = m.
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make a s s e t  h o l d e r s  c o n t e n t  t o  h o l d  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k  
o f  a s s e t s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  e n s u i n g  c a p i t a l  f l o ws  t h a t  
p r o v i d e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  c u s h i o n i n g  t o  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e s .  
The d e g r e e  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  be tween  d o m e s t i c  and 
f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  c u r r e n c y  r i s k  t h e y  
i n v o l v e ,  which  i n  t u r n  i s  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e ­
d i c t a b i l i t y  o f  exchange  r a t e  ch ang es  d u r i n g  t h e  p e r i o d  
a c u r r e n c y  i s  h e l d .  C u r r e n c y  r i s k ,  a s  A r t u s  and 
C r o c k e t t  (1978)  m a i n t a i n ,  depends  on t h e  " t h i n n e s s "  o f  
exchange  m a r k e t s ,  on t h e  r i s k  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  banks  and 
o t h e r  l a r g e  i n s t i t u t i o n a l  m a r k e t  p a r t i c i p a n t s  and on 
t h e  i n c r e a s i n g  r i s k  o f  a g rowing  e x p o s u r e  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  
c u r r e n c y .
To c a p t u r e  t h e  ch ang es  i n  a s s e t  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  
and t h e  e n s u i n g  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  
f o l l o w i n g  ch anges  i n  r i s k  a v e r s i o n ,  we have  e x p l i c i t l y  
i n c o r p o r a t e d  r i s k  i n  ou r  model  by i n c l u d i n g  u a s  an a r g u ­
ment  i n  t h e  a s s e t  demand f u n c t i o n s .  u a l s o  s t a n d s  f o r  
changes  i n  t h e  d e g re e  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  o f  e x p e c t e d  r e l a t i v e  
p u r c h a s i n g  power o f  c u r r e n c i e s ,  which  as  A r t u s  and 
C r o c k e t t  (1978) p u t  i t ,  "make t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  marke t  
more l i k e  a s t o c k  m a r k e t  whe re  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  a r e  due 
more t o  c h a n g i n g  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  f u t u r e  p r o f i t a b i l i t y  
r a t h e r  t h a n  c u r r e n t  p r o f i t s "  (p.  1 4 - 1 5 ) .  Hence ,  changes  
i n  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  s u b s t i t u t a b i l i t y  among a s s e t s ,  o r  e q u i ­
v a l e n t l y ,  ch anges  i n  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  and i n  u n c e r t a i n t y  
a b ou t  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p u r c h a s i n g  power  o f  c u r r e n c i e s  p roduce
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sudden  ch ang es  i n  u and l e a d  t o  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
v a r i a b i l i t y .
We may r e c a l l  t h a t  f rom t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t e m  t o  a r e d u c t i o n  i n  u ,  i n  
S e c t i o n  2 . 6 ,  we have  e s t a b l i s h e d  an unambiguous exchange  
r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  on t h e  i mp ac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  chang e ,  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechanism.  The 
exchange  r a t e  e v o l u t i o n  o v e r  t im e  i n  t h i s  c a s e  i s  shown 
i n  F i g u r e  2 .9  . PP^ i s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h  p r i o r  t o  t h e  exogenous  change  and PP2 i s  t h e  p a t h  
c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  new a s s e t  m a r k e t  c o n d i t i o n s ;  PP£ 
l i e s  above PP^,  f o r  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  u r e d u c e s  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  i n  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  and s h i f t s  t h e  l o n g -  
r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  up w a rd s ,  r e f l e c t i n g  a l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n .  ABC i s  t h e  dynamic exchange  
r a t e  p a t h  un d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and AB'C’ t h e  one 
un d e r  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  Because  o f  t h e  impac t  
exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g ,  b o t h  B abd B' l i e  above t h e  
PP2 l i n e .  The dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h s  BC and B’ C’ 
r e f l e c t  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  t h e  sy s t em u n d e r  
t h e  two e x p e c t a t i o n s  m echan i sm s ,  r e f e r r e d  t o  i n  S e c t i o n
2 . 6 .  Given t h a t  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  £^' £2  t r a j e c t o r y  i n  
F i g u r e  2 .7  i s  un a m b i g u o u s l y  p o s i t i v e ,  a s  b o t h  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  
r i s i n g  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  ( s e e  e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 3 8 ) ) ,  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  a lw ays  a p p r e c i a t i n g  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  
l o n g - r u n  p a t h .  The e x t e n t  o f  t h i s  a p p r e c i a t i o n  i s  a
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p o s i t i v e  f u n c t i o n ^ ^  o f  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  be tween  a c t u a l  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  v a l u e ;  a t  t h e  
i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  may be a c t u a l l y  f a l l i n g  i n  a b s o l u t e  t e r m s ,  ove r  
t i m e , t h o u g h , i t  i s  r i s i n g  a t  a r a t e  l e s s  t h a n  i t s  l o n g -  
r u n  d e p r e c i a t i o n  (m) .
Under a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t h e  exchange  r a t e  
w i l l  i n i t i a l l y  d e p r e c i a t e  even more t h a n  t h e  impac t  
e f f e c t  (D In  P > m) r e d u c i n g  f u r t h e r  t h e  r e a l  money s t o c k ,  
p r o v i d e d  p o i n t  i n  F i g u r e  2.4 l i e s  above  t h e  x = o 
s c h e d u l e .  As r e a l  b a l a n c e s  s t a r t  r i s i n g  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  w i l l  be g r a d u a l l y  a p p r e c i a t i n g ,  r i s i n g  a t  a r a t e  
l e s s  t h a n  m, t i l l  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  r e a c h e d .
34.  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  B’C’ p a t h  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  e q u a t i o n  ( s e e  ap p en d ix  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n ) :
D In  P ( t )  = m - X ( x ( t )  - x)
( - )  ( - )
where  A i s  t h e  n e g a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t .  I f  a t  
t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  
( x ( t )  -  x)  i s  h i g h  enough ,  i t  m igh t  ou tw e ig h  m and 
c a u s e  an a b s o l u t e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  exchange  r a t e .  
A c t u a l l y  t h i s  i s  t h e  way t h a t  i s  dr awn.  At  t h e  l o n g -  
r un  e q u i l i b r i u m  a t  C’ , D In  P = m.
35.  The s l o p e  o f  BC o v e r  t im e  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
e x p r e s s i o n  ( s e e  a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n ) :
D In  P ( t )  = m - A ^ ( x ( t )  - x)
( - )  ( - )
( - )
+ -  h ) ( X2 -  + gyCXi -  h y ) ] ( v Q *  -
(+) (?)  ( ?)  (+) (?)  ( - )
where  A^, A^  a r e  t h e  two n e g a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s .
IVhen t h e  n e t  s i g n  o f  t h e  s q u a r e  b r a c k e t  i s  n e g a t i v e ,  t h e  
s e con d  t e r m  may be o u t w e i g h t e d  by t h e  r e s t  f o r  sm a l l  
v a l u e s  o f  t ,  so t h a t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  r i s i n g  a t  a 
r a t e  h i g h e r  t h a n  m, and t h i s  i s  t h e  way t h a t  i s  drawn.
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From F i g u r e  2 . 9  we a l s o  n o t e  t h a t  t h e  
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  e q u i l i b r i u m  u nd e r  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  l e s s  t im e  t h a n  un d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c ­
t a t i o n s ,  s i n c e  even  i f  t h e  two p a t h s  have  t h e  same s l o p e ,  
t h e  B*C p a t h  r e a c h e s  t h e  r i s i n g  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h  s o o n e r ,  f o r  i t  l i e s  be low BC. A c om pa r i s on  o f  t h e  
s l o p e s  o f  t h e  two p a t h s  ( f o o t n o t e s  34 and 35) r e v e a l s  
t h a t  a l t h o u g h  no unambiguous  f o r m a l  p r o o f  can be  d e r i v e d ,  
i t  seems v e r y  u n l i k e l y  t h a t  BC would have  a s h a r p  n e g a ­
t i v e  s l o p e  a t  some s t a g e  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s .
I n  g e n e r a l  i t  i s  n o t e w o r t h y ,  t h a t  a l t h o u g h  we 
assume i n s t a n t a n e o u s  a d j u s t m e n t  i n  b o t h  t h e  goods and 
a s s e t  m a r k e t s ,  we s t i l l  g e t  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g ,  
w h i l e  Dornbusch  (1976b)  a t t r i b u t e s  t h i s  m a g n i f i c a t i o n  o f  
i n i t i a l  sh oc k s  t o  t h e  s l u g g i s h  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  d o m e s t i c  
p r i c e s  t h a t  he a s s um es .  Kour i  ( 1 9 76 ) ,  however ,  u s i n g  
a model  s i m i l a r  t o  o u r s ,  shows t h a t  und e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e ­
s i g h t ,  f o l l o w i n g  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  r a t e  o f  g rowth  o f  
t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t s  
as  w e l l .  In  g e n e r a l ,  a s  S c h a d l e r  (1977,  p .  256) a r g u e s :
" . . .  t h e  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  such  exchange  r a t e  
b e h a v i o u r  [ o v e r s h o o t i n g ]  l i e s  i n  u n r e s o l v e d  
i s s u e s  c o n c e r n i n g  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r m a t i o n ,  
d i f f e r e n t i a l  sp e e d s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  among 
m a r k e t s ,  t h e  imp ac t  o f  u n c e r t a i n t y  on f o r e i g n  
exchan ge  t r a n s a c t i o n s ,  and t h e  economic  
p o l i c y  d e c i s i o n s . "
One word o f  c a u t i o n ,  however ,  i s  i n  o r d e r  on 
t h e  u se  o f  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  a p p ro a c h  as  t h e  b a s i c  e x p l a ­
n a t i o n  f o r  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y ,  s i n c e  i t
81
i s  b a s e d  on somewhat  s t r i c t  a s s u m p t io n s  g i v i n g  d i s ­
p r o p o r t i o n a t e  w e i g h t  i n  i t s  s t r u c t u r e  t o  t h e  a s s e t  
m a rk e t  w i t h  no d i s a g g r e g a t i o n  o f  t h e  goods m ark e t  and 
no e x p l i c i t  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  exogenous  r e a l  shoc ks  such  
as  ch an g es  i n  o i l  p r i c e s  o r  p r i c e s  o f  raw m a t e r i a l s .
The m o d e l l i n g  o f  ch ang es  i n  r i s k  a v e r s i o n  and o f  d i f ­
f e r e n t i a l  s p e e d s  o f  a d j u s t m e n t  i n  t h e  v a r i o u s  m a r k e t s  
ne eds  t o  be  e x p l o r e d  even  more.  S c h a d l e r ' s  c o n c l u d i n g  
comment [pp .  2 9 0 - 2 9 1 ) ,  p e r f e c t l y  r e f l e c t s  such  r e s e r ­
v a t i o n s  :
"On a t h e o r e t i c a l  l e v e l ,  t h e  c o n se n s u s  seems 
t o  be t h a t  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  a r e  b e s t  
s t u d i e d  i n  an a s s e t  m a rk e t  e q u i l i b r i u m  model ,  
and t h a t  w i t h o u t  a p p e a l  t o  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  
s p e c u l a t i o n ,  t h e  model  does  p r e d i c t  exchange  
r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  e x c e s s  o f  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  
u n d e r l y i n g  c o n d i t i o n s .  On a more r e a l i s t i c  
l e v e l ,  howeve r ,  i t  does  n o t  seem l i k e l y  t h a t  
o v e r s h o o t i n g  i m p l i c i t  i n  a s s e t  ma r ke t  e q u i ­
l i b r i u m  model s  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  a c c o u n t  f o r  
t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a t i o n s  
o b s e r v e d  r e c e n t l y .  There  seems t o  be l i t t l e  
e v i d e n c e  t h a t  c o n c l u s i v e l y  p r e c l u d e s  t h e  p o s ­
s i b i l i t y  t h a t  a t  l e a s t  ove r  p a r t i c u l a r  p e r i o d s  
f o r  c e r t a i n  c u r r e n c i e s ,  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u ­
l a t i o n  ha s  c o n t r i b u t e d  t o  exchange  r a t e  
v a r i a t i o n s . "
In  t h e  a n a l y s i s  so f a r ,  however ,  n o t h i n g  was 
s a i d  a b o u t  gove rnm en t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  
m arke t  and we hav e  t r e a t e d  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  as 
a r i s i n g  o n l y  o u t  o f  exogenous  shocks  i n  t h e  a s s e t  o r  
good m a r k e t s ,  i m p l i c i t l y  e x c l u d i n g  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
m o d e r a t i n g  o r  e x a c e r b a t i n g  t h e s e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  by g o v e r n ­
ment  i n t e r v e n t i o n  -  a c a s e  much more c l o s e  t o  t h e  r e a l  
w o r l d .  In  t h e  n e x t  two c h a p t e r s ,  u s i n g  t h e  f r amework
8 2
d e v e l o p e d  so f a r ,  we t r y  t o  c o m p a r a t i v e l y  examine t h e  
exchange  r a t e  dynamics  un d e r  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g  
f o r  d i f f e r e n t  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mech­
ani sms  .
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APPENDIX 2
A2.1 S h o r t - r u n  C om par a t i ve  S t a t i c s
L i n e a r i s i n g  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 16a)  - ( 2 . 16d )  o f  S e c t i o n  2 . 3 ,  
we have  :





























— -p f  — f
i^TT ^ l u  ^ l y
-£o - f o  -£2tt u 2y
0 0 0
0 0 0
(-C C^-Cl-C p)i  -c J  0 - d - C _ j , )  -C j, 1 i
y y y y^ y
n i p 0 0 0 0 1 -1 - i
(A2.3)
The d e t e r m i n a n t  o£ t h e  m a t r i x  o£ c o e £ £ i c i e n t s , 
A ^ l ,  i s  u n a m bi g uo u s l y  n e g a t i v e ,  i . e .
At I = - ( 1  -  £^^)  ^  < 0;  s i n c e  0 < £i,^^  < 1 (A2.4)Iw
Us ing  C ra me r ’ s r u l e  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  
e £ £ e c t s  o£ ch an ge s  i n  t h e  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  as  
£ o l l o w s :
(a)  E £ £ e c t s  o£ exogenous  changes  on t h e  p r i c e  










dP ^ l u
du .  y'l  ^ °  (A2.8)
P
OT " , ,  °  (A2.9)
3T = 3Ü = S = 0 fA2.10)
(b) E f f e c t s  o f  exogenous  changes  on t h e  s t o c k  o f  
f o r e i g n  exchange :
^  -  0 (A2.11)
3 9  ■ ( 1 - f  ■ ■)  ^ ® (A2.12) ^ Iw
^ 2 .  + = ? (A2.13)
C^) ( . f
(+) (+)
+
( - ) ( + )
f  
f
s u b s t i t u t i n g  i n  (A2.14)  we deduce  t h a t
D e f i n i n g  a = - > 0  s i n c e  f ^ ^  > j f ^ ^ j  and
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^  = 0 i f f  a = - ^  — —  (A2.15)
^2u ^2w
t h a t  i s  i f f  r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c )  h o l d s ,  i . e .  t h e  e f f e c t s  
o f  a change  i n  u on f o r e i g n  exchange  s t o c k  a r e  e x a c t l y  
o f f s e t  by t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  ( b eca u se  o f  a change i n  u) 
ch anges  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .
i  = - ^  ^  t f 2 y ( l  -  f i J  + f l y  £2„]  = ? (A2.16)
( - )  C-) (+)  (+) (+)
" TO ■ I s  ■ °  (A2.17)
(c) E f f e c t s  o f  exogenous  changes  on t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e :
^  -  0 (A2.18)
dP + dF + ^
dv 9v 9P * Ï Ï V  9F * dv 9B ' dv
- [C* -  (1 -  C o ) i ]  C-) 
y
% » '  '
■“  - V‘ ^
+ 0 < 0 ; g i v e n  r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9b )  (A2.19)
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dS _ dS ^ 9S dP ^ as  dF  ^ aS dB 
ÏÏ? " J-F ap * ÏÏ? aF * d J  a f  • ÏÏ?
-  Cl -  C ^ , ) i  [ f , ,  ^ T
+ 0 (A2.20)
The a S / a F . d F / d i r  t e rm  i s  ambiguous b e ca us e  
dF/ d i r  i s  amb iguous .  a S / a F  = - (1 - C i  i s  n e g a t i v e  
b e c a u s e  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  a b s o r p t i o n  t h a t  a r i s e  i n  F 
c a u s e s  t h r o u g h  i t s  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  on r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  
income ( f a l l  i n  i n t e r e s t  e a r n i n g s  o u t  o f  a g i v e n  s t o c k  
o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ) ,  i s  l e s s  t h a n  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  
t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t ,  i f  t h e  m a r g i n a l  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  con ­
sume o u t  o f  d i s p o s a b l e  income i s  l e s s  t h a n  one .  The 
d F/ d i r  t e rm  i s  ambiguous  b e c a u s e  a r i s e  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
i n c r e a s e s  on t h e  one hand  t h e  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  exchange  
( f 2^) due t o  ou r  g r o s s  s u b s t i t u t e s  a s s u m p t i o n ,  b u t  on 
t h e  o t h e r ,  i t  c a u s e s  an i n c r e a s e  i n  p r i c e s  and h e n c e ,  a 
r e d u c t i o n  i n  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  and w e a l t h  which d e c r e a s e s  
t h e  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e .  I f  d F / d n  < 0 t h e n  
d S / d i r  > 0 u n a m b i g u o u s l y ,  w h i l e  i f  d F/ d i r  > 0 t h e  s i g n  o f  
d S / d i r  depends  on t h e  r e l a t i v e l y  s t r e n g t h  o f  a s / a i r  and
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(8S/8P)  (dP/dir)  on t h e  one hand and (8S/8£ )  (dP/dir)  on t h e  
o t h e r .  In  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e ,  however ,  t h e  p o s i t i v e  e f f e c t  
( d i r e c t )  o f  a r i s e  i n  it on t h e  c u r r e n t  a cc o u n t  and t h e  
i n d i r e c t  e f f e c t  o f  a r i s e  i n  p r i c e s  most  p r o b a b l y  w i l l  
ou t we igh  t h e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  a r i s e  i n  F. To show 
t h i s  l e t  us  a l l o w  t h e  p a r a m e t e r s  o f  t h e  model  t o  assume 
t h o s e  v a l u e s  t h a t  maximize  t h e  p o s s i b l e  n e g a t i v e  e f f e c t  
o f  a r i s e  i n  F on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t ,  i . e .  l e t  fn  = - f ,
'  ZTT ITT
and f ? = 0 so t h a t  any i n c r e a s e  i n  e x n e c t a t i o n s  c a u s e s
a s h i f t  ou t  o f  d o m e s t i c  money i n t o  f o r e i g n  exchange  o n l y ,  
so t h a t  t h e r e  i s  t h e  maximum f a l l  i n  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t .  
Le t  a l s o  C ^ = 0 so t h a t  any f a l l  i n  i n t e r e s t  e a r n i n g s
y
does  n o t  c a u s e  any r e d u c t i o n s  i n  a b s o r p t i o n  - t h e  p o s i t i v e  
e f f e c t  o f  an i n c r e a s e  i n  F on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i s  
m in im iz ed .  E q u a t i o n  (A2.20)  t h e n  becomes:
(+) . (+)
3 #  " - ^ 1 .  [ ( 1 - "  (A2.21)
C-) (+)
(A2.21)  i s  p o s i t i v e  i f  f ^ ^  < C^Vi.  A l lowing  some p o s ­
s i b l e  v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  p a r a m e t e r s ,  s ay  = .07 f rom Ando 
and M o d i g l i a n i  (1963)  and i  = . 1 0 ,  t h e n  f^^^ < . 7 which  
i s  w e l l  w i t h i n  t h e  a c c e p t a b l e  r an g e  o f  v a l u e s  f o r  f ^ ^ .
(0 < f < 1 ) .  Thus ,  t h e  h i g h e r  t h e  m a r g i n a l  p r o p e n ­
s i t y  t o  consume o u t  o f  d i s p o s a b l e  income and t h e  l ower  
t h e  f o r e i g n  nom ina l  r a t e  o f  i n t e r e s t ,  t h e  more e a s i l y  
t h e  p o s i t i v e  s i g n  f o r  dS/dn  p r e v a i l s .  In any e v e n t u a l i t y .
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however ,  dS/dir ha s  t o  be p o s i t i v e  f o r  dynamic s t a b i l i t y  
and so i t  m igh t  u l t i m a t e l y  be c o n s i d e r e d  as  one o f  our  
s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s .
= I S  ^ ^  dP ^ ^  dF + as 
du 9u 9P du 9F ' du * du
=  0
■ f lw )
-  (1 - C y o ) i [ f 2 u  + £ i „  (?)  (A2.22)
R e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c ) ,  however ,  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
f o r  (A2.22)  t o  be n e g a t i v e  - t h ou gh  n o t  n e c e s s a r y .
3Y -  (1 " CyCp ("")
-  ( -  • c . )  ( - )
-  (1 -  C ^ o ) i t £ 2 y  * f ; „  (?)
= ? (A2.23)
= C > 0 (A2.24)
y
- 1 < 0 (A2.25)dG
^  -  - i  < 0 (A2.26)
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(d) E f f e c t s  o f  exogenous  changes  on t h e  i s s u e  
o f  gove rnmen t  d e b t :
dB = 0 (A2.27)
M  j — T > 0 (A2.29)
h w . m
(1 - h w )
h . . m
(1 - ^Iw^
h u - m
(1 - h w )
^ l y
. m
^  -r  < 0 (A2.30)
a f  " ■ ( f -   ^ °  (A2.31)
^  = - 1 < 0 (A2.32)
I I  = 1 > 0 (A2.33)
I I  = i  > 0 (A2.34)
Given e q u a t i o n  ( 2 . 1 5 ) ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  exogenous  
chang es  on t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (v) 
a r e  g i v e n  a s  t h e  sum o f  t h e i r  e f f e c t s  on t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  and t h e  i s s u e  o f  government  d e b t .
91
A2.2 L on p - run  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s
L i n e a r i s i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  
( 2 . 2 1 a )  -  ( 2 . 2 1 d )  o f  S e c t i o n  2 . 4 ,  c o n s i d e r i n g  it a s  exo­
genous  e q u a l  t o  m, g i v e n  by c o n d i t i o n  ( 2 . 2 1 e ) ,  we have:

























- f ,  0 0 0l u
- f z u  0 0 0
(1 - c p) 0 c _ -1  - i
7 7
0 -1 - i
(A2.37)
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The d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  t h e  m a t r i x  o f  c o e f f i c i e n t s ,  
IA2 I ,  i s  un a m b ig u ou s l y  p o s i t i v e  g i v e n  r e s t r i c t i o n s  (2 .9 b )  
and ( 2 , 9 a ) :
1 * 2 1 = -  ( f i w  -  1 ) ( C „  -  ( 1 - C  + f i w ( -  C giT + C „ )
y y
( - )  (•*■) ( + ) ( + )
(+) (+)  ( - )  (+) (+)  C+)
(A2.38)
Us ing  C r a m e r ' s  r u l e ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  
s t a t i c  r e s u l t s  f o r  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  as  f o l l o w s :
S  = m  « l y  - (1 - C + £1 ^ ( 1  - C g)
I 2 I •' y y
(+) (+) (+) (+) (+)
- ( 1  - C ^ p ) i [ -  f 2 „  + f 2y  f i „ ] }  > 0 (A2.39)
(+)  C+) (+)  ( - )  (+)
Ë  - ( l - C y D ) i )  + ( l - C y D ) i  h u  ^2w
(+)  (+)  (+■) (+)  C+) (+)
- ( 1  - C g ) i  £2^ > 0  (A2.40)
C+) ( - )  (+)
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 ^ (C „ -  1) < 0 ( A 2 . 4 1 )
C + ) ( + ) ( - )
i  = i  = 0 (A2.42)
The c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  on r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  a r e :
3Y = r b  ( h w  - I H l  -  c ) - c + C J
(+) ( - )  (+) ^ (+) ^ (+)
( l - C y D ) i  f z y C f l w - l )  -  ( l - C y D ) i  h y  ^2w '  “  h y >  = ? 
( + ) ( - )  ( - )  ( + )  (+)  ( + ) ( + )
(A2.43)
m - h u t -  + C„) + (1 -C^D^i  f z u t f l w - l )
(+) (+) (+) (+) ( - )  ( - )
- ( l - C y D ) i  h u  h w  -  ” h u ^  = • ( A 2 - 4 4 )
(+) (+) (+) (+)
R e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c )  i s  a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  - 
t h o u g h  n o t  n e c e s s a r y  - f o r  (A2.44)  t o  be n e g a t i v e .  No te ,  
t h a t  we a r e  u s i n g  ( 2 . 9 c )  t o  f a c i l i t a t e  ou r  s h o r t - r u n  and 
l o n g - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s ,  w i t h o u t  any l o s s  o f  g e n e r ­








( f l w  -  I H l  -  C < 0
( - )  (+)
y
( A 2 . 4 5 )
(A2.46)
The e f f e c t s  on t h e  s t o c k  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange 
a r e  as  f o l l o w s :
dF
3T = Tatr ( f l y  [fzwCCw - (l-C - ^Zw^ - C D" + C*)]y y
f 2 y [ ( f l w - l ) ( C w - ( l - C  o ) i )  - f i ^ ^ -  C 0^ + C^p]
y y
- ( l - C  r P i [ f 2 w ( f l w  - 1) -y Iw 2w
[ -^Iw ^2y ^ h y  ^ 2 * ] )  = ’ (A2.47]
dF ^
du IA^ I ^^ lu  ■^ 2w(C„ -  (1-C g ) iy
-  ^ l u  f2w( -  Cyo" + C,Jw-
- f z u f f l w  -  - (1-C n ) i )  + f , „  C „7T + C,Jw yD 2u Iw'^ D‘ wy
h w  ^2u " ^ l u  f2w) )  = ■ (A2.48)
R e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c )  i s  a g a i n  s u f f i c i e n t  f o r  
(A2.48)  t o  be n e g a t i v e .
dF
{ ( 1 - C  n) [ f 9. , ( f i . .  -  1) - f i„ ,  £ 9..,]} < 0 (A2.49)I T  " TSTT^ ^ D-' '-^2w'-^lw




3 5  = ï f i  = 0  t A 2 . 5 0 )
F i n a l l y ,  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  on t h e  
i s s u e  o f  gove rnment  bonds  a r e :
W  ’  T A ^  - C^p) + f^yCC^ - (1 -
(+) (+) ( + ) ( + ) ( + )
-m ( l  -  C D ) i [ - £ i „  f 2y + f l y  f z * ] }  < 0 (A2.51)
(+) (+) C-) (+) (+)
3ÏÏ " ■ CyCpi)]
(+)  ( +)  ( +)
-mCl - C^D^iC- f i „  f z ^  + f l u  £zw^> < 0 ( A2 .52)
(+) (+) ( - )  (+) (+)
3T ■ TCT o'" • I^w (fiw - (1 - C p ) i )
I 2' y y
(+) (+) (+) ( - )  (+)
flw(-CyD" + C*) + (1 - C^D)if^2w(flw - 1 ) -  flw ^2*]) < ° 
(+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  ( - )  (+)  (+)
(A2.53)
35 " TSTT I^w ■ (ffw ■ - (1 - C ) i )  + £i„C-C gTT + C^)
2 '  y  y
(+) (+)  ( - )  (+)  C+) (+)
- (1 - C D^i  [ f z w ( f l w - l )  - f l w  ^2»]} > 0 (A2.54)
( + ) ^  ( + ) ( - )  ( + ) (■*■)
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dB
ÏÏB = i  > 0 ( A 2 . 5 5 )
A2.3 Dynamic S t a b i l i t y
(a)  A d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s : The dynamics  o f  t h e  sys tem
i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  sy s t em 
o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  [ s ee  S e c t i o n  2 . 5 ) :
7T = B [ m - x - 7 r ) ;  0 < g < 1 (A2.56a)
X = g [ v ,  tt) (A2.56b)
=  h ( v ,  i t )  ;  <  0 ,  >  0 (A2.5ÔC)
L i n e a r i s i n g  a roun d  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  we g e t :
TT + gx = - 3[tT - 7 T ^ ) (A2.57a)
0 = - Tig) - (x - Xg) + gy (v  - Vg) (A2.57b)
V  =  h ^ ( T I  -  T i g ) + h y [ v  - Vq) [A2.57c )
o r  i n  m a t r i x  n o t a t i o n






- g 0 0
Btt -1 g
0 h
( tt -  T T ^ )
(X -  Xg) 
(V -  Vg)
(A2.S8)
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For  n o n - t r i v i a l  s o l u t i o n s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  polyonyum 
sh o u l d  be e q ua l  t o  z e r o ,  i . e .





w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n :
( l  + 6g^)X^ + -  h y ( l  + eg^) + g h ^ . g l x  - ghy = 0 CA2.60)
( - )  ( - )  ( - )  (+) (+) ( - )
A c c o rd i n g  t o  t h e  R o u t h - H ur w i t z  t heo re m ( s ee  Samuel son ,
1947 ) ,  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  
r e a l  p a r t s  o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  o f  a s econd  d e g r e e  
polyonyum to  be n e g a t i v e  - t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t  f o r  l o c a l  
s t a b i l i t y  - i s  t h a t  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
e q u a t i o n  a r e  a l l  p o s i t i v e .  Thus ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
l o c a l  s t a b i l i t y  r e d u c e s  t o
(1 + > 0  o r  IB.g^I  < 1 ( A 2 . 61)
To d e r i v e  t h e  p h a s e  d i ag ra m a n a l y s i s  un d e r  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  (A2.56b)  w i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  t i m e ,  i . e .
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X = n + g y  V ( A 2 . 6 2 )
S u b s t i t u t i n g  tt f rom (A2.57a )  and v from (A2.57b)  we have :
CA2.63]
S u b s t i t u t i n g  dTr f rom e q u a t i o n  (A2 .57b ) ,  we d e r i v e  t h e  
e q u a t i o n  o f  t h e  x = o l o c u s ,  i . e .
( l + 6 g ^ ) x  = ( g y h ^ - g g ^ ) — dx +
T^T
- — ( g y \  - BSy) dv
(A2.64)
f rom wh ich  we have :
dx
dv
(+) ( + ) (+) ( “ ) (")  ( + ) ( “ ) 
8v Cëy hy - hy - Pgy
> 0
x=o ( 8 y  \  -  e g y )  
( + ) ( + )  ( - )
( A 2 . 65)
p r o y i d e d
TT
(A2.65)
I f  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  s i g n  o f  (A2.65)  i s  r e v e r s e d ,  
t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  x = o l o c u s  i s  ambiguous .  D e v i a t i o n s  o f  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  f rom t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  s e l f  - 
c o r r e c t i n g ,  s i n c e
3.x
9x
(+) (+) ( - )  
:Sv • -  6gn
v = c o n s t g ^ d  + Bg„)
< 0
( - )  (+)
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( A 2 . 6 6 )
g i v e n  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  (A 2 . 61 ) .
S u b s t i t u t i n g  dir f rom (A2.57b)  i n  ( A 2 .5 7 c ) ,  we 
d e r i v e  t h e  e q u a t i o n  o f  t h e  v = o l o c u s ,  i . e .
V  =  - ! L  d x  +  ( h ^
g IT
(A2.67)
from which  we h av e :
dx
dv
( - )  ( - )
= g
V


















(b) P e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t : The f o l l o w i n g  sy s tem o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l
e q u a t i o n  d e s c r i b e s  t h e  dynamics  o f  t h e  sy s tem u n d e r  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t  :
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X = g ( v ,  m - x ) ; gy > 0 ,  g^ < 0 (A2.70a)
V = h ( v ,  m - x) ; h < 0,  h > 0' ' V TT (A2.70b)
L i n e a r i s i n g  (A2.70)  a r ou n d  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  we hav e :
g^X = -Cx -  X^) + gy (v  -  V^) CA2.71a)
t  = 0 + h ^ ( v  - (A2.71b)
o r  i n  m a t r i x  n o t a t i o n
Stt 0 X -1 gy (X - x^)
1 V 0 (V - v^)
CA2.72)
For  n o n - t r i v i a l  s o l u t i o n s  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n  
s h o u l d  be e q u a l  t o  z e r o ,  i . e .
gV
=  0 CA2.73)
w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n
+ (1 -  hy 'gw - b y  = 0 CA2.74)
The s i g n s  o f  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  (A2.74)  a r e  as  f o l l o w s
a = < 0
C-)
b = 1 - hy . + g A  = ■ (A2.75)
( - )  ( - )  ( + ) (  + )
c = - > 0
( - )
2Hence ,  s i n c e  - 4 a c  = 4g .h > 0  and b > 0 ,
°T T V
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  a r e  r e a l  and o f  o p p o s i t e  s i g n s ;  
a s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a s a d d l e  p o i n t .
E q u a t i o n s  (A2.71a)  and (A2.71b)  r e p r e s e n t  t h e  
x= 0 and  v = 0 c u r v e s  r e s p e c t i v e l y  o f  t h e  p h a s e  d i ag ra m 
i n  F i g u r e  2 . 5 .  From (A2.71a)  we n o t e  t h a t  t h e  x = 0 i s  
upwards  s l o p i n g  s i n c e
dx
ÏÏV
and t h a t  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  f rom t h e i r  
l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  c u m u l a t i v e ,  i . e .
dx
9x v = c o n s t .  = - r  > 0 (A2.77)®7T
S u b s t i t u t i n g  x f rom (A2.71a)  i n t o  (A2.71b)  we d e r i v e  
an e x p r e s s i o n  i d e n t i c a l  t o  (A 2 . 6 7 ) ,  which  a g a i n  g i v e s  
an ambiguous  s l o p e  f o r  t h e  v = 0 l o c u s  and an ambiguous  
r e a c t i o n  o f  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  t o  






(+) ( - H - )  (+)
x ^ c o n s t .  = r  ( T  - gv) > 0 as  < g ,
^7T TT TT
(A2.78)
( - ) ( - )  C + )
v=0 = - r  + Sv '  0 r  < gv (A2.79)
TT TT
(+)
A2.4 Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  t o  exogenous  changes
(a) Exogenous r i s e  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( a d a p t i v e  e x p e c ­
t a t i o n s )  . The i n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e  s t o c k  o f  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
c an  be w r i t t e n  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  t i m e ,  i . e .
TT ( t )  = TT+ A^ e^ l ^  + (A2.80a)
x ( t )  = X  + (A2.80b)
v ( t )  = V + CLe^l^ + C . e ^ z t  (A2.80c)
where  A, B and C a r e  c o n s t a n t s ,  and ^2 a r e  t h e  two 
n e g a t i v e  r o o t s  o f  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n  (A2.60) 
and TT, X  and v a r e  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  v a l u e s  o f  expec ­
t a t i o n s  a b o u t  i n f l a t i o n  (= m ) , r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and 
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  Th i s  p a r t i c u l a r  
form o f  e q u a t i o n s  (A2.80)  was i m p l i c i t l y  u sed  i n  A2 .3 ( a )  
t o  check  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  model  un d e r  a d a p t i v e  e xpe c ­
t a t i o n s .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  be tw een  t h e  c o n s t a n t s  A, B
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and C can  e a s i l y  be e s t a b l i s h e d  from t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
m a t r i x ,  i . e .  f rom (A2.58)  we have :
- (3 + X) - 3X 0 A
7^T -1 §v B
0 C
= 0 (A2.81)
S i n c e  t h e  t h r e e  e q u a t i o n s  i n  (A2.81)  a r e  n o t  i n d e p e n d e n t  
f rom each  o t h e r  g i v e n  ( A 2 .5 9 ) ,  u s i n g  t h e  two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
r o o t s  and X^ we d e r i v e  f rom (A2.81)  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
r e l a t i o n s h i p s  :
A,
(X2 -  h , J
^ — ~  C2 (A2.82aD
2 = *2+ gy C2 (A2.82b)
Given t h a t  a t  t  = 0 we have  an exogenous  r i s e  
i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t h a t  does  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  
i m p l i e d :
and
v ( 0 )  = v^ = V
Tt ( 0 )  =  7 T ^  >  i t
(A2.83a)
(A2.83b)
L e t t i n g  t  = 0 i n  (A2.80a)  and (A2.80c)  and u s i n g  (A2 .8 3 ) ,  
we have
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= ( tt^  -  TT) -  ( A 2 . 8 4 )
C = - C- (A2.85)
1 ^
From ( A 2 .8 2 a ) ,  (A2.84)  and (A2.85)  we g e t
k-,   k 2 _
A  =  ( tt -  t t )  ;  A _  =    ( tt -  t t )
1 (k, - k )^ o 2 o
(A2. 86a)
1
C = ---------------------- . ( tt -  t t )  ;  =    ( tt -  t t )
1 (k^ -  k^) ° 2 (k^ - k j )  °
where
(X, -  h ) (X - h )
k,  = — ±------- —  ; k ,  = — -------- —  (A2.86b)
Note  t h a t  X. = h i s  n o t  a s o l u t i o n  t o  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
1  V
e q u a t i o n  (A2.60)  b e c a u s e  f o r  t h i s  v a l u e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
polyonyum (A2.59)  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom z e r o .
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (A2.86a)  i n t o  (A2.82b)  we have
B  ^  _ n _ J ----------- V  (A2.87)
'  Ck2 -  k^)
Tak ing  t h e  t im e  d e r i v a t i v e s  o f  (A2.80b)  and 
(A2.80c)  we hav e :
x(t )  = + XzBzG^ Zt (A2.88a)
105
Sub
v ( t )  = ( A 2 . 8 8 b )
s t i t u t i n g  f rom ( A 2 .8 0 b ) ,  B2 f rom (A2 .87 ) ,  from
(A2.80c)  and f rom (A2.86a )  and u s i n g  (A 2 .86b ) ,  we 
have  :
x ( t )  = Xj^Cx(t) -  x)  + p ^ ( ^ 2 " ^ V ^  + T^T •
(A2.98a)
v ( t )  = X ^ ( v ( t )  - v)  + -  î f ) e ^ 2 t  (A2.98b)
wh ich  g i v e  t h e  r a t e  o f  change  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and 
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  ( s ee  
F i g u r e  2 . 6 ) .  S i n c e  x ( t )  = m - D l n P ( t ) ,  (A2.89a)  becomes
D l n P ( t )  = m - A ^ ( x ( t ) - X )  -
(A2.90)
wh ich  g i v e s  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  dynamic exchange  r a t e  p a t h  BC i n  
F i g u r e  2 . 8 .
(b) Exogenous  f a l l  i n  u
In  t h e  c a s e  o f  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  we have  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s :
TT^  = TT - (A2.91a)
v ( 0 )  = v^* < v ^ * = V  (A2.91b)
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where  v^* i s  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a t  t h e  new 
l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  Us ing  a s i m i l a r  p r o c e d u r e  as 
b e f o r e  t o  e s t i m a t e  t h e  c o n s t a n t s  A, B and C, we have
B. ( v y  -  v^*) (A2.92a)
ki k .  + g„  k.
2 = (V * -  V *)
( k i  -  k^)
L e t t i n g  t  = 0 i n  (A2.80b)  we have :
(A2.92b)
x ( 0 )  = X  +  B ^  +  B 2 = (A2.93)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  B^ and B^ f rom (A2.92)  we g e t
X q  =  X  +  g y ( V o *  -  V i * )  <  X  
(+) ( - )
(A2.94)
S i n c e  x^ < x r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  on t h e  impact  o f  t h e  
exogenous  change  o v e r s h o o t  t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l .  Sub­
s t i t u t i n g  B^ f rom (A2.80b)  and B^ from (A 2 .92b ) ,  (A2.88)  
now becomes




which g i v e s  t h e  r a t e  o f  change  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
( s e e  F i g u r e  2 . 7 ) .
S i m i l a r l y ,  f o l l o w i n g  a s i m i l a r  p r o c e d u r e ,  t h e  r a t e  
o f  change  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  
p r o c e s s  r e d u c e s  t o
v ( t )  = ( v ( t )  - v^*)
Xo t-  h^)  ( % *  -  V i * ) e  2 (A2.95b)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  x ( t )  w i t h  i t s  e qua l  i n  (A 2 . 9 5 a ) ,  we d e r i v e  
t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  BC o f  f i g u r e  2 . 9 ,  i . e
D l n P ( t )  = m - X^  ( x ( t )  -  x)
T^T
TT
(Xi -  (XjV- \ )  + gy(Xi -  hy)
(A2.96)
Under  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  e q u a t i o n s
( A 2 . 9 7 a )
v ( t )  = V + (A2.97b)
where  and X2 a r e  now t h e  two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  o f  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n  (A2.74)  and A and B i s  a 
new s e t  o f  c o n s t a n t s .  One o f  t h e  r o o t s  i s  n e g a t i v e  
( s ay  X^  =X < 0) and t h e  o t h e r  i s  p o s i t i v e  (X^ > 0 ) .  
Hence,  f o r  a s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
A2 - B2 - 0 (A2.98)
w i t h  (A2.97)  becoming
x ( t )  = X + Ae Xt (A2.99a)
v ( t )  = V  + Be Xt (A2.99b)





f rom t h e  f i r s t  row o f  which  we have
*  ■ (1 - X »  •
Us ing  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  (A2.91b)  i n  (A2.99b)  and 
s o l v i n g  f o r  B we have
B = (v^* -  Vi*]  and A = (-f ‘ •CA2.10Z)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  A i n  (A2.99a)  we g e t
=  X  + ( 1  ( ^ 0 *  ■ (A2.103)
For  t  = 0 we g e t  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  on t h e  impact  
o f  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u un d e r  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e ­
s i g h t ,  i . e .
( + )
^  + (1 X) (^0* - V^*) = x ^ '  < X  (A2.104)
'^ TT
S inc e  ' < x, we have  o v e r s h o o t i n g .  S u b t r a c t i n g  (A2.94)  
f rom (A2.104)  we o b s e r v e  t h a t  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  un d e r  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i s  g r e a t e r  s i n c e
( + ) ( - ) ( - )
(%o' - " -  (1 (Vo* -  Vi*)  > 0 CA2.10S)
(-) (“ ) (")
Tak ing  t h e  t im e  d e r i v a t i v e s  o f  (A2.99)  and s u b s t i t u t i n g  
A^ from (A2.99)  and B f rom (A2.102)  we g e t  t h e  r a t e  o f
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a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  un d e r  r a t i o n a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( s e e  F i g u r e  2 .7 )
x ( t )  = A ( x ( t )  -  x) (A2.106a)
v ( t )  = X(vQ* - v ^ * ) e^ ^  (A2.106b)
From (A2.106a)  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  d u r i n g  
t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  (B’C  i n  F i g u r e  2 . 9 )  i s
D In  P ( t )  = m - X ( x ( t )  - x)  (A2.107)
The f o r m a l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h i s  s e c t i o n  u n d e r l i e s  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  S e c t i o n s  2 .6  and 2 .7  o f  t h e  t e x t .
I l l
CHAPTER 5
EXCHANGE RATE DYNAMICS UNDER MANAGED FLOATING 
3 .1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
A f t e r  t h e  c o l l a p s e  o f  t h e  B r e t t o n  Woods sy s t em 
i n  March 1973,  t h e  ma j o r  i n d u s t r i a l i z e d  c o u n t r i e s ,  f a c e d  
w i t h  s u b s t a n t i a l  u n c e r t a i n t y  c o n c e r n i n g  f u t u r e  b a l a n c e  o f  
paymen ts  d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  a l l o w e d  t h e i r  c u r r e n c i e s  t o  f l o a t  
i n  v i ew  o f  t h e  p e r s i s t i n g  marked d i f f e r e n c e s  among n a t i o n a l  
e conomies  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  l e v e l s  o f  economic  a c t i v i t y ,  
i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and s t r u c t u r a l  c h a n g e s .
The s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  t h a t  r e s u l t e d  and 
t h e  p o t e n t i a l  economic  c o s t s  t h a t  i t  e n t a i l s ,  l e d  many 
c e n t r a l  banks  t o  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t  t o  
c o r r e c t  d i s o r d e r l y  ma r ke t  c o n d i t i o n s  o r  t o  m i t i g a t e  e x c e s s i v e  
exchange  r a t e  movements o r  even t o  d r i v e  r a t e s  a g g r e s s i v e l y  
i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  d i r e c t i o n  f o r  v a r i o u s  economic  o r  p o l i t i c a l  
r e a s o n s .  The most  w i d e l y  u s e d  means o f  exchange  r a t e  man­
agement  i n c l u d e :  c a p i t a l  o r  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,
o f f i c i a l  f o r e i g n  b o r r o w i n g ,  m o n e t a r y  o r  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  
p o l i c i e s ,  b u t  m a i n l y  p u r c h a s e s  o r  s a l e s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  
i n  s p o t  o r  f o r w a r d  m a r k e t s .
In  s p i t e  o f  t h i s  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  which  i r o n i c a l l y  
had  l e d  i n i t i a l l y  t o  a g r e a t e r  r e s e r v e  u s a g e  t h a n  un d e r  
f i x e d  r a t e s  (W i l l i amson  1976) c o n t r a r y  t o  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t o
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t h e  o p p o s i t e  (Wi l l i a ms on  1 97 3 ) ,  exchange  r a t e  changes  i n  
t h e  m a j o r  i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t r i e s  were  u s e d  as  t h e  main 
mechanism o f  a d j u s t m e n t  i n  b a l a n c e  o f  payment s  d e v e l o p ­
ment s  (IMF 1978,  1979 ) .  A g e n e r a l  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  major  
de v e l o p m e n t s  d u r i n g  t h e  r e c e n t  f l o a t i n g  p e r i o d  i s  g i v e n ,  
a p a r t  f rom t h e  IMF a n nu a l  r e p o r t s ,  i n  McKinnon (1 976a ) ,
Brown (1796)  and T o s i n i  ( 1 97 7 ) .
The I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Mone t a ry  Fund i n  J u n e  1974,  
r e f l e c t i n g  a g e n e r a l  i m p l i c i t  ag r e em e n t  t h a t  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  
o f  gove rnm en t s  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  exchange  r a t e s  s h o u l d  be a 
m a t t e r  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s u r v e i l l a n c e ,  a d o p t e d  a s e t  o f  
n o n - b i n d i n g  g u i d e l i n e s ^  wh ich  recommend t h a t  members:
(1) s h o u l d  p r e v e n t  o r  m o d e r a t e  day t o  day and week 
t o  week movements i n  exchange  r a t e s ,
(2) s h o u l d  m o d e r a t e  r e v e r s i b l e  movements i n  t h e i r  
r a t e s  f rom month t o  month o r  q u a r t e r  t o  q u a r t e r ,
(3) a r e  a l l o w e d  t o  a c t  a g g r e s s i v e l y  t o  l e a d  t h e i r  
exchange  r a t e s  t o w a rd s  a med ium- te rm-no rm a g r e e d  
w i t h  t h e  Fund,  and
(4) s h o u l d  c o n s u l t  t h e  Fund a b o u t  t h e i r  d e s i r e d  r e s e r v e s  
l e v e l s ,  s h o u l d  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e  i n t e r e s t  o f  
t h e  c o u n t r i e s  i n  whose c u r r e n c i e s  t h e y  i n t e r v e n e  
and s h o u l d  r e f r a i n  f rom t h e  u se  o f  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t
1.  These  g u i d e l i n e s  have  been  a d o p t e d  by t h e  e x e c u t i v e  b o a r d  
o f  t h e  IMF i n  J u n e ,  13,  1974 and a r e  i n c l u d e d  i n  ap pe nd ix  
I I  o f  IMF ( 1 9 7 4 ) ,  pp.  112 - 116,  and i n  t h e  a pp end ix  o f  
M i k e s e l l  and G o l d s t e i n  (1975)  and F l eming  ( 19 75 ) .
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r e s t r i c t i o n s .
A number o f  a cademic  p a p e r s  a l s o  d i s c u s s  t h e  
r u l e s  t h a t  s h o u l d  gove rn  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  
exchange  m a r k e t .  M i k e s e l l  and G o l d s t e i n  (1975) s u g g e s t  
c e r t a i n  r u l e s  f o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  b a s e d  on v a r i o u s  p o l i c y  
m o t i v a t i o n s ,  which  r e l a t e  i n  g e n e r a l  t o  p e r m i s s i b l e  changes  
i n  o f f i c i a l  r e s e r v e s  be tween  r e p o r t i n g  p e r i o d s .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  
two o t h e r  p a p e r s  r e f e r  t o  t h e  m ec ha n i c s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
r a t h e r  t h a n  t h e  p r esumed m o t i v a t i o n .  F i r s t ,  t h e  " l e a n i n g  
a g a i n s t  t h e  wind"  p r o p o s a l  ( T o s i n i  1977) r e f e r s  t o  a 
n o n - a g g r e s s i v e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  t o  s y m m e t r i c a l l y  and smoo th ly  
r e s i s t  exchange  r a t e  movements w i t h o u t  a c t u a l l y  f i x i n g  t h e  
r a t e  t o  a p a r t i c u l a r  l e v e l .  T h i s  p r o p o s a l  i s  r e f l e c t e d  i n  
g u i d e l i n e s  (1) and (2) o f  t h e  IMF which  r e q u i r e  smoo th ing  
and m o d e r a t i n g  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
The s e c o n d ,  t h e  " r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  p r o p o s a l "  p u t  
f o r w a r d  by E t h i e r  and B l o o m f i e l d  (1 9 7 5 ) ,  i s  o f  a n o n ­
m an d a to r y  n a t u r e  and r e q u i r e s  t h e  s e t t i n g  o f  a s t r u c t u r e  
o f  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s ,  r e v i s e d  p e r i o d i c a l l y  t h r o u g h  some d e f i n e d  
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p r o c e d u r e  and t h a t  c e n t r a l - b a n k s  s h o u l d  
u n d e r t a k e  n o t  t o  s e l l  t h e i r  c u r r e n c i e s  a t  a p r i c e  be low 
t h e i r  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s , b y  more t h a n  a f i x e d  p e r c e n t a g e  
( p o s s i b l y  z e r o )  o r  buy t h e i r  c u r r e n c i e s  a t  a p r i c e  e x c e e d i n g  
r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  by more t h a n  t h e  f i x e d  p e r c e n t a g e .  The 
r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  p r o p o s a l  i s  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  g u i d e l i n e  (3) 
o f  t h e  IMF, and i n  f a c t  E t h i e r  and  B l o o m f i e l d  c o n s i d e r  
t h e i r  p r o p o s a l  a s  an i m p l e m e n t a t i o n  o f  g u i d e l i n e  ( 3 ) ,  i n
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which  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  a r e  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  medium-term t a r g e t  
zones  f o r  exchange  r a t e s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  a s u g g e s t e d  
s u b s t i t u t i o n  o f  p e r m i s s i b l e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  f o r  t h e  manda to ry  
one recommended by t h e  IMF. W i l l i a m s o n  (19 75 ) ,  e x t e n d i n g  
t h e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  p r o p o s a l  c o n s i d e r s  i t  as s t r e n g t h e n i n g  
t h e  IMF’ s g u i d e l i n e s  and a s  p r o v i d i n g  t h e  fo cu s  f o r  
s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n .  I t s  i m p l e m e n t a t i o n ,  he a r g u e s ,  
would  p e r m i t  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  symmetry i n  
t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  mechanism and c o n t r o l  o f  g l o b a l  l i q u i d i t y  
wh ich  c o u l d  be a c h i e v e d  by t h e  i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  m u l t i c u r r ­
ency i n t e r v e n t i o n  and a s s e t  s e t t l e m e n t .
Both p r o p o s a l s ,  howeve r ,  p r e s e n t  p r a c t i c a l  and 
t h e o r e t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s .  L ea n i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  wind i s  
o p t i m a l  so l o ng  as  m a rk e t  f o r c e s  a r e  moving t h e  exchange  
r a t e  e x c e s s i v e l y  i n  one d i r e c t i o n ;  i f ,  t ho ug h ,  r a t e s  a r e  
moving t o wa rds  a new l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  l e v e l ,  t h i s  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  r u l e  would h i n d e r  t h e  a t t a i n m e n t  o f  t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
exchange  r a t e s .  I t  m ig h t  be  more i m p o r t a n t ,  f o r  example ,  
t o  a c t  a g g r e s s i v e l y  t o  d r i v e  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o wards  i t s  
new l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  m i n i m i z i n g  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  be tween  
s p o t  and medium-t erm excha nge  r a t e s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  
e f f e c t i v e  b a l a n c e  o f  paymen t s  a d j u s t m e n t .  The e s t a b l i s h ­
ment  o f  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  a g r e e d  s e t  o f  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  f o r  
a l l  c o u n t r i e s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  i s  f a r  from e a s y ,  g i v e n  
t h e  u n c e r t a i n t y  a bo u t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  exchange  r a t e s  
o f  ch anges  i n  t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  w or ld  t r a d e  t h a t  c h a r a c t e r ­
i z e d  t h e  1970s .  The a t t a i n m e n t  o f  such medium-t erm "norms"
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i s  u n l i k e l y  t o  be p o l i t i c a l l y  f e a s i b l e , g i v e n  t h e  p e r s i s t ­
ence  o f  marked d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  n a t i o n a l  economies  as  f a r  as 
i n f l a t i o n  r a t e s ,  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  and l e v e l s  o f  economic 
a c t i v i t y  a r e  c o n c e r n e d .  The e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  such  a 
s t r u c t u r e  o f  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  p r e s u p p o s e s  some d e g r e e  o f  
s t a b i l i t y  o f  u n d e r l y i n g  economic  c o n d i t i o n s  and some 
h a r m o n i z a t i o n  o f  n a t i o n a l  economic  p o l i c i e s .
I n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  t h e s e  r e s e r v a t i o n s ,  i t  i s  p e r h a p s  
n o t  s u r p r i s i n g  t h a t  no a t t e m p t  was made t o  implement  t h e  
IMF g u i d e l i n e s  o r  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  p r o p o s a l .  The new 
A r t i c l e s  o f  Agreement  o f  t h e  IMF e x p r e s s  t h e  exchange  r a t e
o b l i g a t i o n s  o f  members i n  more g e n e r a l  t e r m s ;  t h e  amended
2
a r t i c l e  IV i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  m a i n t a i n s  t h a t :
"members  s h a l l  a v o i d  m a n i p u l a t i n g  exchange  
r a t e s  o r  t h e  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  mo n e t a r y  sy s t em 
i n  o r d e r  t o  p r e v e n t  e f f e c t i v e  b a l a n c e  o f  
payments  a d j u s t m e n t  o r  t o  g a i n  an u n f a i r  
c o m p e t i t i v e  a d v a n t a g e  o v e r  o t h e r  member s . ’*
In  A p r i l  1977 t h e  IMF i s s u e d  some s p e c i f i c  p r i n c i p l e s ^  
f o r  t h e  g u i d a n c e  o f  m em ber s ’ exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s  which  
a v o i d  p r e c i s e  f o rm a l  r u l e s .  I n s t e a d  t h e y  e s t a b l i s h  p r o c e d ­
u r e s  t h a t  would a l l o w  c o n t i n u o u s  and e f f e c t i v e  s u r v e i l l a n c e  
by t h e  fund,  w h i l e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o u n t r i e s  a r e  l e f t  f r e e  t o
IMF (1 97 6 ) ,  p .  228.
The r e l e v a n t  d e c i s i o n  o f  t h e  IMF e x e c u t i v e  b o a r d  i s  
r e p r o d u c e d  i n  a p p e n d i x  I I  o f  IMF (1 97 7 ) ,  pp .  107-109 
and i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x  o f  A r t u s  and C r o c k e t t  (1978)
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f o l l o w  any exchange  r a t e  a r r a n g e m e n t s  t h e y  w i sh .
The l i t e r a t u r e  on i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c i e s  and 
managed f l o a t i n g  ha s  d e a l t  w i t h  a v a r i e t y  o f  t h e  i s s u e s  
r a i s e d  by t h e  new s t a t u s  q u o . Some p a p e r s  t r y  t o  j u s t i f y  
a c a s e  f o r  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n :  Day ( 19 77 ) ,  u s i n g  a
s i m p le  model  o f  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n ,  a r g u e s  t h a t  
o f f i c i a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m ar ke t  on a 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  b a s i s  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  a v o id  any n e c e s s i t y  f o r  
t h e  b u i l d  up o f  l a r g e  open  p o s i t i o n s  by p r i v a t e  s p e c u l ­
a t i o n .  L i p s c h i t z  (1978)  , u s i n g  a s i m p le  IS-LM model  w i t h  
d o m e s t i c  s u p p l y  and demand s h o c k s ,  makes a s i m p l e  c a s e  
f o r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  exchange  m ar k e t  i n  o r d e r  t o  
s t a b i l i z e  d o m e s t i c  a b s o r p t i o n .
G i r t o n  and He nde r son  (1976,  1977) a n a l y s e  
c e n t r a l  bank  o p e r a t i o n s  i n  f o r e i g n  and d o m es t i c  a s s e t s  
i n  a s h o r t - r u n  p a r t i a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o r t f o l i o  b a l a n c e  
model .  W i l l i a m s o n  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  i n  a s im p le  s t o c h a s t i c  g e n e r a l  
e q u i l i b r i u m  f l ow  mo de l ,  examines  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  
r e s e r v e  u se  and t h e  t r a d e - o f f  be tween exchange  r a t e  
f l e x i b i l i t y  and t h e  e x t e n t  o f  r e s e r v e - u s e  w i t h  t h e  gov­
e rnment  i n t e r v e n i n g  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  3 rd  g u i d e l i n e  o f  t h e  
IMF ( r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  p r o p o s a l ) .  B l ack  ( 19 76 ) ,  i n  a c r i t i c a l  
comment,  m o d i f i e s  W i l l i a m s o n ’ s r e s u l t s  f o r  t h e  c a s e  o f  
r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s .
Kour i  (1976)  and Hende r son  (1978)  examine t h e  
im p a c t ,  l o n g - r u n  and dynamic  e f f e c t s  o f  a once  and f o r  a l l  
f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t  o p e r a t i o n ,  i n  a p o r t f o l i o  b a l a n c e
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g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  model .  F i n a l l y ,  i n  an e m p i r i c a l  
c o n t e x t ,  A r t u s  (1976)  examines  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  
d e u t s c h m a r k - d o l l a r  exchange  r a t e  f o r  t h e  r e c e n t  f l o a t i n g  
p e r i o d  w i t h  an e x p l i c i t  i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  government  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n ;  t h e  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  u s e d  r e f l e c t s  b o t h  t h e  
l e a n i n g  a g a i n s t  t h e  wind and t h e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  p r o p o s a l s .  
Branson  e t  a l .  ( 1 9 7 7 ) ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand,  i n  an  e m p i r i c a l  
s t u d y  o f  t h e  same exchange  r a t e  u se  an endogenous  g o v e r n ­
ment  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  d e r i v e d  t h r o u g h  a p r o c e s s  o f  m in­
i m i z i n g  t h e  w e l f a r e  c o s t s  o f  d i v e r g e n c e  from t h e  t a r g e t  
v a l u e s  o f  t h e  ex change  r a t e ,  t h e  money s u p p l y  and t h e  
r e s e r v e  s t o c k .
Our a n a l y s i s  i s  an a t t e m p t  t o  i n c o r p o r a t e  a 
government  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i n  a g e n e r a l  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o r t f o l i o  b a l a n c e  model  and t o  compare t h e  r e s u l t i n g  
exchange  r a t e  dynamics  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  w i t h  t h o s e  
un de r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  A p a r t  f rom a s s e s s i n g  t h e  e f f e c t i v e ­
n e s s  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  and t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t s  o f  
t h e  d e g r e e  o f  r e s e r v e  u s e  i n v o l v e d ,  ou r  a n a l y t i c a l  f r a m e ­
work a l l o w s  a r i g o r o u s  e x a m i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
s t a b i l i z i n g  and d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n  on dynamic  e x ­
change  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r .  F i r s t ,  however ,  gove rnment  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  n e e d s  t o  be j u s t i f i e d  i n  t h e  w or ld  d e s c r i b e d  by 
our  model .
The n e o c l a s s i c a l  b a s i c  f o r m a t  o f  o u r  mode l ,  
a n a l y s e d  i n  d e t a i l  i n  c h a p t e r  2,  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  h i g h l y  
a b s t r a c t  n a t u r e  and i t s  r a t h e r  s t r i c t  a s s u m p t i o n s  ab ou t
118
wage and p r i c e  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  t h e  law o f  one p r i c e  and t h e  
i n s t a n t a n e o u s  c l e a r i n g  o f  a l l  m a r k e t s ,  a l l o w s  no economic 
c o s t s  t o  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .  The r e s u l t i n g  
s h o r t - r u n  p r i c e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  do n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  
o f  r e s o u r c e s  o r  t h e  gove rnment  p o l i c y ;  t h e y  s i m p ly  c au se  
c o r r e s p o n d i n g  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  d o m e s t i c  co n su m p t i o n  and a b s o r p ­
t i o n .  To j u s t i f y  gove rnment  i n t e r v e n t i o n  we p o s t u l a t e  t h a t  
t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  s e n s i t i v e  t o  p r i c e  v a r i a b l i l i t y  wh ich  
a f f e c t s  n e g a t i v e l y  some i m p l i c i t  gove rnment  w e l f a r e  
f u n c t i o n .  Thus ,  t h e  m o n e t a r y  a u t h o r i t i e s  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  
f o r e i g n  excha nge  m a r k e t  t o  m in im ize  t h e  w e l f a r e  c o s t s  o f  
s h o r t - r u n  p r i c e  v a r i a t i o n . ^  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  
assumed t o  have  a l o s s  f u n c t i o n  t h e  m i n i m i z a t i o n  o f  wh ich  
d i c t a t e s  a s p e c i f i c  governmen t  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n .  More 
s p e c i f i c a l l y ,  t h e  c e n t r a l  bank i n t e r v e n e s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  
exchange  m a r k e t  i n  o r d e r  t o  m in imize  t h e  w e l f a r e  c o s t s  o f  
d e v i a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  ( p r i c e  l e v e l )  f rom i t s  
e x p e c t e d  l o n g - r u n  p a t h .  Such an i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  can
S h o r t - r u n  p r i c e  v a r i a b i l i t y , t h r o u g h  i t s  e f f e c t s  on 
p r i v a t e  w e a l t h , c a u s e s  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  d o m e s t i c  
c o ns u m p t i o n  and a b s o r p t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t o  
t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  governmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  m o d e r a t e s  
p r i c e  v a r i a t i o n ,  i t  s t a b i l i z e s  d o m e s t i c  a b s o r p t i o n  as  
w e l l .  See L i p s c h i t z  (1978)  f o r  a gove rnment  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  f u n c t i o n  d i r e c t l y  c o n c e r n e d  w i t h  s t a b i l i z i n g  
d o m e s t i c  a b s o r p t i o n .  Use o f  a more r e a l i s t i c  model ,  
a l l o w i n g  e x p l i c i t  economic  c o s t s  t o  exchange  r a t e  
v a r i a b i l i t y , w i l l  r e n d e r  o u r  a n a l y s i s  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  
i n t r a c t a b l e .
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f o r m a l l y  be p r e s e n t e d  a s  f o l l o w s :
FgCtg)  = I P(to)  - ; & > 0 ( 3 . 1 a )
Mg(t  )
F g ( t  ) = -----------— ( 3 .1 b )
° P ( t o )
F g ( t )  = 6 P ( t )  -  P ( t ) 5 > 0 ( 3 . 1 c )
Mg(t )
F g ( t )   ---------------; t  > to ( 3 . I d )
PCt)
where  Fg i s  t h e  change  i n  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ' s  h o l d i n g s  
o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  due t o  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .  P ( t )  
i s  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e ,  P ( t )  i s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  e s t i m a t e  
o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  and 5, and 6 a r e  p o s i t i v e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  p a r a m e t e r s .  The i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  amounts  t o  
a gove rnmen t  p u r c h a s e  o r  s a l e  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  from t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  be tween  t h e  
s p o t  r a t e  a t  a p a r t i c u l a r  t ime  t  and i t s  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e ,  
g i v e n  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p a r a m e t e r .  I n  r e t u r n ,  t h e  
governmen t  s e l l s  o r  buys  d o m e s t i c  money (Mg).
On t h e  imp ac t  o f  any exogenous  change  ( t im e  t.^) , 
t h e  gove rnmen t  c h an g e s  d i s c r e t e l y  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  
p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s  t h r o u g h  exchange  m a r k e t  o p e r a t i o n s  
( e q u a t i o n s  { 3 . 1 a )  and ( 3 . 1 b ) .  E q u a t i o n s  ( 3 . 1 c )  and ( 3 . Id)  
d e s c r i b e  how t h e  s t o c k s  o f  Fg and Mg v a r y  o v e r  t i m e .
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The i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  can e q u i v a l e n t l y  be 
e f f e c t e d  by e x c ha n g in g  f o r e i g n  bonds  f o r  d o m e s t i c  money,  
w i t h  an added c o m p l i c a t i o n  on t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t .
Because  d o m e s t i c  bonds  a r e  deno mina t ed  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y ,  
d o m e s t i c  open m ar ke t  o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  a l s o  f o r e i g n  exchange  
m a r k e t  o p e r a t i o n s .  An exchange  o f  d o m e s t i c  w i t h  f o r e i g n  
bo nd s ,  t h o u g h ,  w i l l  have  no e f f e c t  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  
p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s . ^
We a r e  n o t  i n t e r e s t e d  i n  d e r i v i n g  t h e  optimum 
r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  m in i m ize s  a g i v e n  l o s s  f u n c t i o n  
b u t  r a t h e r ,  we s t a r t  w i t h  a p a r t i c u l a r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e ,  
t h e  v e r y  e x i s t e n c e  o f  which  i m p l i e s  an i m p l i c i t  l o s s  
f u n c t i o n  which  j u s t i f i e s  a l s o  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .  
Hence ,  o u r  a p p r o a c h  i s  q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h a t  o f  
F i s c h e r  (1977)  , Hende r son  (1979) and Boyer  ( 19 78 ) .  Boyer  
i n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  d e a l i n g  w i t h  a s i m p l i f i e d  s t o c h a s t i c  model ,  
d e r i v e s  an o p t i m a l  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c y  p e r m i t t i n g  t h e  
a p p r o p r i a t e  d e g r e e  o f  exchange  r a t e  f l e x i b i l i t y ,  g i v e n  t h e  
d e t e r m i n i s t i c  and s t o c h a s t i c  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  economy; 
suc h  an a n a l y s i s  i s  c o n d u c t e d  i n  t e rms  o f  t h e  t e c h n i q u e s  
d e v e l o p e d  by t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  o f  t a r g e t s ,  i n s t r u m e n t s  and 
i n d i c a t o r s  u n d e r  u n c e r t a i n t y . ^
Our p o s t u l a t e d  government  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n
5. See G i r t o n  and Hende r son  (1977) f o r  a t h o r o u g h  a n a l y s i s  
o f  c e n t r a l  bank o p e r a t i o n s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m ark e t
6. For  t h e  t a r g e t s ,  i n s t r u m e n t s  and i n d i c a t o r s  l i t e r a t u r e  
s e e  B r a i n a r d  ( 1 9 6 7 ) ,  Po o l e  (1970) and Fr iedman ( 1 97 5 ) .
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( 3 . 1 )  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  p r o p o s a l  o f  
E t h i e r  and B l o o m f i e l d  (1975)  and t h e  3 rd  g u i d e l i n e  o f  t h e  
IMF, where  o u r  P ( t )  c o r r e s p o n d s  t o  t h e  r e f e r e n c e - r a t e  o f  
E t h i e r  and B l o o m f i e l d  and t h e  IMF’ s e x c h a n g e - r a t g  medium - 
t e rm  t a r g e t  zone .  A s i m i l a r  gove rnmen t  r e a c t i o n  f i ^nc t i on  
i s  a l s o  u s e d  by W i l l i a m s o n  ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  B l a c k  (1976)  and A r t u s  
( 1 9 7 6 ) .  We m a i n t a i n  t h e  n o n - m a n d a to r y  n a t u r e  o f  i n t e r s  
v e n t i o n  recommended by E t h i e r  and B l o o m f i e l d , b u t  we 
assume t h a t  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  p a t h  ( P ( t ) )  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  
by t h e  d o m e s t i c  gove rnment  a l o n e  and n o t  t h r o u g h  any 
c o n s u l t a t i o n  w i t h  t h e  IMF o r  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y  a g r e e d  
p r o c e s s .  Given t h e  f o r m a t  o f  ou r  m od e l ,  howeve r ,  v a r i a t i o n s  
i n  P ( t )  would n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  wo r l d  s t r u c t u r e  o f  exchange 
r a t e s  f o r  we o n l y  have  two c o u n t r i e s  w i t h  one d e g r e e  o f  
f r eedom ( g i v e n  t h a t  P* i s  c o n s t a n t ) . I f  more t h a n  two 
c o u n t r i e s  a r e  i n t r o d u c e d , t h i n g s  become q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t ,  f o r  
i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  any r e c o n c i l i n g  mechan ism,  such  b e h a v i o u r  
m ig h t  l e a d  t o  i n c o m p a t i b l e  n a t i o n a l  p o l i c i e s ,  t o  p o s s i b l e  
a s y m m e t r i e s  i n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and i t  c o u l d  c o m p l i c a t e  t h e  
c h o i c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c u r r e n c i e s .
To make ou r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  o p e r a t i o n a l ,  we 
need  t o  s p e c i f y  t h e  way i n  wh ich  t h e  gove rnmen t  forms i t s  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h ,  t h e  e s t i m a t e  o f  wh ic h ,  as  w i l l  be  shown,  ha s  c o n s i d ­
e r a b l e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  exchange  r a t e  d y n a m i c s ,  t h e  l ong  -
7. For  a more t h o r o u g h  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e s e  i s s u e s  s ee  
F l e ming  (1975)  and W i l l i a m s o n  ( 1 9 7 5 ) .
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r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  and t h e  s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  whole  sy s t em 
In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  we p o s t u l a t e  t h a t  t h e  gove rnment  r e f e r e n c e  
r a t e  a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t i m e ,  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  
i s  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n :
M^Ct)
PCt)  = ---------  ( 3 . 2 )
M®
where  i s  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  e x p e c t e d  by
5
t h e  gove rnmen t  t o  p r e v a i l  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n .  M ( t )  i s  t h e  
no m in a l  money s t o c k  a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t i m e .  On t h e  
imp ac t  o f  any exogenous  ch an ge ,  t h e  government  works  o u t  
t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  t h e  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e  f o r  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and a d j u s t s  i t s  
r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  i . e .
M^Ct) g
P ( t )  = - 3 —  = M^( t )  L (M®); L ' ( - )  < 0 ( 3 .3 )
From t h e  l o n g - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  o f  c h a p t e r  
2 ( sum mar i s ed  i n  t a b l e  2 . 5 ) ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s ,  M*, c an  be w r i t t e n  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  
exogenous  v a r i a b l e s ,  i . e .
M* = M*(Y, u ,  T,  G, B) ( 3 . 4 a )
123
M* > 0 ,  M*^ > 0 ,  < 0 ,  = M*g = 0 ( 3 .4 b )
Hence,  t h e  gove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  can be
w r i t t e n  as
P ( t )  = a M ^ ( t ) . L ( Y ,  u ,  T) ; a > 0  ( 3 . 5 a )
Ly < 0 ,  < 0 ,  > 0 ( 3 .5 b )
where  Y, u ,  and T r e p r e s e n t  now t h e  l e v e l s  o f  t h e s e  
v a r i a b l e s  e x p e c t e d  by t h e  gove rnment  t o  ho ld  i n  t h e  l o n g  - 
r u n .  Exogenous d i s t u r b a n c e s  t h a t  a r e  e x p e c t e d  t o  r e v e r s e  
t h e m s e l v e s ,  do n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e ,  even  i f  t h e  exogenous  shocks  a f f e c t  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  
c a s e s  o f  r e v e r s i b l e  exogenous  changes  o r  o f  s h o r t - r u n  
d i s t u r b a n c e s  t h a t  l e a v e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n a f f e c t e d ,  
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 )  amounts  e f f e c t i v e l y  t o  a l e a n ­
ing  a g a i n s t  t h e  wind p o l i c y .  a i s  a p a r a m e t e r  r e f l e c t i n g  
t h e  r e l a t i v e  p r e c i s i o n  w i t h  wh ich  t h e  gove rnment  p r e d i c t s  
l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  I f  a = 1,  t h e  government  
ha s  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  and i f  a ^ 1,  t h e  g o v e r n ­
m e n t ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  d e v i a t e s  
f rom i t s  t r u e  v a l u e ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  gove rnment  i s  u s i n g  
t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h .
The way t h e  go ve rnmen t  i s  p o s t u l a t e d  t o  form i t s  
e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  p a t h  i s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e
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’’p u r c h a s i n g  power  p a r i t y  me thod” s u g g e s t e d  by A r t u s  ( 197 8 ) ,  
wh ich ,  g i v e n  t h e  f o r m a t  o f  our  a n a l y s i s  seems most
o
s u i t a b l e .
The l a y o u t  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r  i s  as f o l l o w s :  i n
s e c t i o n  3 . 2  we i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 )  i n  
our  b a s i c  model  a s suming  t h a t  t h e  government  ha s  l o n g - r u n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  ( c a s e  I ) .  Then,  i n  s e c t i o n  3 . 2 . 4 ,  we 
compare t h e  dynamic  exchange  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r  u n d e r  f r e e  and 
managed f l o a t i n g .  I n  s e c t i o n  3 . 3  we r e l a x  t h e  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t  a s s u m p t i o n  ( c a s e  I I ) ,  and examine t h e  p o s s i b i l ­
i t i e s  o f  v a r i o u s  a s y m m e t r i e s  i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  be tween  t h e  
p u b l i c  and p r i v a t e  s e c t o r s  and t h e i r  c o n se q ue n ce s  f o r  
exchange  r a t e  dy n a mi cs .  Under  a m o d i f i e d  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 )  i s  shown to  r e f l e c t  s p e c u l a t i v e  
b e h a v i o u r  and i n  s e c t i o n  3 .4  we examine t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
s t a b i l i z i n g  and d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n  on t h e  dynamic  
exchange  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r .  F i n a l l y ,  s e c t i o n  3 .5  p r o v i d e s  
our  c o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s .
3 .2  Case I :  Government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  w i t h  t h e  r i g h t  e s t i m a t e
o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h
In t h i s  c a s e  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e
8. O t h e r  methods  s u g g e s t e d  by A r t u s  (1978),  a r e  t h e  ’’u n d e r ­
l y i n g  paymen ts  d i s e q u i l i b r i a  a p p r o a c h ” and t h e  ’’a s s e t  
m a r k e t  d i s t u r b a n c e s  me tho d” . In  A r t u s  ( 1 97 6 ) ,  whe re  a 
gove rnment  i n t e r v e n t i o n  f u n c t i o n  s i m i l a r  t o  o u r s  i s  u s e d ,  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
i s  e n d o g e n o u s l y  d e t e r m i n e d  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  d o m e s t i c  and 
f o r e i g n  p r i c e  l e v e l s .
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l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  i s  a lways  eq u a l  t o  i t s  t r u e  
v a l u e ,  g i v e n  by ( 3 . 5 a )  w i t h  a = 1,  b e ca us e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  a s s u m p t i o n .  The p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  on t h e  
o t h e r  han d ,  i s  assumed t o  form i t s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  e i t h e r  i n  
an e r r o r - l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s  o r  a c c o r d i n g  t o  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t ,  a s  b e f o r e .
The i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  s t o c k s  
o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  ( i n  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  c o m p l e t e  s p e c i a l i z a t i o n ) . To r e f l e c t  t h e s e  
r e p e r c u s s i o n s  o f  exchange  m ar ke t  o p e r a t i o n s ,  we r e d e f i n e  
ou r  a s s e t s  as  f o l l o w s :
M M Mg
M 5 —  = -  + —  (1 - k ) ;  0 < k < 1 ( 3 . 6 )
P P P
V 5 b ( l  - k) + F + Fg ( 3 . 7 )
Q
where  M s t a n d s  f o r  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k  a t  e v e r y  
moment i n  t i m e ;  i t  i s  made up from t h e  s t o c k  o f  nomina l  
money (M) a c c u m u l a t e d  by t h e  normal  f i n a n c i n g  o f  government  
e x p e n d i t u r e s  and f rom Mg, wh ich  shows t h e  a c c u m u l a t e d  
c han ge s  i n  t h e  n o m in a l  money s u p p l y  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
p o l i c y  b r i n g s  a b o u t .  k i s  t h e  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  p a r a m e t e r ,  
showing t h e  e x t e n t  t o  wh i ch  t h e  government  s t e r i l i z e s  t h e  
c hanges  i n  money s u p p l y  ( t h r o u g h  d o m es t i c  open m ar ke t  
o p e r a t i o n s )  c a u s e d  by  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  I f  k = 1, s t e r i l i z a t i o n
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i s  co m p l e t e  and i f  k = 0, we have  no s t e r i l i z a t i o n  a t  a l l .
In  e m p i r i c a l  s t u d i e s  on t h e  DM/do l l a r  exchange  r a t e  t h e  
s t e r i l i z a t i o n  p a r a m e t e r  was found  b o t h  s i g n i f i c a n t  and
9
c l o s e  t o  u n i t y ,  i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h e  Bundesbank was a b l e  
t o  p u r s u e  e f f e c t i v e l y  i t s  d e s i r e d  d o m e s t i c  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y .  
I n t e rms  o f  o u r  mo de l ,  however ,  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  i s  i n c o n ­
s i s t e n t  w i t h  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Because  d o m e s t i c  bonds  a r e  
de nomina t ed  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  and a r e  p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s  
t o  f o r e i g n  bo n d s ,  d o m e s t i c  open mar ke t  o p e r a t i o n s  a r e  
e f f e c t i v e l y  f o r e i g n  exchange  m ark e t  o p e r a t i o n s .  Hence ,  i f  
s t e r i l i z a t i o n  i s  c o m p l e t e ,  open marke t  o p e r a t i o n s  o f f s e t  
t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t  o p e r a t i o n s  and n e t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
i s  z e r o .  Thus ,  i n  o u r  model  we assume no s t e r i l i z a t i o n  
(k = 0) o r ,  e q u i v a l e n t l y ,  we r e f e r  t o  n e t  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
The a c c u m u l a t e d  changes  i n  p r i v a t e  h o l d i n g s  o f  
f o r e i g n  exchange  (Fg) augment  t h e  p r i v a t e  h o l d i n g s  o f  
f o r e i g n  a s s e t s .  To r e f l e c t  t h i s ,  we i n t r o d u c e  a new n o t ­
a t i o n ,  V, which  s t a n d s  f o r  t h e  " augmented  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h " ,  d e f i n e d  by e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 7 ) .  Hence ,  f o r  
k = 0 r e a l  h o m e - c o u n t r y  w e a l t h  becomes:
M Mg
W — —  + V ~ —  + V + Fg ( 3 . 8 )
P P P
9. A r t u s  ( 1976 ,  t a b l e  3,  p .  326) f ound a s t e r i l i z a t i o n  
c o e f f i c i e n t  e q u a l  t o  .745 and Branson e t  a l .  ( 1977,  
p .  318) c i t e  a s t u d y  by H e r r i n g  and M a r s t o n  (1977)  who 
found  a c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  a rou nd  . 9 ,  i n d i c a t i n g  a h i g h  
d e g r e e  o f  i n s u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  d o m es t i c  money s u p p l y  from 
e x t e r n a l  d e v e l o p m e n t s .
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Given e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 1 b ) ,  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  marke t  
o p e r a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  i n v o l v e s ,  change  
t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s .  I n t e r v e n t i o n  amounts  
t o  a mere  r e a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  w e a l t h  be tween  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .  Any i nduced  changes  
i n  t h e  exchange  r a t e  ( p r i c e  l e v e l ) ,  however ,  w i l l  a f f e c t  t h e  
e v a l u a t i o n  o f  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k  o f  a s s e t s .
3 . 2 . 1  S h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
The gove rnmen t  on t h e  impac t  o f  any exogenous  
ch an g e ,  i n t e r v e n e s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t ,  i n  t h e  
way d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 ) ,  a l t e r i n g  
d i s c r e t e l y  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s .  Over  
t i m e ,  b o t h  Fg and Mg v a r y  c o n t i n u o u s l y ,  t h e i r  m a r g i n a l  
change s  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  same i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e ,  t i l l  l o n g -  
r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  r e s t o r e d .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  government  
b e h a v i o u r  c a n  be p r e s e n t e d  as  f o l l o w s :
F g ( t n )  =  & P ( t )  -  aM^( to)L(Y,  u ,  T) £ > 0 ( 3 . 9 a )
Mg(to)
F g ( t o )  = --------------  ( 3 . 9 b )
P ( t o )
and
F g ( t )  = 6 P ( t )  -  aM^( t )L (Y,  u ,  T) (S > 0 ( 3 .1 0 a )
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F g ( t )
Mg(t )
P ( t )
f o r  t  > t ( 3 . 1 0b )
E q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 9 )  shows t h e  d i s c r e t e  change  i n  Fg 
and Mg on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change  a t  t ime  t  = t g  
t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  b r i n g s  a b o u t .  ( 3 . 1 0 ) ,  
s i m i l a r l y ,  shows how Fg and Mg e v o lv e  o v e r  t i m e .  I f  t h e  
f o r e i g n  exchange  m ar ke t  o p e r a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
p o l i c y  i n v o l v e s , d o e s  n o t  a f f e c t  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  
p o r t f o l i o s  on t h e  imp ac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change  b u t  s im p l y  
a f f e c t s  t h e  dynamic  e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  sy s t em  ( i . e .  i f  o n l y  
e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 1 0 )  i s  u s e d ) ,  t h e  impac t  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  
exogenous  sh oc k  u n d e r  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g  w i l l  be 
t h e  same.
The s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  o f  c h a p t e r  
2 have  t o  be  m o d i f i e d  t o  t a k e  a c c o u n t  o f  t h e  d i s c r e t e  
gove rnmen t  r e a c t i o n ,  i . e .  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 9 ) .  Assuming ,  w i t h  
no l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  t h a t  we s t a r t  f rom an i n i t i a l  s t a t ­
i o n a r y  s t a t e  p o s i t i o n  where  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t o c k s  o f  b o t h  Mg 
and Fg a r e  z e r o ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  
( i m p a c t  e f f e c t )  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  a r e  as  f o l l o w s :
Y, ( p  + v ) ,  i ,  n ,  u j  = p  - Fg ( 3 . 1 1 a )
Y. ( p  + V ) ,  i = F + Fg = F (3 .11 b )
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Fg = £ P -  a CM -FgP) L CY, u ,  T) ( 3 . 1 1 c )
S = Y -  C (Y - T + i ( v - F )  -
“ G + i  (v — F — B) ( 3 . l i d )
MG + iB = T + B +  nip - mFg ( 3 . l i e )
S i n c e  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t o c k s  o f  Fg and Mg a r e  z e r o ,  r e a l
p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  r e d u c e s  t o  (M/P + v ) . Fg i s  t h e  s t o c k  o f
f o r e i g n  exchange  by which  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  w i l l
augment  t h e  p r i v a t e  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  on t h e
impac t  o f  any exogenous  c han ge .  The i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y
a f f e c t s  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s ,  b u t
g i v e n  ( 3 . 9 b ) ,  t o t a l  w e a l t h  r em a in s  (M/P + v).Using (3.9b),  the supply
o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  becomes ((M/P - Fg) and t h e  s h o r t  -
r un  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  e x c h a n g e , , (F = F + F g ) . Real
d i s p o s a b l e  i ncome,  as  b e f o r e ,  i n c l u d e s  t h e  e x p e c t e d  c a p i t a l
Q
l o s s e s  on t o t a l  money s u p p l y  M , which  i s  now a f f e c t e d  by
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .  The government  i s  assumed t o
m a i n t a i n  i t s  m on e t a r y  p o l i c y  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  money s t o c k
SM by a f i x e d  p r o p o r t i o n  m ( = M/M ) o f  t h e  t o t a l  money
S
s u p p l y  M , a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t i m e .  Under  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  
a = 1.
The s h o r t - r u n  ( im pa c t  e f f e c t )  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s
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a r e  P,  F,  Fg,  S and B w h i l e  M, v ,  i ,  ir, u .  Y, T, G, B, a 
and £ a r e  exogenous .  The i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  i n v o l v e s  
ex cha ng es  o f  d o m e s t i c  f o r  f o r e i g n  money,  w i t h  no d i r e c t  
i n v o l v e m e n t  i n  t h e  goods m ar k e t  e q u i l i b r i u m .  T h e r e f o r e ,  
t h e  sy s t e m  m a i n t a i n s  i t s  a s s e t - m a r k e t - a p p r o a c h  r e c u r s i v e ­
n e s s  i n  t h a t  t h e  exchange  r a t e ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  h o l d i n g s  
o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  and t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  a r e  d e t e r ­
mined i n  t h e  a s s e t  m a r ke t  e x c l u s i v e l y ,  u n l e s s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
t h e  goods m ar k e t  i n f l u e n c e s  e x p e c t a t i o n s , a s  i s  t h e  c a s e  
u n d e r  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .  Given t h e  a s s e t  marke t  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  and t h e  i s s u e  
o f  new government  d e b t  a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  f low m ar k e t .  
T h i s  i s  f o r m a l l y  shown by t h e  m a t r i x  o f  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  
t h e  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s ,  , o f  t h e  l i n e a r i s e d  form o f  
t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s :
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As an i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
d e t e r m i n a t i o n  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  we w i l l  examine t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  
o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r i s k  r e l a t i v e  t o  d o m e s t i c  money,  
s t r e s s i n g ,  a t  t h e  same t i m e ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  t h e  impac t  
e f f e c t s  u n d e r  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g .
S t a r t i n g  from an i n i t i a l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o s i t i o n  where  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’s e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h  i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  one ,  Fg = 0 and
g
M = M, an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u o c c u r s  wh ich  i s  e x p e c t e d  n o t  
t o  r e v e r s e  i t s e l f .  Under  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  t h i s  l e a d s  t o  an 
e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  d o m e s t i c  money and an e x c e s s  demand f o r  
f o r e i g n  a s s e t s ,  s h i f t i n g  t h e  MM^  and FF^ s c h e d u l e s  o f  f i g .
3 . 1  upwards  t o  MM’  ^ and F F ’  ^ r e s p e c t i v e l y .  I n  t h e  ab se n c e  
o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  t h i s  l e a d s  t o  an exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  
( P ’ ^) and a c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  ( S ’^ ) ,  l e a v i n g  t h e  
s h o r t - r u n  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  unchanged  
(F = F o , s i n c e  Fg = 0 ) ,  g i v e n  r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c ) .  Under  
managed f l o a t i n g ,  howeve r ,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  u ,  b e c a u s e  i t  
a f f e c t s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and i s  
e x p e c t e d  t o  be p e r m a n e n t ,  s h i f t s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e s t i m a t e  
o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  up wa rd s ,  f o r  i t  l e a d s  
t o  a l o n g - r u n  r e d u c t i o n  i n  r e a l  b a l a n c e s ,  < 0 by ( 3 .5 b )
P r i o r  t o  t h e  exogenous  c h a n g e , t h e  gove rnment  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  
was e q u a l  t o  P ^ ; t h e  f a l l  i n  u s h i f t s  i t  upwards  t o  P, 
wh ich  l i e s  be low P ’  ^ as  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  










F i g u r e  3 . 1 .  S h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  under  
managed f l o a t i n g ;  e f f e c t s  o f  an exogenous  
f a l l  i n  u .
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exogenous  f a l l  i n  u .  Under  managed f l o a t i n g ,  g i v e n  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 9 ) ,  t h e  t r e n d  o f  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  to  
o v e r s h o o t  i t s  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l , a c t i v a t e s  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
p o l i c y .  As PCt^)  > F ( t ^ ) , t h e  gove rnment  t h r o u g h  exchange  
m ar ke t  o p e r a t i o n s  s e l l s  f o r e i g n  exchange  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r ,  b uy i ng  i n  r e t u r n  d o m e s t i c  money.  E f f e c t i v e l y ,  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  m o d e r a t e s  b o t h  t h e  e x ce s s  demand f o r  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and t h e  e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  do m es t i c  
money.  For  a g i v e n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p a r a m e t e r ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  and t h e  government  
r e f e r e n c e  r a t e ,  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  m ag n i t u d e  o f  t h e  exchange  
m ark e t  o p e r a t i o n .  But t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  government  p u r c h a s e  
o f  d o m e s t i c  money t h e  l e s s  t h e  e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  and h e n c e ,  t h e  l e s s  t h e  exchange  r a t e  has  
t o  d e p r e c i a t e  ( t h e  p r i c e  l e v e l  ha s  t o  r i s e )  t o  r e s t o r e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  money m a r k e t .  T h i s ,  however ,  r e d u c e s  
t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  and t h e  r e f e r e n c e  
r a t e  P and i t  t h u s  r e d u c e s  t h e  volume o f  government  s a l e s  
o f  f o r e i g n  money,  i . e .  Fg f a l l s .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h i s  i s  shown 
by t h e  f a c t  t h a t  b o t h  Fg and P a r e  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s .
Given t h e  s t r u c t u r e  o f  t h e  government  r e a c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n ,  t h e  gove rnment  i s  i m p l i c i t l y  assumed n o t  t o  be 
i n t e r e s t e d  i n  a once  and f o r  a l l  e x c h a n g e , t h a t  would t a k e  
t h e  sy s t em to the new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .  In  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
example  o f  a f a l l  i n  u ,  any a t t e m p t  t o  do so ,  and hence  t o  
s u p p l y  a l l  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  neede d  t o  r e s t o r e  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  w i l l  a l s o  mean a g r e a t  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e
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e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  b r i n g i n g  t h e  s p o t  
exchange  r a t e  c l o s e r  t o  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  P.  Given 
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e ,  howeve r ,  t h i s  w i l l  r e d u c e  t h e  
m ag n i tu d e  o f  gove rnmen t  s a l e s  o f  f o r e i g n  excha nge ,  c o u n t e r ­
a c t i n g  t h e  i n i t i a l  o b j e c t i v e .  Thus ,  t h e  government  does  
n o t  c o m p l e t e l y  e l i m i n a t e  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  o f  t h e  s p o t  
r a t e  from i t s  e x p e c t e d  l o n g - r u n  p a t h ;  i t  s i m p ly  a l l o w s  
t h e  "opt imum” exchange  r a t e  f l e x i b i l i t y  t h a t  m in i m iz e s  
t h e  w e l f a r e  c o s t s .
From t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s ,  d e r i v e d  
i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x  and summar i sed  i n  t a b l e  3 . 1  be low ,  Fg 
u na mb ig uo u s ly  r i s e s  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  
i n  u ,  i m p ly in g  t h a t  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  has  t o  l i e  somewhere 
be tween  P '  ^ and P; t h e  d i s c r e t e  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c ­
i a t i o n  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change  i s  m o d e r a t e d  
r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  b u t  we s t i l l  have o v e r s h o o t i n g . ^ ^
10.  F o r m a l l y ,  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  m o d e r a t e s  t h e  d i s c r e t e  





a(M-FgP)L • > 0
( - )  (+)
However ,  we s t i l l  h ave  o v e r s h o o t i n g ,  c o n f i r m e d  by t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  t o  t h e  
exogenous  f a l l  i n  u i n  s e c t i o n  3 . 2 . 4 .  The gove rnmen t  
r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  ¥ ,  l i e s  be low P* i n  f i g . 3 . 1 ,  s i n c e
" " o '  . " " " o '  .  & " o '  -  "’« " o " > J  .  ,
" o '  ÿ  ' " o '
a s  F g ( t ^ )  > 0 and M* = by t h e  a s s u m p t io n  o f  l o n g - r u n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .
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I n  t e rm s  o f  f i g .  3 . 1 , t h e  MM and FF s c h e d u l e s  ^ ’ o o
s h i f t  upwards  t o  MM^  and FF^ r e s p e c t i v e l y  u n d e r  t h e  combined  
i n f l u e n c e  of, the f a l l  in u and the r i s e  i n  Fg,  which  a r e  b o t h  
s h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e s .  The f a l l  i n  u a l o n e  s h i f t s  t h e  s y s t e m  to  
t h e  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  b u t  t h e  r i s e  i n  F^ s h i f t s  b o t h  
s c h e d u l e s  downwards^^ so t h a t  t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  
i s  m i t i g a t e d .
The s h o r t - r u n  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  ex ch a n g e ,  a s  can 
be s een  f rom ( 3 .1 1b )  a r e  e q u a l  t o  (F + F g ) . From e q u a t i o n
( 3 . 7 ) ,  dFg -is t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  s t o c k  o f  augmented  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  r e s u l t i n g  from t h e  impact  o f  t h e  exogenous  
d i s t u r b a n c e  s i n c e  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  ( v ) ,  g i v e n  by p a s t  
a c c u m u l a t i o n ,  i s  c o n s t a n t  i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n .  D i f f e r e n t i a t i n g
( 3 . 7 )  we deduce  t h a t  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  
on bond h o l d i n g s  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  t o  - d F ,  s i n c e
dV = db + dF + dFg = dFg
I . e .
db = - dF ( 3 . 1 3 )
11.  From ( 3 . 1 1 a )  and ( 3 . 1 1 b )  we have
dP MM 1
=  -    <  0
dFg 
dP FF
F = c o n s t .  -c M
dFg F=Cons t .  r ^   ^ ^
^2Wp2 .
Hence t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  Fg s h i f t s  b o t h  s c h e d u l e s  down­
wards  f rom what  t h e y  would o t h e r w i s e  have  been  ( f r e e  
f l o a t i n g  p o s i t i o n ) .
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The i n c r e a s e  i n  augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h
t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  b r i n g s  abo u t  a v a i l s  t h e
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  o f  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  o f  i n c r e a s i n g  i t s
s h o r t - r u n  h o l d i n g s  o f  b o t h  f o r e i g n  exchange  and bonds
s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  t h e  exogenous  c h a n g e , u n l i k e  t h e  ca se
o f  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  where  t h a t  i s  p o s s i b l e  o n l y  o v e r  t im e ,
as c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s e s  a l l o w  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n
a s s e t s .  The s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  show t h a t
12f o r e i g n  exchange  and bond h o l d i n g s  b o t h  i n c r e a s e  (F 
f a l l s  i n  f i g .  3 . 1  ) .
The imp ac t  e f f e c t  on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  
w i l l  depend  on t h e  r e l a t i v e  s h i f t  o f  t h e  CC^ s c h e d u l e .  The 
r i s e  i n  Fg s h i f t s  CC^ up w a rd s ,  w h i l e  t h e  f a l l  i n  F t e n d s
12.  From t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  -  s e e  a p pe n d i x  
- by a d d in g  (d F /du )  and (dFg/du)  and u s i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n  




a(M-FgP)L^ + l u
s i n c e ,  f rom f o o t n o t e  10,  t h e  n u m e r a to r  i s  p o s i t i v e
TABLE 5 . 1
S h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  ( im p a c t  e f f e c t s )
Endogenous Exogenous v a r i a b l e s
V a r i a b l e s M V ÏÏ u Y T G B
P ( + ) (+) ( - ) ( + ) 0 0
F 0 (■*■) (?) ( + ) (?) ( + ) 0 0
0 (+) (?) ( - ) 0 0
S 0 (?) (?) (?) (?) (?) ( - ) ( - )
B 0 (+) ( - ) (?) ( + ) ( + )
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13t o  s h i f t  i t  downwards.  F i g .  3 . 1  has  been  drawn showing
as  a n e t  e f f e c t  an upward s h i f t  t o  CC^. The f a l l  i n  p r i v a t e  
r e a l  b a l a n c e s ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  
and t h e  r i s e  i n  bond h o l d i n g s  t e n d  t o  d r i v e  t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  i n t o  s u r p l u s ,  w h i l e  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  nomina l  
b a l a n c e s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  c a u s e s , d e c r e a s e s  
e x p e c t e d  c a p i t a l  l o s s e s  and t e n d s  t o  c o u n t e r a c t  t h e  above 
two e f f e c t s  t h r o u g h  a r i s e  i n  r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  i ncome.  The 
l a t t e r  e f f e c t ,  t h o u g h ,  m igh t  n o t  be s t r o n g  enough t o  push  
t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i n t o  d e f i c i t  and h e n c e , i n  f i g .  3 . 1  t h e  
c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i s  shown t o  be  i n  s u r p l u s  ( S ^ j .
To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  CC^ s c h e d u l e  s h i f t s  
u pw ar ds ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  
i s  u n a m b i g u ou s l y  r e d u c e d  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  Th i s  
r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  im b a l an c e  i s  due t o  t h e  
c u s h i o n i n g  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  p r o v i d e s  t o  p r i v a t e  
w e a l t h :  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m ar ke t  o p e r a t i o n s  m o d e r a t e
t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  and t h u s  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  a r e  
r e d u c e d  by l e s s  t h a n  i s  t h e  c a s e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ;
13.  T a b l e  2 . 3  shows t h a t  a f a l l  F s h i f t s  t h e  CC s c h e d u l e  
downwards .  From e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . l i d )  on t h e  o t h e r  
ha n d ,  an i n c r e a s e  i n  Fg s h i f t s  CC^ upwards  s i n c e
dP CC C °.iT
—  = TT > °
dFg S = c o n s t .  (-C . tt + C ) —
y  w p 2
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h e n c e ,  co ns um p t io n  i s  h i g h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n .  The i n c r e a s e  i n  s h o r t - r u n  bond h o l d i n g s  ( u n d e r  
managed f l o a t i n g ) ,  though, tends  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  t h e  
m o d e r a t e d  f a l l  i n  w e a l t h ^ ^  on t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s ,  
by im pr o v i n g  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t .  However ,  a s suming  t h a t  
t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  p r e v a i l , t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  
i m b a l a n c e  i s  u na mb ig uo us l y  m o d e r a t e d .
14.  The exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  r e d u c e s  r e a l  w e a l t h ,  f o r  
f rom e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 8 )  we have :
M M  M
W = — + —^  + V  + Fg = — + V  
P P P
15
g i v e n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 9 b ) .  Thus ,  t h e  r i s e  i n  p r i c e s  r e d ­
u c e s  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and w e a l t h .  S i n c e ,  however ,  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g ,  
i s  m o d e r a t e d  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  
i n  w e a l t h  i s  m o de ra t ed  as  w e l l .
F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  imbal ance  

























p r o v i d e d  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  bond h o l d i n g s  on 
t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  ( - i ( d F / d u ) )  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  
do n o t  o f f s e t  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  e f f e c t s .  The i n c l u s  
i o n  o f  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t  i n  o u r  mode l ,  a p a r t  from 
c o m p l i c a t i n g  t h e  a n a l y s i s ,  s u g g e s t s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
t h a t  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t  e f f e c t s  o f  a p a r t i c u l a r  d i s ­
t u r b a n c e  migh t  be s t r o n g  enough t o  more t h a n  o f f s e t  t h e  
b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  e f f e c t s .  T h a t  s a i d ,  t h o u g h ,  we assume 
t h a t  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  a lways  d om in a t e .
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The n e t  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  
i n t u i t i v e l y  seem q u i t e  c l e a r :  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u
c r e a t e s  an e x c e s s  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  and an e x c e s s  
s u p p l y  o f  d o m e s t i c  money and l e a d s  t o  a c u r r e n t  a ccoun t  
s u r p l u s , p r o v i d i n g  o v e r  t im e  t h e  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  needed  t o  
e s t a b l i s h  a h i g h e r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n  
p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s  a t  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .  The i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  s i m p ly  a l l e v i a t e s  t h e  e x c e s s  demand f o r  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and t h e  e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  
by i n c r e a s i n g  t h e  s u p p l y  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  and  d e c r e a s i n g  
t h e  nom ina l  money s u p p l y  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  t h e  exogenous  
c h a n g e .  As a c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e ' s  d i s c r e t e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  and o v e r s h o o t i n g  a r e  m od e ra t e d  and t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  im b a l an c e  i s  r e d u c e d .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
p o l i c y  c u s h i o n s  t h e  r e d u c t i o n  i n  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  and co n ­
s u m p t i o n ,  s t a b i l i s i n g  d o m e s t i c  a b s o r p t i o n .  Government  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n - e x c h a n g e  m a r k e t  c o n t i n u e s  so 
l o n g  a s  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  d e v i a t e s  f rom i t s  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e ,  
s p e e d i n g  up t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t ,  a f a c t  c o n f i r m e d  by t h e  
a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  t o  t h e  
exogenous  change  i n  s e c t i o n  3 . 2 . 4 .
The s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  o f  a 
change  i n  u and a l l  o t h e r  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  f o r m a l l y  
d e r i v e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x  and summar ised  i n  t a b l e  3 . 1  above.  
Note  t h a t  an i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k  (M) m a in ­
t a i n s  i t s  s h o r t - r u n  n e u t r a l i t y ,  f o r  i t  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  p r i c e  
l e v e l  ( t h e  exchange  r a t e )  i n  t h e  same p r o p o r t i o n , l e a v i n g
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a l l  o t h e r  v a r i a b l e s  u n a f f e c t e d .  S i m i l a r l y ,  changes  i n  
gove rnmen t  e x p e n d i t u r e  and i n  t h e  o u t s t a n d i n g  s t o c k  o f  domes­
t i c  bonds  (B) l e a v e  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  e q u i l i b r i u m  unchanged ,  
a f f e c t i n g  on l y  t h e  i s s u e  o f  new d e b t  and t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  
b a l a n c e ,  as  u nd e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .
The s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  ( 3 .1 1 )  
d e s c r i b e  t h e  impac t  e f f e c t s  o f  any exogenous  change  when 
t h e  gov e rnme n t ,  ba se d  on t h e  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  ( 3 . 9 ) ,  
change s  d i s c r e t e l y  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s  
c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y  w i t h  t h e  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e  . Sub­
s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e ,  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  sy s tem 
( 3 . 1 1 ) ,  d e t e r m i n e s  r e c u r s i v e l y  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  b o t h  Fg and 
Mg o v e r  t ime  t h r o u g h  t h e  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  ( 3 . 1 0 ) .  The 
s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s ,  t h a t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  
o f  t h e  sy s t em a t  a l l  p o i n t s  i n  t im e  ( n o t  j u s t  o n l y  on t h e  
impac t  o f  any shocks  a s  c o n d i t i o n s  ( 3 .1 1 )  d o ) ,  a r e  t h e  same 
a s  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  p l u s  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 0 ) .  
T he r e  i s  one m o d i f i c a t i o n ,  however :  r e a l  w e a l t h ,  r e a l
money b a l a n c e s  and augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  now 
g i v e n  by e q u a t i o n s  ( 3 . 8 ) ,  ( 3 . 6 )  and ( 3 . 7 )  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
Thus ,  t h e  s h o r t  r un  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  become:
Y, + V ) ,  i M‘ ( 3 . 1 4 a )
Y, ( ^  + V ) ,  i IT ,  U = F = F + Fg (3 .1 4b )
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Fg = 6 [ p  -  ctM^.L(Y, u ,  T)J ( 3 . 1 4 c )
S = Y - C
s s
(Y -  T + i  (V -  F) - , ( ^  + V)
-  G + i (V -  F - B) ( 3 . 1 4d )
s
G + iB = T + B +  m ! ! ^  ( 3 . 1 4 e )
where  F a r e  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange .
A p a r t  f rom e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 1 4 c )  and  t h e  r e d e f i n i t i o n  o f  w e a l t h  
v a r i a b l e s ,  c o n d i t i o n s  ( 3 . 1 4 )  a r e  t h e  same a s  u n d e r  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g .  Government  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  b a s e d  on ( 3 . 1 4 c ) ,  
a f f e c t s  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  Fg and Mg o n l y  o v e r  t ime  and f o r  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a l l  s t o c k s  o f  a s s e t s  a r e  
g i v e n  by p a s t  a c c u m u l a t i o n .  The endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
P,  F , Fg,  S and B, w h i l e  M^, V, i ,  tt , u ,  Y, T, G, B, m, a and 6 
a r e  ex ogenous .  Moreove r ,  ( 3 . 1 4 )  i s  p e r f e c t l y  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  ( 3 . 1 1 )  b e c a u s e  t h e  gove rnmen t  p o l i c y  s im p ly  a l t e r s ,  on 
t h e  impac t  o f  any exogenous  c h a n g e ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s  
o f  ( 3 . 1 4 )  by c ha ng i ng  t h e  e x i s t i n g  s t o c k s  o f  a s s e t s .  As i s
shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  o f
( 3 . 1 4 )  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  f o r  Fg 
i s  d e t e r m i n e d  r e c u r s i v e l y  by o t h e r  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s .
T a b l e  3 . 2  be low ,  p r o v i d e s  a summary o f  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  
c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s .  The l a s t  row shows t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
exogenous  changes  on t h e  r a t e  o f  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  augmented
TABLE 5 . 2
S h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  un d e r  managed f l o a t i n g
Endogenous Exogenous v a r i a b l e s
V a r i a b l e s M V ÏÏ u Y T G B
P ( + ) (+) ( - ) 0 0 0
F 0 ( + ) (?) 0 (?) 0 0 0
Fg 0 (+) ( - ) (?) ( - ) 0 0
S 0 (+) ( - ) (?) ( + ) • ( - ) ( - )
B 0 (+) ( - ) ( - ) ( + ) ( + )
V 0 (+) ( - ) (?) ( - ) 0 0
04
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r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  g i v e n  a s  t h e  a l g e b r a i c  sum o f  t h e  
c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  on S,  B and F g , s i n c e  by d i f f ­
e r e n t i a t i n g ^ ^  ( 3 . 7 ) ,  we have  (k = o ) :
V = V + Fg = S + B + Fg (3 . 1 5 )
3 . 2 . 2  The l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e
P r o v i d e d  t h e  sy s t e m  i s  d y n a m i c a l l y  s t a b l e ,  t h e  
s e qu en c e  o f  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  w i l l  l e a d  t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n
16.  More r i g o r o u s l y ,  V i s  d e r i v e d  from t h e  e q u a l i t y  be tween  
ex p o s t  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  w e a l t h  (W) and ex p o s t  n e t  
p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  (Sp^ ,  d e f i n e d  as  g r o s s  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  
p l u s  c a p i t a l  g a i n s ) ,  i . e .
S
W = o r  V + M = S - S g - ^ . p
sM Pwhere  Sg a r e  government  s a v i n g s  and C“ • p)
a r e  t h e  ex p o s t  c a p i t a l  g a i n s .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  Sg from t h e  
governmen t  b u d g e t  c o n s t r a i n t ,  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 1 4 e ) ,  we h a v e :
i... i . s . i . j ^  . j - ^  ^
= S + B - ^ ^ = S + B + F g  
g i v e n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 1 0 b )
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s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  where  r e a l  w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t  and h e l d  i n  
t h e  d e s i r e d  p r o p o r t i o n s ,  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  c o n s t a n t  and 
f u l l y  r e a l i s e d  and whe re  a l l  nomina l  v a r i a b l e s  grow a t  t h e  
same r a t e .  The exchange  r a t e  f o l l o w s  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h ,  
which ,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
e s t i m a t e ,  and g i v e n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 0 ) ,  t h e r e  i s  no 
r e a s o n  f o r  t h e  gove rnmen t  t o  i n t e r v e n e .
Hence ,  u n d e r  c a s e  I where  t h e  gove rnment  u s e s  t h e
r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  t h e
l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
f^  [ Y ,  (M + V) ,  i ,  n ,  Û] = M (3 .1 6 a )
^2 [ Y ,  (M + V) ,  i ,  n ,  u] = F = F + Fg (3 .16b )
Y =  C|JY - T + i ( V - F )  - ttM ) ,  ( M  +  V)]
+ G - i ( V - F - B )  - B ( 3 .1 6 c )
G + i B = T + B +  mM (3 .16d )
IT = m (3 . 1 6 e )
which  a r e  e x a c t l y  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,
g i v e n  t h e  r e d e f i n i t i o n  o f  a s s e t s .  The endogenous  v a r i a b l e s
a r e  M, F , V, B and tt , w h i l e  Y, i , u , T , G, B and m a r e
ex ogenous .  T ab l e  2 . 5  o f  c h a p t e r  2 summar izes  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  r e s u l t s .  The l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e
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i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  d i a g r a m a t i c a l l y  i n  f i g .  3 . 2  be low .  The 
e q u i l i b r i u m  s c h e d u l e s  have  t h e  same i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  as  un d e r  
f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  On t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  a x i s  we now have  a ug ­
mented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (V) which  i s  equ a l  i n  v a l u e  
t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (v) u n d e r  
f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  Because  we r e s t r i c t  t h e  p r e s e n t a t i o n  o f  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  a t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l  s p a c e ,  t h e  
CC* and FF* s c h e d u l e s  depend  on endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  as  
w e l l  a s  on ex og en o us .  T a b l e s  2 . 6  - 2 .8  o f  c h a p t e r  2 
summar ize  t h e  s h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
s c h e d u l e s .
3 . 2 . 3  Dynamic s t a b i l i t y
The a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and 
augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  c ha n g i n g  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  move t h e  sy s t em  o v e r  t i m e .  Dynamic s t a b i l i t y  
r e q u i r e s  c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  t h e  s eq uen ce  o f  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  
to  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  where  w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t  and 
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  c o n s t a n t  and f u l l y  r e a l i s e d .  S i n c e  u n d e r  
c a s e  I Fg = o i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n ,  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n s  o f  a u g ­
mented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (V) and r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
(v) w i l l  b o t h  be ze ro ,  g i v e n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 1 5 ) ;  t h i s  t h o u g h ,  
does  n o t  h o l d  i f  Fg f  o, a s  c an  be t h e  c a s e  u n d e r  t h e  
g e n e r a l i s e d  gov e rnmen t  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  d i s c u s s e d  i n  
c h a p t e r  4.  As u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  
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a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .
(a)  A d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s : The dynamic b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e
sys t e m  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i s  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  sy s t em  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s ,  d e r i v e d  form­
a l l y  i n  s e c t i o n  A3.2  o f  t h e  ap p en d i x :
7T =  3 [m - ^  - X - TT
L M
; o < 6 < l ,  E y > o ,  E^<o ( 3 . 1 7 a )
X = g i  (V, tt) ;  g iY>o,  gin<o (3 .17b )
V = h^(V,  tt) ; h^y<o,  h^^>o (3 .1 7 c )
The f i r s t  two t e rm s  i n  t h e  s q u a r e  b r a c k e t  o f  
( 3 . 1 7 a )  show t h e  r a t e  o f  g rowth  o f  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k ,
• g g
M /M ; i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  co m p l e t e  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  t h e  r a t e  
o f  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  nomina l  money s u p p l y  i s  no l o n g e r  e qu a l  
t o  m ,b u t  i s  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .  As i s  
p r o v e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  s u f f i ­
c i e n t  f o r  a l o c a l l y  s t a b l e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e :
I tt < 1 ( 3 . 1 8a )
T^T ■ ^IV ^ 
( - )  ( - ) (+) (+)
( 3 . 1 8b )
The f i r s t  c o n d i t i o n  i s  i d e n t i c a l  i n  form t o  t h e  
s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  The p r e s e n c e  o f
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o f  t h e  s e con d  c o n d i t i o n  makes t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  dynamic 
s t a b i l i t y  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  more s t r i n g e n t  t h a n  u nd e r  
f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  T h i s ,  however ,  i s  n o t  due t o  t h e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  p e r  s e , b u t  i t  a r i s e s  b e c a u s e  t h e  r a t e  o f  
g rowth  o f  t h e  money s u p p l y ,  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  co mp le t e  
s t e r i l i z a t i o n ,  i s  no l o n g e r  c o n s t a n t  o v e r  t i m e .
F i g .  3 . 3  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  p h a s e  d i ag r am  u nd e r  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  The x = 0 and t h e  V = 0 c u rv e s  
show t h e  l o c i  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  ( i n  l o g s )  and au g ­
men ted  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f o r  which  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  
b a l a n c e s  and augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
a r e  c o n s t a n t .  The e q u a t i o n s  o f  b o t h  s c h e d u l e s  a r e  f o r m a l l y  
d e r i v e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x  from e q u a t i o n s  ( 3 . 1 7 ) .  The s l o p e  
o f  t h e  X = 0 l o c u s  i s  amb iguous ,  s i n c e
dx
dV X = 0
( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( - )  ( - )  (-) (+)
g l V ^ g l V  ^iTT '  glTT ^IV ^ ~ ^^iTT^lV 
^^ I tt ^ ^IV ^lïï^
C“) (") (+) (+)
= ?
(3 .1 9 a )
When
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X = 0 i s  una mb ig uou s ly  upwards  s l o p i n g ,  b u t  i f  t h e  
i n e q u a l i t y  s i g n  o f  ( 3 . 19b )  i s  r e v e r s e d ,  i t s  s l o p e  can be 
p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e .  However ,  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  f rom t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  a lways  s e l f  c o r r e c t  
i ng  ( v e r t i c a l  a r r o w s ) , s i n c e
( - ) ( - )  (+) (+)
9x
9x
Cg I tt ^ 7 t ^IV ^iTT^ < 0
V=cons t
( - )  (+)
( 3 . 1 9c )
g i v e n  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  ( 3 . 1 8 a ) .
The s l o p e  o f  t h e  V = 0 c u r v e  and t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  a r rows  depend on i n e q u a l i t y  ( 3 .19b )  as 
w e l l  :
dx
dV






0 as  g IV <
IV i^TT
I tt
( 3 . 2 0 a )
9V








a s  g IV
> *^ 1V i^TT (3 .20b )
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F i g u r e  3 .3  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  f u l l  r an g e  o f  p o s s ­
i b i l i t i e s .  I f  i n e q u a l i t y  ( 3 . 1 9b )  h o l d s ,  b o t h  x = 0 and 
V = 0 a r e  p o s i t i v e l y  s l o p i n g  and d e v i a t i o n s  o f  augmented 
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f rom i t s  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  cumul ­
a t i v e .  The V = 0 c u rv e  can  be e i t h e r  f l a t t e r  ( f i g .  3 . 3 ( a ) )  
o r  s t e e p e r  ( f i g .  3 . 3 ( b ) )  t h a n  t h e  x = 0 l o c u s .  The l a t t e r
c a s e ,  however ,  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  dynamic s t a b i l i t y .  I f
.
t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  s i g n  i n  ( 3 . 1 9 b )  i s  r e v e r s e d ,  V = 0 becomes 
downwards s l o p i n g  and d e v i a t i o n s  o f  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n ­
c i a l  w e a l t h  f rom i t s  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g ,  
w h i l e  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  x = 0 l o c u s  can  be p o s i t i v e  o r  
n e g a t i v e .  Diagrams c ,  d and e o f  f i g u r e  3 . 3  i l l u s t r a t e  
t h e  t h r e e  p o s s i b l e  s u b c a s e s .  Subcase  d sh o u l d  be d i s m i s s e d ,  
f o r  i t  i m p l i e s  an  u n s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m .
As i n  c h a p t e r  2,  t o  enhance  i n t u i t i v e  i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s tem to  t h e  
exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  d e r i v e d  f o r m a l l y  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  w i l l  
be p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h e  (M, V) s p a c e ,  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  t h r e e  
l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  s c h e d u l e s  MM*, CC* and FF* ( s e c t i o n  
3 . 2 . 4 )  .
(3) P e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t : Wi th  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  e x p e c t e d
i n f l a t i o n  o r  e q u i v a l e n t l y  e x p e c t e d  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c ­
i a t i o n  i s  a lways  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  r a t e  ( s e e  app end ix  f o r  
d e t a i l  d e r i v a t i o n ) ,  i . e .
mS
TT = —  - X = w(V, x) ; Wy > 0 ,  (A)^  < 0 (3 .21 )
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S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 3 .2 1 )  i n  ( 3 . 1 7 b )  and ( 3 . 1 7 c )  we g e t  a 
sy s t em o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  t h a t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  dynamic 
b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t em u n d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  i . e .
X = gj^[y,  w(V, x ) ]  ; > 0 ,  < 0 ( 3 . 2 2 a )
V = h ^ [ y ,  w(V, X ) ] ;  = ? ,  > 0 (3 .2 2b )
where  g*^y = (3x/3V) + (3x/3 t t )  is>  ^ and
h * i v  = (3V/3V) + (3V/3n)Wy.
As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  
i s  a s a d d l e  p o i n t  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  p r o v i d e d :
h*^y < 0 ( 3 .2 3 )
F i g .  3 . 4  b e lo w ,  d e p i c t s  t h e  p h a se  d i ag ram u n d e r  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .  The x = 0 and V = 0 c u r v e s  a r e  d e r i v e d  
from ( 3 . 2 2 a )  and ( 3 .2 2b )  r e s p e c t i v e l y  ( s e e  a p p e n d i x ) .  The 
X = 0 l o c u s  i s  p o s i t i v e l y  s l o p i n g ,  b u t  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  f rom t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  c u m u l a t i v e ,  
s i n c e
dx
g*TV  ^ ^ ( 3 . 2 4 a )
dV X = 0
dx
> 0 ( 3 .2 4b )
dx V = co n s t .  g.  . w.®1tt X













F i g u r e  3 . 4 .  Phase  d i agram a n a l y s i s  un d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t
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The s l o p e  o f  t h e  V = 0 c u rv e  and t h e  r e a c t i o n  
o f  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  r a t e  o f  augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
t o  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  i t s  s t o c k  f rom t h e  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  
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( 3 . 2 5 a )
> 0 ( 3 .2 5b )
( 3 . 2 5 c )
F i g .  3 . 4 ( a )  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  c a s e  where  t h e  V = 0 
l o c u s  i s  downwards s l o p i n g  and f i g .  3 . 4 ( b )  when i t  i s  p o s ­
i t i v e l y  s l o p i n g  b u t  f l a t t e r  t h a n  t h e  x = 0 c u r v e .
The a s s u m p t i o n  o f  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  
e l i m i n a t e s  t h e  d i v e r g i n g  p a t h s  and e n s u r e s  t h a t  t h e  
economy l i e s  a lways  on t h e  e q u i l i b r a t i n g  t r a j e c t o r y  QQ ( s e e  
s e c t i o n  2 .4  o f  c h a p t e r  2 f o r  d e t a i l s ) ;  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t ­
ment  p r o c e s s  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and augmented r e a l  f i n a n c ­
i a l  w e a l t h  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  move i n  t h e  same d i r e c t i o n .
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3 . 2 . 4  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s tem t o  an exogenous  change
The r e a l  t e s t  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  depends  
c r u c i a l l y  on i t s  c o n s e q u e n c e s  f o r  t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  
o f  t h e  sy s t e m ,  a s  t h e  l o n g  r un  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  t h e  
same f o r  b o t h  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g ,  g i v e n  ou r  a s sump­
t i o n  t h a t  t h e  go ve rnmen t  u s e s  t h e  r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h .  F i g .  3 . 5  p a r t l y  r e p e a t s  
f i g .  2 . 9  o f  c h a p t e r  2 and i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  
o f  t h e  sy s t em t o  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  b o t h  u n d e r  f r e e  
and managed f l o a t i n g .  I n  t h e  ab se nc e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and 
f o r  b o t h  e x p e c t a t i o n s  m echan i sm s ,  r e a l  b a l a n c e s ,  on t h e  
impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  c h a n g e ,  o v e r s h o o t  t h e i r  new l o n g - r u n  
l e v e l ,  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  b e i n g  g r e a t e r  un d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s .  Over  t i m e ,  t h e  s y s t e m  f o l l o w s  t h e  BE^ p a t h  u n d e r  
a d a p t i v e  and t h e  AE^ p a t h  u n d e r  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t i l l  
t h e  new l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  r e a c h e d .
The o v e r s h o o t i n g  i s  r e q u i r e d  f o r  s h o r t - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  money m a r k e t , i n  v i ew o f  t h e  f a l l  o f  u ,  
wh ich ,  a t  t h e  g i v e n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (v q*) 
r e q u i r e s  a l o we r  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  i n  
p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s .  Under  managed f l o a t i n g ,  howeve r ,  as  
we have  s e e n ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  t h r o u g h  exchange  m a r k e t  
o p e r a t i o n s ,  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  by 
Fg(o)  on t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  a s s e t  m a rk e t  d i s t u r b a n c e .  T h i s  
by i t s e l f  a l l o w s  a h i g h e r  l e v e l  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a t  













V?V *  V  V V* V,v
F i g u r e  3 . 5 .  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s tem t o  an 
exogenous  f a l l  i n  u.
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Under  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  on t h e  impac t  o f
t h e  f a l l  i n  u t h e  sy s t em  s h i f t s  t o  B ' which shows b o t h  a
h i g h e r  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  (Mg,) and augmented
17r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (V^] r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .
The i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  s u c c e e d s  i n  c u s h i o n i n g  t h e  r e d ­
u c t i o n  i n  r e a l  w e a l t h  and hence  i t  makes p o s s i b l e  a h i g h e r  
l e v e l  o f  c o n s u m p t i o n  and a l ower  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s .  
From p o i n t  B ’ onwards  t h e  economy f o l l o w s  t h e  B’E^ a d j u s t ­
ment  p a t h  t o  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m .  A f t e r  t h e  impac t  e f f e c t
18r e a l  b a l a n c e s  f a l l  even  f u r t h e r  as  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s ,  b e c a u s e
17.  The s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  
exogenous  change  s t i l l  o v e r s h o o t s  i t s  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l ,  
s i n c e  ( s e e  s e c t i o n  A3.3 o f  t h e  a p pe nd ix  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n )
x ^ ( B ' )  = X  +  ( V ^  -  V * ^ )  <  X
(+) ( - }
where  x i s  t h e  l o g  o f  r jeal  money b a l a n c e s  a t  t h e  new 
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  i . e .  x = InM*. Mg, i s  g r ea ter  t h a n  Mg 
s i n c e
X^ (B ' )  -  X^(B) = . Fg(o)  > 0
(+) (+)
Under  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  
s t a g e s _ o f  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  f a l l  even  f u r t h e r  
be low Mg. T h i s  i s  s o ,  b e c a u s e  i n  c h a p t e r  2 B was
assumed t o  l i e  be low t h e  x = o and above t h e  v = o 
s c h e d u l e s ,  where  t h e  v e r t i c a l  and h o r i z o n t a l  a r row s  
move t h e  s y s t e m  i n  a s o u t h - e a s t  d i r e c t i o n .  Assuming 
t h e  same f o r  B ’ , r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  u n d e r  managed 
f l o a t i n g  f o l l o w  a s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n  o f  movement .
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o f  t h e i r  e r r o r - l e a r n i n g  mechani sm,  come to  e x p e c t  an exchange  
r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  unaware  o f  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  i t  ha s  a l r e a d y  
d e p r e c i a t e d  t oo  much. Over  t i m e ,  however ,  as  w e a l t h  
h o l d e r s  c a t c h  up w i t h  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  
s t a r t  r i s i n g  a g a i n  a l o n g  w i t h  t h e  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  i n c r e a s i n g  
s t o c k  o f  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  
a c c u m u l a t i o n  r a t e s  o f  b o t h  a s s e t s  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  
p r o c e s s  a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s  ( s ee  s e c t i o n  
A3.3 o f  t h e  a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n ) :
X  ( t )  = ( x ( t )  -  x)
( - )  ( - )
( - )
g I tt
( A i - h i y )  ( X 2 ~ h j ^ y )  + (Vo-V*^)e"2
(+) (?) (?) (+) (?) ( - )
( 3 . 2 6 a )
V ( t )  = x p v ( t )  -  V * p  -  (X^ -  h^y) (V^ -  V * p e ^ 2 ^
( - )  ( - )  (?)  ( - )
( 3 .26b )
whe re  and X2 a r e  t h e  two n e g a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s .
I f  B ’ l i e s  above  t h e  x = o and be low t h e  V = o s c h e d u l e s ,  
t h e  p h a s e  d i ag ra m  a n a l y s i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  
s t a g e s  o f  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  ( s m a l l  v a l u e s  f o r  t )  t h e  
s q u a r e  b r a c k e t  i s  n e g a t i v e  and t h a t  t h e  s econd  t e rm  i n  (3 . 2 6 a )
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o u t w e ig h s  t h e  f i r s t ,  so t h a t  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  f a l l  
even f u r t h e r  t h a n  a t  t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change .
I f  B ' l i e s  be low t h e  x = o s c h e d u l e ,  however ,  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  w i l l  be i n c r e a s i n g  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  ( n o t i c e  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  
o f  t h e  v e r t i c a l  a r rows  i n  f i g .  3 . 3  i n  t h e  a r e a s  above and 
be low X = o ) . Given t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  
a r r o w s ,  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  
i n c r e a s i n g  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s .
Under  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  economic a g e n t s  
a r e  assumed t o  know t h e  s h o r t - r u n  and l o n g - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  
s t a t i c s ;  t h u s ,  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change t h e y  
come t o  e x p e c t  an exchange  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  which  s h i f t s  
t h e  sy s t em  on t h e  e q u i l i b r a t i n g  p a t h  ( t h e  QQ t r a j e c t o r y  
i n  f i g .  3 . 4 ) ,  m o d e r a t i n g  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  be low t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  c a s e  o f  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ^ ^  ( p o i n t  A ’ i n  f i g .  3 . 5 ) .  From p o i n t
19.  As shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  u n d e r  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t
f o r e s i g h t  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  
exogenous  change  a r e  e q u a l  t o
( + )
X  (A-) =  E  + ----------------- — ----------------  (V'  -  V* ) < X
( 1 - g l ,  . -  . A)
( “ ) ( - )  ( - )
where  A i s  t h e  n e g a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t .  The 
m o d e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
r e l a t i v e  t o  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  depends  on how 
much s m a l l e r  F g ' ( o )  i s  r e l a t i v e  t o  F g ( o ) ,  s i n c e  
^ o ’ ~ \  = F g ' ( o )  - F g ( o ) .
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A' onwards  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  a r e  b o t h  i n c r e a s i n g  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  u n t i l  t h e  new 
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  r e a c h e d ,  a l o ng  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  
A ’E^.  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  r a t e s  o f  t h e  two a s s e t s  
d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
e x p r e s s i o n s  ( s ee  a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n ) :
x ( t )  = X ( x ( t )  -  x) ( 3 . 2 7a )
( - )  ( - )
V ( t )  = X(V' q -  ( 3 . 2 7b )
C-) ( - )
which  a r e  b o t h  u n a b i g u o u s l y  p o s i t i v e  (A i s  t h e  n e g a t i v e  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t ) .  V ’^ i s  l e s s  t h a n  , b e c a u s e  t h e  
imp ac t  government  s a l e s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  u n de r  l o n g - r u n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  F g ’ ( o ) ,  a r e  l e s s  t h a n  t h o s e  u n d e r  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  F g ( o ) .  On t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exo ­
genous  ch an ge ,  t h e  m o d e r a t e d  o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  (M^, > M^ , ) ,  
d e c r e a s e s  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c y  be tween  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  
and i t s  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  and h e n c e ,  F ’g(o)  < F g ( o ) .  The 
dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  A ’E^ i n  f i g .  3 . 5  i s  drawn to  be 
d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h e  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  p a t h  un d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  
Th i s  can  be j u s t i f i e d  o n l y  i f  t h e  QQ t r a j e c t o r i e s  o f  f i g .
2 . 5  and f i g  3 . 4  a r e  n o t  t h e  same,  as  i n  f a c t  i s  t h e  c a se  
s i n c e  e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 .3 5 )  and ( 3 . 2 2 ) ,  t h a t  d e s c r i b e  t h e
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dynamic b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t em  u n de r  f r e e  and managed 
f l o a t i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  a r e  n o t  t h e  same f u n c t i o n s  ( t h e y  
have  d i f f e r e n t  p a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i v e s ) .
Given t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e ­
s i g h t  f o r  b o t h  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and t h e  gov e rnme n t ,  
t h e r e  i s  no asymmetry  o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  and p r i v a t e  economic  
a g e n t s  c an  p r e d i c t  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  any exogenous  
c hanges  j u s t  as  a c c u r a t e l y  a s  t h e  government  c an ;  t h e i r  
a c t u a l  b e h a v i o u r  t h ou g h  m ig h t  be q u a n t i t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t ,  
b e c a u s e  o f  t h e i r  w e a l t h  c o n s t r a i n t .  I t  would t h u s  be 
i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  examine  w h e t h e r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  b e n e f i c i a l  
t o  t h e  economy,  i f  we assume t h a t  t h e  government  p o l i c y  ha s  
no q u a l i t a t i v e  e f f e c t  on t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  
( i . e .  AE^ and A ’E^ a r e  i d e n t i c a l ) ,  a l t h o u g h  t h i s  i s  r u l e d  
o u t  i n  o u r  model  by t h e  a p p a r e n t  d i f f e r e n c e s  be tween  
e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 .3 5 )  and ( 3 . 2 2 ) .  I f  t h a t  i s  t h e  c a s e  and AE 
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  un d e r  f r e e  and manag­
ed f l o a t i n g ,  we s t i l l  g e t  d i f f e r e n t  impac t  e f f e c t s ;  a t  C, 
t h e  impac t  e f f e c t  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
and augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  b o t h  g r e a t e r  r e l a t i v e  
t o  t h e  impac t  e f f e c t  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  (A) . Government  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  s t i l l  b e n e f i c i a l ,  f o r  i t  changes  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s t o c k  o f  f o r e i g n  a s s e t s  s i m u l t a n e o u s l y  w i t h  t h e  exogenous  
ch an g e ,  a l t e r i n g  t h e  w e a l t h  c o n s t r a i n t  t h a t  r e s t r a i n s  t h e  
b e h a v i o u r  o f  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  - 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
But  t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h s  a r e  n o t  i n v a r i a n t
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t o  exchange  r a t e  a r r a n g e m e n t s ,  as  e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 .3 5 )  and 
(3 .22 )  s u g g e s t .  The i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y ,  a p a r t  f rom i t s  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  e f f e c t s ,  ha s  q u a l i t a t i v e  e f f e c t s  on t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  as  w e l l ;  t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  can  
be speede d  up o r  d e l a y e d  d e pe nd in g  on w h e t h e r  t h e  e q u i l ­
i b r a t i n g  t r a j e c t o r y  A'E^ l i e s  above o r  be low AE^ r e s p e c t ­
i v e l y .  I f  A’E^ l i e s  be low AE^, r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  on t h e  
impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change  migh t  be  l e s s  t h a n  i n  t h e  
a b se n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  e x a c e r b a t i n g  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  More r i g o r o u s l y , t h i s  i s  o n l y  p o s s ­
i b l e ,  i f  t h e  spe ed  o f  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  u n d e r  managed 
f l o a t i n g  i s  so much l e s s  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g , s o  t h a t  
t h e  i n c r e a s e  i n  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  t h a t  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  b r i n g s  a b o u t  i s  n o t  enough t o  o f f s e t  i t ,  
i . e .  t h e  n e g a t i v e  q u a l i t a t i v e  e f f e c t  ex cee ds  t h e  p o s i t i v e  
q u a n t i t a t i v e  e f f e c t .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h i s  c an  be i l l u s t r a t e d  by 
e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a t  t h e  
two impac t  e f f e c t s ;  i . e .
-  Xg(A) =
g*
(+)  (+)  
IV
I tt • “'x "• &TT
(+) (+) ( - )
(v *  — *
( U
IVg*
M. . F ' g ( o )  = ? ( 3 . 2 8 )
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where and X^ a r e  t h e  n e g a t i v e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  u nd e r  
managed and f r e e  f l o a t i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  The f i r s t  t e r m  
shows t h e  ambiguous  q u a l i t a t i v e  e f f e c t  and t h e  s econd  t h e  
p o s i t i v e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  e f f e c t  o f  an i n c r e a s e  i n  augmented  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .  I f  t h e  s q u a r e  b r a c k e t  i s  p o s i t i v e ,  
t h e  f i r s t  t e r m  m ig h t  o f f s e t  t h e  p o s i t i v e  q u a n t i t a t i v e  
e f f e c t ,  so t h a t  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  e x a c e r b a t e s  t h e  
o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  Th i s  i s ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  
an outcome i n  d i r e c t  c o n t r a s t  t o  t h e  o b j e c t i v e s  o f  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .  S i n c e ,  however ,  t h e  gove rnment  ha s  
l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  i t  can a n t i c i p a t e  such  comp­
l i c a t i o n s .  I n t e r v e n t i o n  u n d e r  such  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  i s  
i r r a t i o n a l  b e c a u s e  i t  would e x a c e r b a t e  r a t h e r  t h a n  d i m i n i s h  
t h e  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  from i t s  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  i f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  has  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t ,  t h e  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n e s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  
exchange  marke t ,  o n l y  i f  i t  a n t i c i p a t e s  a r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  
o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .
In  summary,  u n d e r  b o t h  e x p e c t a t i o n s '  mechan i sms ,  
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  m o d e r a t e s  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  and i n c r e a s e s  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  b o t h  a s s e t s  on 
t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  chang e ,  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g .  I t  a l s o  a f f e c t s  t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  
b o t h  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  and q u a n t i t a v e l y , s p e e d i n g  up t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  ( s e e  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  f i g .  3 . 6  b e l o w ) .  
F l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  r e a l  w e a l t h  a r e  c u s h i o n e d  s i n c e  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  and augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  h i g h e r
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t h a n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  v a l u e s  und e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  a t  e v e r y  
p o i n t  i n  t im e  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s .  As a r e s u l t ,  
d o m e s t i c  c o n su m p t io n  and a b s o r p t i o n  i n  g e n e r a l  a r e  s t a b ­
i l i z e d  and c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i m ba l a n c es  a r e  m o d e r a t e d .  The 
d i f f e r e n c e s  i n  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  u n d e r  t h e  two e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s ’ mechani sms  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  u n d e r  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g :  w h i l e  u n d e r  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  r e a l
money b a l a n c e s  and augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  
m o n o t o n i c a l l y  i n c r e a s i n g  u n t i l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  
r e s t o r e d ,  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
i n i t i a l l y  f a l l  even  f u r t h e r  b e f o r e  t h e y  s t a r t  r i s i n g  a g a i n  
as  s p e c u l a t o r s  c a t c h  up w i t h  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( i . e .  
t h e y  come t o  e x p e c t  an exchange  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n ) .
The dynamic  exchange  r a t e  r e s p o n s e  t o  exogenous  
changes  i s  c o m p l e t e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e
c _
nomina l  and r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  ( P ( t )  = M ( t ) / M ) .  F i g u r e s
3 .6  and 3 .7  be low ,  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  
exchange  r a t e  t o  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  b o t h  u n d e r  f r e e  
and managed f l o a t i n g  and f o r  a d a p t i v e  and r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  PP*^ i s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  and PP*^ i s  t h e  new 
one c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  l ower  v a l u e  f o r  u .  I n  b o t h  d i a g r a m s ,  
ABC shows t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  
un de r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .
Under  managed f l o a t i n g ,  t h e  government  t h r o u g h o u t  
t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  s e l l s  f o r e i g n  exchange  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  





I n P * (0)
t ime
F i g u r e  3 . 6 .  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  an
exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  un de r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s
I n P ( t )
PP
I n P * (0) 
I nP i (O)
t t  imet t 21o
F i g u r e  3 . 7 .  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  an exogenous  
f a l l  i n  u ,  unde r  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .
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money b a l a n c e s  a r e  t h e  same as  i n  t h e  a b se n c e  o f  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n ,  s i n c e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  w i t h  t h e  r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  has  no l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s .  
C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  
PP^,  l i e s  be low PP*^ f o r  b o t h  e x p e c t a t i o n s ’ mechan i sms ,
b e c a u s e  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  i s  
20l e s s  t h a n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n .
C o n s i d e r i n g  i n i t i a l l y  t h e  c a s e  o f  a d a p t i v e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  we have  shown above t h a t  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  i n  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  i s  r e d u c e d ,  i m p l y in g  e f f e c t i v e l y  t h a t  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  i s  m o d e r a t e d  as  w e l l  ( p o i n t  
B’ i n  f i g u r e  3 . 6 ) .  Given t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  t o  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  o v e r  t i m e ,  t h e
20. F o r m a l l y ,  by s o l v i n g  t h e  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n  d e f i n e d  
by t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  ( 3 . 1 6 e ) ,  t h e  
e q u a t i o n  o f  t h e  PP^ p a t h  i s  as  f o l l o w s :
I n P ( t )  = InM^(o) + mt -  InM*
Re a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  t h e  same f o r  b o t h  f r e e  and 
managed f l o a t i n g .  What i s  d i f f e r e n t  i s  t h e  i n i t i a l  
no m in a l  money s t o c k ,  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  impa c t  government  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  t h a t  changes  d i s c r e t e l y  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t o c k s  
o f  a s s e t s .  Thus ,  M (o) i s  h i g h e s t  un d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  
and l o w e s t  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  ( a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ) , 
s i n c e
M(o) > M(o) - F g ’ (o) P qJ M(o) - Fg(o)  .P^
as
F ' g ( o )  < Fg(o)
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exchange  r a t e  f o l l o w s  t h e  same p a t t e r n  o f  movements as 
u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  d e p r e c i a t i n g  i n i t i a l l y  more and a p p ­
r e c i a t i n g  a f t e r w a r d s ,  b u t  a t  a l ower  p a t h ;  d u r i n g  t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  a lways  l owe r  t h a n  
i t s  e q u i v a l e n t  v a l u e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  
s l o p e  o f  t h e  dynamic exchange  r a t e  p a t h  B’C’ a t  e v e r y  mom­
e n t  i n  t i m e  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n  ( s e e  
a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n ) :
D l n P ( t )  = Din M^( t )  - X ^ ( x ( t )  - x)
( - )  ( - )
C-)
^ 1 .
[ + )  c n  ( ? )  ( + )  ( ? )  ( - )
( 3 . 2 9 )
The f i r s t  t e rm  shows t h e  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  
no m ina l  money s t o c k , w h i c h  i s  now l e s s  t h a n  m and v a r i a b l e  
ov e r  t i m e ,  as  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  a f f e c t s  t h e  nomina l  
money s u p p l y .  So l o ng  as  p o i n t  B ' o f  f i g u r e  3 . 5  l i e s  above  
t h e  X = o and be low t h e  V = o l o c i ,  t h e  pha se  d i ag ram 
a n a l y s i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  a d j u s t ­
ment  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  f i r s t  and t h i r d  t e r m s  o u t w e ig h  t h e  s e c o n d ,  
f o r c i n g  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  d e p r e c i a t e  even more r e l a t i v e  
t o  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h .  Dur ing  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  P ( t )  i s  g rowing  a t  a v a r i a b l e  r a t e ,  
r e f l e c t i n g  t h e  movements  o f  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k .
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From p o i n t  C’ onwards ,  however ,  i t  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h e
a c t u a l  exchange  r a t e ,  g rowing  b o t h  a t  t h e  same
r a t e  m. PP^ and PP^* a r e  p a r a l l e l  t o  e ach  o t h e r ,  s i n c e
t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  un de r  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g  i s  t h e
same.
S i m i l a r l y ,  un d e r  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  t h e  
exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  i s  r e d u c e d ,  s i n c e  on t h e  impact  
o f  t h e  exogenous  ch ang e ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  un d e r  managed 
f l o a t i n g  a r e  h i g h e r  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  (p on t  B’ i n  
f i g u r e  3 . 7 ) .  Over t i m e ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  
p a t h  B ’C’ , t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  a lways  a p p r e c i a t i n g  r e l ­
a t i v e  t o  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h ,  b e i n g  a lways  l ower  t h a n  i t s  
r e s p e c t i v e  v a l u e  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( B ' C ’ l i e s  
be low BC) . F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  B 'C '  p a t h  i s  g i v e n  
by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n :
DlnPCt)  = -  X ( x ( t )  -  x)  ( 3 . 3 0 )
C-) ( - )
i n d i c a t i n g  t h a t  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  t h e  
exchange  r a t e  grows a t  a r a t e  l ower  t h a n  t h e  r a t e  o f  g rowth 
o f  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k .  As u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  
f rom p o i n t  C  onwards  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  
t h e  government  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e .  PP^ i s  a g a i n  p a r a l l e l  t o  
PP^*.
The a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  
sy s t e m  t o  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u shows,  t h a t  f o r  b o t h
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e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechanisms,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  c l o s e r  t o  i t s  
e x p e c t e d  l o n g - r u n  p a t h .  Rea l  money b a l a n c e s  and augmented 
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  h i g h e r ,  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a d j u s t ­
ment  p r o c e s s ,  t h a n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  v a l u e s  i n  t h e  absen ce  
o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  s u c c e e d s  i n  mod­
e r a t i n g  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  ( p r i c e  v a r i a b ­
i l i t y )  and c o n s e q u e n t l y ,  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  r e a l  p r i v a t e  
w e a l t h  and c on sum pt i on  a r e  c u s h i o n e d .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e  
dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  i s  speeded  up ,  as  f o r  b o t h  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechanisms t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  i n  l e s s  t im e  t h a n  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .
However ,  we n o t e  t h a t  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  
and s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  a r e  b o t h  c o n s i s ­
t e n t  w i t h  a r eg ime  o f  managed f l o a t i n g ;  a r e s u l t  t h a t  
con fo rms  w i t h  t h e  e m p i r i c a l  o b s e r v a t i o n  o f  b o t h  s u b s t a n t i a l  
s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  and a c t i v e  government  
i n t e r f e r e n c e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t .
3 . 3  Case I I :  Government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  w i t h  t h e  wrong
e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h
In  t h e  a n a l y s i s  so f a r  t h e  gove rnment  was assumed 
t o  be a b l e  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money s t o c k  
c o r r e c t l y .  Given t h e  u n c e r t a i n t i e s ,  t h o u g h ,  t h a t  i n  t h e  
r e a l  w or ld  a r e  i n v o l v e d  i n  f o r m ing  such  an e x p e c t a t i o n ,  i t  
would be i n t e r e s t i n g  t o  r e l a x  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  l o n g - r u n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  and examine  t h e  c o n s e q u e n c e s  o f  any
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p o s s i b l e  d e v i a t i o n s  be tween  t h e  e x p e c t e d  (M^) and t h e  
a c t u a l  (M*,) l ong  r un  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  i . e .  a 1.  In 
o t h e r  word s ,  we a r e  c o n s i d e r i n g  s i t u a t i o n s  whe re  t h e  gov ­
e rnment  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  P ( t )  d e v i a t e s  f rom i t s  t r u e  v a l u e  
P * ( t ) ,  where  P * ( t )  = M^( t )  L (Y, u ,  T ) . More r i g o r o u s l y ,  
t h e  gove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  [ b o t h  r i g h t  o r  wrong) a r e  
i m p l i c i t l y  assumed t o  be p o i n t  e s t i m a t e s .  They s h o u l d  be 
i n t e r p r e t e d  t h o u g h ,  as  t h e  c e n t r e  o f  a zone and wheneve r  
t h e  a c t u a l  s p o t  r a t e  f a l l s  w i t h i n  t h i s  zone ,  gove rnment  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  c e a s e s .  Thus ,  we a r e  e f f e c t i v e l y  r e f e r r i n g  
t o  d e v i a t i o n s  be tween  F ( t )  and P * ( t )  t h a t  a r e  g r e a t e r  t h a n  
t h e  span  o f  t h e  n e u t r a l  zone a rou n d  P ( t ) .
These  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  a r e  p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e l e v a n t  i n  
an u n c e r t a i n  w o r l d , w h e r e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s  o f  exogenous  
d i s t u r b a n c e s  a r e  d i f f i c u l t  t o  i n f e r  w i t h  c e r t a i n t y ;  more 
r e a l i s t i c a l l y ,  economic a g e n t s  a n d / o r  t h e  government  would 
p r e d i c t  a c e r t a i n  r a n g e  i n s i d e  wh ich  t h e  t r u e  v a l u e  w i l l  
l i e  w i t h  some p r o b a b i l i t y .  D i s c r e p a n c i e s  a r e  even more 
l i k e l y  t o  a r i s e  i n  c a s e s  where  exogenous  changes  i n v o l v e  
s u b j e c t i v e  v a r i a b l e s ,  such  a s  i s  t h e  c a s e  w i t h  a f a l l  i n  
t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  r i s k  r e l a t i v e  t o  dom­
e s t i c  money ( u ) . E s t i m a t i o n  o f  t h e  t r u e  m ag n i t u de  o f  such 
an exogenous  shock  i s  e x t r e m e l y  d i f f i c u l t  i n  i t s e l f .
I n  such  a c o n t e x t ,  t h e  gove rnment  i n  p r a c t i c e  
u s e s  a s  an e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  
e i t h e r  an  o v e r e s t i m a t e  o r  an u n d e r e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  t r u e  
p a t h .  Any d e v i a t i o n s  be tween  P * ( t )  and P ( t )  a r e  c o n s i d ­
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e r e d  as  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s .  D e l i b e r a t e  com­
p e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s  a r e  i r r a t i o n a l .  The law 
o f  one p r i c e  and t h e  sm a l l  c o u n t r y  a s s u m p t io n s  t h a t  we 
employ,  do n o t  a l l o w  t o  t h e  gove rnment  any l e v e r a g e  t o  
a f f e c t  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  p r i c e  o f  d o m e s t i c  o u t p u t .
3 . 3 . 1  S h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
In t e rm s  o f  f i g .  3 . 1 ,  any m i s t a k e  by t h e  gov­
e rnment  i n  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h  would s h i f t  P e i t h e r  be low o r  above P* on t h e  
impac t  o f  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  r e f l e c t i n g  r e s p e c t i v e l y  
an u n d e r e s t i m a t e  o r  an  o v e r e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  t r u e  r e f e r e n c e  
r a t e  a t  t im e  t  = o . To t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  s p o t  r a t e ,  i n  
t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  l i e s  above  b o t h  P and P* - i n  
t h e  same d i r e c t i o n  from b o t h  i n  g e n e r a l  -  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  a n a l y s i s  w i l l  r e m a in  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  t h e  same as 
u n d e r  Case I ,  t h e  o n l y  d i f f e r e n c e  b e i n g  t h e  magn i t ud e  o f  
gove rnment  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  I n  s u b s e q u e n t  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  
t h a t  t h e  dynamic e v o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  sy s t em w i l l  b r i n g  a b o u t .
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t h e  exchange  r a t e  w i l l  a p p r e c i a t e ,  moving t o w a rd s  bo th  
P and P* u n t i l  i t  f a l l s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  be tween them (P,  P * ) , 
wh ich  ha s  t o  be g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  n e u t r a l  zone a ro u nd  t h e  
g o v e r n m e n t ’ s r e f e r e n c e  r a t e ,  f o r  o t h e r w i s e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
w i l l  s t o p .  The b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t em w i t h i n  t h e  (P,  P*) 
r a n g e  m e r i t s  p a r t i c u l a r  a n a l y s i s .  To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s  c a s e ,  
we assume w i t h o u t  any l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  t h a t  on t h e  impac t  
o f  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u , t h e  s p o t  r a t e  i n  t h e  a bs enc e  
o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  l i e s  be tween  P and P * ; t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment ,  i n  o t h e r  words,  o v e r a d j u s t s  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l ong  - 
r un  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  so t h a t  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r  ( d e v i a ­
t i o n  o f  P from P*) more t h a n  e x c e e d s  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  impact
21exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  i . e .
P > P^ i n  f i g .  3 .8  be low.  The s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  co nd ­
i t i o n s  ( i mp ac t  e f f e c t )  a r e  e q u a t i o n s  (3 . 1 1 a )  -  ( 3 . l i e ) ,  
t h e  same as  u n d e r  Case I .
Given t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 1c )  and t h a t  
P ( t )  > P ’ ( t ) ,  t h e  government  w i l l  p u r c h a s e  f o r e i g n  exchange  
from p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  d o m e s t i c  money;  
t h i s  e x a c e r b a t e s  b o t h  t h e  e x c e s s  demand f o r  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  and t h e  e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  c au se d  
by t h e  f a l l  i n  u .  The d e c r e a s e d  s t o c k  o f  augmented  r e a l
21.  F o r m a l l y ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  a i s  l a r g e  enough ( a> l )  so t h a t  
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F i g u r e  3 .8 S h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  u n d e r  
managed f l o a t i n g  (Case I I ) :  e f f e c t s  o f  an 
exogenous  f a l l  i n  u.
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2 2f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  l e a d s  t o  a r e d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  s h o r t - r u n
23p r i v a t e  h o l d i n g s  o f  b o t h  f o r e i g n  exchange  and bonds .  (F 
i n  f i g . 3 . 8  r i s e s ) .  The i n c r e a s e d  e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l
money b a l a n c e s  r e q u i r e s  a g r e a t e r  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c ­
i a t i o n ^ ^  (a l a r g e r  i n c r e a s e  i n  p r i c e s )  r e l a t i v e  t o  b o t h  
f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g  (Case I )  t o  r e s t o r e  e q u i l i b r i u m  
i n  t h e  money m a r k e t .  In  t e rm s  o f  f i g .  3 . 8  t h e  combined
i n f l u e n c e s  o f  t h e  f a l l s  i n  u and Fg s h i f t  t h e  MM_ and FF_
°  0 0
s c h e d u l e s  upwards  t o  MM^  and FF^ r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  e x a c e r b a t i n g  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g ,  i . e .  > P ' .
22 From e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 1 3 ) ,  t h e  change  i n  t h e  s t o c k  o f  a u g ­
mented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  on t h e  impact  o f  t h e  
exogenous  c h an g e ,  i s  equ a l  t o  t h e  change  i n  Fg.  From 
t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  ( s e c t i o n  A3.1 o f  t h e  
a p p e n d i x ) ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  Case I ,we  now have:
dFg






s i n c e ,  by a s s u m p t i o n ,  t h e  s q u a r e  b r a c k e t  i s  n e g a t i v e  
( s e e  f o o t n o t e  21 ) .  W i n d i c a t e s  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  P * ( t )
Us ing  r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c )  and t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  i n  f o o t ­
n o t e  21,  we have :
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The f a l l  i n  Fg s h i f t s  t h e  CC^ s c h e d u l e  downwards,
w h i l e  t h e  r i s e  i n  F ( f a l l  i n  bond h o l d i n g s )  p u s h e s  i t
upw ards ,  f i g .  3.8 showing a n e t  downward s h i f t .  The
i n c r e a s e d  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  r e d u c e s  r e a l  w e a l t h
and c o n su m p t i o n  by more t h a n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,
impr ov i ng  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e .  Assuming t h a t  t h e  b a l a n c e
o f  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  p r e v a i l  o v e r  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t  e f f e c t s
( n e g a t i v e  s i n c e  bond h o l d i n g s  f a l l ) , t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t
s u r p l u s  u n d e r  Case I I ,  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous
2 5change,  i s  u n a m b i g u o u s l y  g r e a t e r  t h a n  un d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  
(S^ > S ’ ) .
T h e r e f o r e ,  whenever  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  f a l l s  
w i t h i n  t h e  r e g i o n  be tw een  P and P * , t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  
works a g a i n s t  m a r k e t  f o r c e s ,  e x a c e r b a t i n g  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  
exogenous  s h o c k s .  Exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  i s  m a g n i f i e d
25. Assuming a g a i n  t h a t  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  t r a d e  e f f e c t s  
d o m in a t e  t h e  s e r v i c e  a c c o u n t  e f f e c t s ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  s u r p l u s  u n d e r  Case I I  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  i n  
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and f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  r e a l  w e a l t h ,  c on sum pt i on  and t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  a r e  e x a c e r b a t e d  r a t h e r  t h a n  d i m i n i s h e d ;  
e x a c t l y  t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  managed f l o a t i n g  
u n d e r  Case  I .
3 . 3 . 2  L o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  and dynamic  s t a b i l i t y
Under  Case I I  whe re  P ( t )  P * ( t ) ,  a l o n g - r u n  
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  i f  i t  e x i s t s ,  l e a d s  t o  a 
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  t h a t  l i e s  somewhere be tw een  P ( t )  
and P * ( t ) .  The r e a s o n  i s  q u i t e  s i m p l e :  i f  t h e  s p o t
exchange  r a t e  l i e s  i n  t h e  same d i r e c t i o n  f rom b o t h  P and 
P * , we a r e  b a ck  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  managed f l o a t i n g  u n d e r  
Case I , b u t  w i t h  a d i f f e r e n t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p a r a m e t e r  6.
Given t h e  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  Case I ,  f o r  b o t h  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  mec han i sm s ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t h r o u g h  a s e qu en c e  o f  
s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  w i l l  be d r i v e n  c l o s e r  t o  b o t h  P and P* 
t i l l  i t  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  one o f  t h e  two,  w h i c h e v e r  i s  c l o s e r .  
Le t  us  assume t h a t  we have  a s i t u a t i o n  where  P = P,  would 
t h a t  be  a l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  ? No; a l t h o u g h  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
i s  z e r o ,  we a r e  back  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  w i t h  a d e p r e c i a t e d  
o r  a p p r e c i a t e d  exchange  r a t e  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h  
i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  P * ( t ) ,  d e p e n d i n g  on w h e t h e r  P 
i s  g r e a t e r  o r  s m a l l e r  t h a n  P * ( t ) ; t h u s  t h e  norma l  i n t e r ­
p l a y  o f  m a r k e t  f o r c e s  would d r i v e  t h e  exchange  r a t e  c l o s e r  
t o  P * ( t ) .  I f ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  P ( t )  = P* ( t )  f  F ( t )  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  would s h i f t  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  c l o s e r  t o
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t h e  gove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e .  T h e r e f o r e ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  
o f  t h e  i n i t i a l  p o s i t i o n ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  f i n a l l y  d r i v e n  
i n  t h e  r e g i o n  be tween  P ( t )  and P * ( t ) ,  where  m a r k e t  f o r c e s  
a r e  a c t i n g  a t  c r o s s  p u r p o s e s  w i t h  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .
For  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  t o  e x i s t  w i t h i n  t h i s  
r e g i o n ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  have  t o  
e x a c t l y  o f f s e t  t h e  c o u n t e r a c t i n g  e f f e c t s  o f  m a r k e t  f o r c e s ,  
i . e .  Fg 7^ 0 .  At  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  r e a l  w e a l t h  s h o u l d  be 
c o n s t a n t  and h e l d  i n  t h e  d e s i r e d  p r o p o r t i o n s  and  a l l  nomin­
a l  v a r i a b l e s  s h o u l d  grow a t  t h e  same r a t e ;  e x p e c t e d  
i n f l a t i o n  s h o u l d  be c o n s t a n t ,  e q ua l  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  r a t e  and 
e q u a l  t o  t h e  r a t e  o f  g rowth  o f  t h e  nomina l  money s t o c k .
The l a s t  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n ^ ^  r e q u i r e s  t h a t
P Mg




= m + Y (3.31)
where  y = - Fg/M. In  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  c o m p l e t e  s t e r i l i z a t i o n ,  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  a f f e c t s  t h e  nomina l  money s u p p l y .  Rea l  money 
b a l a n c e s ,  M, a r e  c o n s t a n t  s i n c e  i n  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  
r e a l  w e a l t h  and i t s  c o m p o s i t i o n  a r e  c o n s t a n t .  Hence ,  f o r
26. See c h a p t e r  4 f o r  a f u l l  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  c o n t i n u e d  
gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n .
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a c o n s t a n t  l o n g - r u n  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e ,  Fg ha s  t o  be  c o n s t a n t ;  
t h e  gove rnmen t  has  t o  p u r c h a s e  f rom o r  s e l l  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r  a f i x e d  amount  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  p e r  p e r i o d .
In  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
r u l e  ( 3 . 1 0 a )  becomes:
F g ( t )  = Ô
= 6
P ( t )  - aMT(t)L(Y, u ,  T)
M^(t)
- aMr(t )L(Y,  u ,  T)
- aL(Y,  u ,  T) M^(t) ( 3 . 3 2 )
s i n c e  P ( t )  = M ( t ) /M* . M* i s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s .  Given t h a t  L(Y,  u ,  T) = 1/M*, e q u a t i o n  
( 3 .3 2 )  becomes :
F g ( t )  = 5
1 1
M* M*
M^(t) ( 3 . 3 3 )
Hence ,  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s  (a  /  1 ) ,  
gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c o n t i n u e s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  (Fg /  0 ) .  
The e x i s t e n c e  o r  n o t  o f  a s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n de r  
Case I I ,  amounts  f i n a l l y ,  t o  w h e t h e r  Fg i s  c o n s t a n t  o r  n o t .  
Tak i ng  t h e  t im e  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  ( 3 . 3 3 ) ,  we have :
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d F g ( t )  1 .q
= 6 ( l - a ) —  . M^( t )  f  0 ( 3 . 3 4 )
d t  M*
whi ch  shows t h a t  Fg,  f a r  f rom b e i n g  c o n s t a n t ,  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  
o r  d e c r e a s i n g  o v e r  t i m e , d e p e n d i n g  on w h e t h e r  a i s  s m a l l e r  
o r  g r e a t e r  t h a n  u n i t y .  Thus ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  a r e  n o t  s a t i s f i e d  and gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
u n d e r  Case  I I  l e a d s  t o  i n s t a b i l i t y .
T h i s  i s  a c o u n t e r - i n t u i t i v e  r e s u l t  i n  t h a t  any 
d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h  f rom i t s  t r u e  v a l u e  l e a d s  t o  dynamic 
i n s t a b i l i t y .  The i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  p o i s e s  t h e  economy on 
a k n i f e - e d g e  p o s i t i o n .  Any d e v i a t i o n  be tween  P ( t )  and P * ( t )  
l e a d s  t o  i n s t a b i l i t y .  The r e a s o n s  f o r  t h i s  r e s u l t  m ig h t  be 
t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  o u r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e ,  t h e  way t h e  
gove rnmen t  forms  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h  o r  even a p o s s i b l e  i n c o n s i s t e n c y  i n  gove rnmen t  p o l i c i e s .
On c l o s e r  e x a m i n a t i o n ,  t h o u g h ,  i n s t a b i l i t y  i s  a t t r i b u t a b l e  
t o  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  s t r u c t u r e  o f  ou r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e .  The 
b e h a v i o u r  o f  a r e a l  v a r i a b l e ,  Fg,  o v e r  t i m e  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  
by t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  two nomina l  v a r i a b l e s ,  P ( t )  and P ( t ) .  
B u i l d i n g  on t h e s e  r e s u l t s ,  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  government  r e a c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n  i n t r o d u c e d  i n  c h a p t e r  4 ,  m o d i f i e s  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
and a l l o w s  a s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  even i f  P ( t )  f  P * ( t ) .
The a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e s e  
l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s  u n d e r  Case I I ,  and i t s  p r o b a b l e  r e a c t i o n  t o  
them w i l l  be o f  p a r t i c u l a r  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  
and t h e  c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  i t s e l f .
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3 . 3 . 3  Dynamic exchange  r a t e  r e s p o n s e
Exchange r a t e  dynamics  u n d e r  Case I I  depend 
c r i t i c a l l y  on t h e  way t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  forms i t s  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  and r e s t  f i n a l l y  on t h e  symmetry o r  asymmetry o f  
i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e  t o  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and t h e  gov ­
e rn m e n t .  The a n a l y s e s  o f  Case s  I and I I  p r o v i d e s  t h e  f u l l  
r a n g e  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s .
Under  Case I we have  assumed t h a t  t h e  government  
ha s  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  w h i l e  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  has  
e i t h e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o r  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t .  
I n  t h e  fo r m er  c a s e , t h e  gove rnmen t  un am bi g uo u s ly  ha s  more 
i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a n  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s , w h o  have  t o  r e l y  
on t h e i r  e r r o r  l e a r n i n g  p r o c e s s .  As was shown i n  s e c t i o n
3 . 2 . 4  above ,  t h e  gove rnment  s u c c e e d s  i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  exchange  
r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  and i n  m o d e r a t i n g  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  r e a l  
w e a l t h  and p r i v a t e  c o n su m p t io n .  In  t h e  l a t t e r  c a s e  we
have  no asymmetry;  b o t h  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and t h e  mo n e t a r y  
a u t h o r i t i e s  have  t h e  same i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t ,  as  t h e y  a r e  b o t h  
e q u ip p e d  w i t h  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  ( t h e  d e t e r m i n i s t i c  
e q u i v a l e n t  o f  r a t i o n a l  e x p e c t a t i o n s ) .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  i s  s t i l l  b e n e f i c i a l  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  q u a l i t a t i v e  and 
q u a n t i t a t i v e  e f f e c t s  on t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  t h a t  r e s u l t  
i n  m o d e r a t e d  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  and s t a b i l i z e d  r e a l  
w e a l t h .
The government  i n f o r m a t i o n  s e t  i s  r e d u c e d  c o n s i d ­
e r a b l y  when we r e l a x  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t
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f o r e s i g h t .  The c r u c i a l  f a c t o r  i n  t h e  dynamic exchange  r a t e  
r e s p o n s e  i s  t h e  a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  
o r  n o t  t h e  dynamic e f f e c t s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  u n d e r  Case I I  and 
t o  r e s p o n d  t o  them a c c o r d i n g l y .  Under  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  i n  no b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  t h a n  t h e  
government  whose r e l a t i v e  s u p e r i o r i t y  i n  i n f o r m a t i o n  depends  
on t h e  m ar g in  o f  e r r o r  i n  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h .  I f  t h e  d e v i a t i o n s  be tween  P ( t )  and P * ( t )  a r e  
s m a l l ,  t h e  dynamic exchange  r a t e  r e s p o n s e  w i l l  i n i t i a l l y  
be  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  u n d e r  Case I t i l l  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  f a l l s  
i n  t h e  r e g i o n  be tween  P ( t )  and P * ( t )  where  we have  i n s t a b ­
i l i t y .  The g r e a t e r  t h e  d e v i a t i o n s  be tween  t h e  e s t i m a t e d  
and t h e  t r u e  exchange  r a t e  p a t h s  t h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  
r e g i o n  w i t h i n  which  t h e  go v e rn m e n t ,  f a r  f rom s t a b i l i z i n g  
exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s ,  e x a c e r b a t e s  i n i t i a l  d i s t ­
u r b a n c e s  .
Such dynamic exchange  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r  i s  i l l u s ­
t r a t e d  i n  f i g u r e  3 .9  be low ,  f o r  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u .
PP*Q and PP*^ a r e  t h e  o r i g i n a l  and t h e  new l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h s  r e s p e c t i v e l y  and ABC i s  t h e  dynamic exchange  
r a t e  p a t h  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  PP^ i s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l ­
i b r i u m  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  t h a t  p r e v a i l s  un d e r  managed 
f l o a t i n g  i f  t h e  governmen t  u s e s  t h e  r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  ( i . e .  when P ( t )  = P * ( t ) ) .  In  t h e  
p a r t i c u l a r  example  o f  f i g u r e  3 . 9 ,  t h e  gove rnment  o v e r e s t i m a t e s  
t h e  t r u e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e ,  P ( t )  > P* ( t ) , i . e .  a > 1,  f o r c i n g  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  f o l l o w  t h e  AB’DE p a t h .  Between t ^  and
1 8 3
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F i g u r e  3 . 9 .  Dynamic exchange  r a t e  r e s p o n s e  under  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a ­
t i o n s :  Case I I ;  P ( t )  > P * ( t )
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F i g u r e  3 . 1 0 . Dynamic exchange  r a t e  r e s p o n s e  unde r  a d a p t i v e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s :  Case I I ;  P ( t )  < P * ( t )
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, t h e  s p o t  r a t e  u n d e r  Case I I  l i e s  above b o t h  P ( t )  and 
P * ( t )  and t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  s t a b i l i z e s  exchange  r a t e  
v a r i a b i l i t y  i n  a way s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  Case I (B’D l i e s  
be low BC). From p o i n t  D ( a t  wh ich  P ( t )  = P ( t ) )  onw ards ,  
however ,  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  f a l l s  w i t h i n  t h e  r an g e  (P,  P*) where  
we have  i n s t a b i l i t y ;  d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  s t r e n g t h  o f  m a r k e t  
f o r c e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y ,  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  can  even move be low PP*^ ( t hou gh  n o t  shown i n  f i g u r e  
3 .9 )  .
Dur ing  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  
i s  p r e d o m i n a n t l y  above  PP*^,  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h  u n d e r  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g ,  b e i n g  r e l a t i v e l y  d e p r e c i a t e d  ( h i g h e r  d o m e s t i c  
i n f l a t i o n ) .  I f ,  i n s t e a d ,  t h e  government  were  t o  u n d e r ­
e s t i m a t e  t h e  t r u e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e ,  i . e .  a < I and  P ( t )  < P * ( t ) , 
t h e  s p o t  r a t e  i n  t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  r e g i o n  would be a p p r e c ­
i a t e d  r e l a t i v e  t o  i t s  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  l o n g - r u n  p a t h  ( l o w er  
d o m e s t i c  i n f l a t i o n ) .  T h i s  c a s e  i s  i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  f i g .  3 . 1 0 .
Given t h e  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechani sm,  
p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  a r e  n e i t h e r  aware  o f  t h e  a p p a r e n t  
i n s t a b i l i t y ,  n o r  a b l e  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  p o s s i b l e  gove rnmen t  
r e a c t i o n  t o  i t ;  a s  a r e s u l t ,  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r  r e m a in s  i n v a r ­
i a n t .  The go v e rn m e n t ,  on t h e  o t h e r  h a n d , ^ c a n n o t  a f f o r d  t o  
r em a in  i d l e  f o r  l o n g .  Given t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e ,  i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  f i g u r e  3 .9  t h e  gove rnmen t  w i l l  have  t o  a c c u m u l a t e  
f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  f o r  e v e r .  S i m i l a r l y ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  
o f  f i g .  3 , 10  t h e  gov e rnmen t  w i l l  have  t o  t o l e r a t e  a g r a d u a l  
d e c u m u l a t i o n  o f  i t s  f o r e i g n  r e s e r v e s .  In t h e  b a s i c  s t r u c t u r e
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o f  our  model  we have  n o t  i n c o r p o r a t e d  a s t o c k  c o n s t r a i n t  
f o r  t h e  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .  Th i s  does  n o t  
mean,  howeve r ,  t h a t  t h e  government  c an  s u s t a i n  t h e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  f o r  e v e r  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e s e  d e v e l o p m e n t s .  A l ­
t hough  i t  i s  e a s i e r  t o  a c c u m u l a t e  r e s e r v e s  - i g n o r i n g  a 
p o s s i b l e  r e a c t i o n  f rom t h e  r e s t  o f  t h e  wor l d  -  t h a n  t o  
d e c u m u l a t e ,  and i n  s p i t e  o f  t h e  e x t r a  l e v e r a g e  t h a t  s a l e s  
o f  d o m e s t i c  bonds  o f f e r  ( b e i n g  p e r f e c t  s u b s t i t u t e s  t o  
f o r e i g n  bonds  and d e n o m i n a t e d  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y ) , t h e  
government  ha s  u l t i m a t e l y  e i t h e r  t o  g i v e  up t h e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  p o l i c y , o r  t o  a d j u s t  a c c o r d i n g l y  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money s t o c k  ( i . e .  a d j u s t  a ) .  The 
e f f e c t s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  on t h e  s t o c k s  o f  r e s e r v e s  c an  be
u se d  as  an i n d i c a t o r  o f  t h e  way t h e  gove rnment  s h o u l d  a d j u s t
27i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  p a t h .  F i n a l l y  t h e  sy s tem 
r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  f u l l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n  o f  Case I .  
The gove rnment  c a n n o t  s u s t a i n  i t s  s u p p o r t  f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h  f o r  e v e r  a g a i n s t  m a r ke t  f o r c e s  b e c a u s e  
o f  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  on i t s  a c t i o n s .  I n  t h e  l a n g u a g e  o f  
Krugman (1979) ,  we have  a " c r i s i s "  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  p a ym e n t s ;  
t h e  way and t h e  t i m i n g  o u t  o f  t h e  c r i s i s  r e s t  e n t i r e l y  on 
t h e  g o ve rn m e n t ,  g i v e n  t h e  i n a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  
t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i n s t a b i l i t y .
27. T h i s  i s  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  4 t h  g u i d e l i n e  o f  t h e
IMF wh ic h  c a l l s  f o r  member c o u n t r i e s  ( i n  c o n s u l t a t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  Fund) t o  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  t h e i r  d e s i r e d  
r e s e r v e s  l e v e l ,  i n  s e t t i n g  t h e i r  exchange  r a t e s  medium 
t e r m  t a r g e t  z o n e s .
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I f  i n s t e a d  o f  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t h e  p r i v a t e  
s e c t o r  i s  assumed t o  p o s s e s s  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  
i t  would have  more i n f o r m a t i o n  t h a n  t h e  government  and i t  
would be a b l e  t o  r e c o g n i s e  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  be tween  P ( t )  and 
P * ( t )  and t h e  c o n s e q u e n t  i n s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  dynamic  a d j u s t ­
ment .  F i g .  3 . 1 1  and 3 .1 2  be low ,  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  dynamic 
r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  a f a l l  i n  u ,  when t h e  
gove rnment  e i t h e r  o v e r e s t i m a t e s  o r  u n d e r e s t i m a t e s  t h e  
t r u e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  In  b o t h  d i ag ra m s  ABC 
shows t h e  dynamic  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  
i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  w h i l e  AB’DE i s  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  p a t h  u n d e r  Case 
I I ,  when s p e c u l a t o r s  r e a c t  p a s s i v e l y  t o  t h e  a p p a r e n t  
exchange  r a t e  i n s t a b i l i t y .  U n l i k e  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  
s p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  now i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  r e a c t i o n  t o  a c o n t i n u o u s  a c c u m u l a t i o n  ( f i g .  3 . 1 1 )  o r  
d e c u m u l a t i o n  ( f i g .  3 . 1 2 )  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s ,  
a d j u s t i n g  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r  i n  a c c o r d a n c e  w i t h  some max im i s ­
i ng  p r o c e s s .  The r e s u l t i n g  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  w i l l  be 
q u i t e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h o s e  shown i n  f i g .  3 .11  and 3 .1 2  and 
w i l l  depend  on t h e  a n t i c i p a t e d  s p e c i f i c  government  r e a c t i o n  
and t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  s p e c u l a t i v e  r e s p o n s e  t o  i t .  As i n  t h e  
c a s e  o f  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e  sy s t em f i n a l l y  r e t u r n s  
t o  t h e  f u l l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n  o f  Case I .
The s i t u a t i o n  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  o f  Krugman’ s 
(1979) model  o f  b a l a n c e  o f  payment s  c r i s e s  where  t h e  gov ­
ernment  i s  u n a b l e  t o  d e f e n d  a p a r t i c u l a r  f i x e d  p a r i t y ;  and ,  
r u n n i n g  o u t  o f  r e s e r v e s ,  g i v e s  up i n t e r v e n t i o n  c a u s i n g  a
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d i s c r e t e  jump i n  t h e  exchange  r a t e  ( d e p r e c i a t i o n )  from i t s  
dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  u n d e r  f i x e d  t o  t h a t  u n d e r  f l e x i b l e  
r a t e s .  S p e c u l a t o r s  e q u ip p e d  w i t h  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  
a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  f o r t h c o m i n g  c a p i t a l  l o s s  and t h r o u g h  a 
s p e c u l a t i v e  a t t a c k , f o r c e  t h e  government  t o  r un  o u t  o f  
r e s e r v e s  e a r l i e r  t h a n  o t h e r w i s e ;  an a t t a c k  t h a t  h e l p s  
a v o i d  t h e  d i s c r e t e  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  and i s  c o n ­
s i s t e n t  w i t h  max i m i s i ng  b e h a v i o u r  by w e a l t h  h o l d e r s .
I n  t e rm s  o f  ou r  model ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  a n t i c i p a t e
t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  t h a t  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  imposes  on
t h e  gove rnmen t  s t o c k  o f  f o r e i g n  r e s e r v e s  and t h e y  a d j u s t
t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g l y .  U n l i k e  Krugman’ s model ,
however ,  t h e  government  m ig h t  r e a c t  i n  a v a r i e t y  o f  ways,
e . g .  g i v e  up i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  r e v i s e  t h e  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l ong  -
r un  r e a l  money s t o c k ,  o r  bo r row more r e s e r v e s .  P r i v a t e
s p e c u l a t o r s  have  t o  i d e n t i f y  which  p o s s i b l e  r e a c t i o n  t h e
gove rnmen t  i s  go ing  t o  u s e  and a d j u s t  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r
a c c o r d i n g l y .  We w i l l  n o t  p u r s u e  t h e  i s s u e  f u r t h e r  a t  t h i s
s t a g e ,  ho wev e r ,  f o r  i n  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  exchange  r a t e  dynamics
u n d e r / g e n e r a l i s e d  government  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i n  c h a p t e r  4 ,
we w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  i s s u e  i n  more d e t a i l .  S u f f i c e  i t  t o
s a y  t h a t  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  symmetry o f  i n f o r m a t i o n  a v a i l a b l e
t o  t h e  gove rnmen t  and t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  p l a y s  a c r u c i a l
r o l e  i n  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g .  The
gove rnmen t  i s  u n a b l e  t o  impose  i t s  own exchange  r a t e  p a t h
2 8a g a i n s t  a b e t t e r  i n fo rmed  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r .  But  even un de r
28. Such a p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  b o t h  t h e  IMF
g u i d e l i n e s  (commentary)  and t h e  IMF s p e c i f i c  p r i n c i p l e s  
f o r  t h e  management  o f  f l o a t i n g  exchange  r a t e s .
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a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  where  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  have  
l e s s  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  i n t e r v e n t i o n  w i t h  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  would f o r c e  t h e  government  
t o  m o d i f y  i t s  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  i t s  r e p e r c u s s i o n s  on t h e  
s t o c k  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s .
3 . 4  S p e c u l a t i o n  and exchange  r a t e  dynamics
Exchange  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r  and s p e c u l a t i o n  has  
a lways  be en  a c o n t r o v e r s i a l  i s s u e ;  a s  l ong  ago as  1944 
Nurske  was a r g u i n g  t h a t  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  i n  t h e  
1920s we re  due t o  " d e s t a b i l i z i n g ” s p e c u l a t i o n ,  whe rea s  
F r i e dman  (1953)  was s u g g e s t i n g  t h a t  p r o f i t a b l e  s p e c u l a t i o n  
f o r  t h e  m a r k e t  as  a whole  can  o n l y  be s t a b i l i z i n g  as  
d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t o r s  would l o s e  money and be d r i v e n  
o u t  o f  b u s i n e s s .  Commenting on t h e  c u r r e n t  f l o a t i n g  
e x p e r i e n c e ,  K i n d l e b e r g e r  (1976) a t t r i b u t e s  t h e  o b s e r v e d
2 9v a r i a b i l i t y  t o  " d e s t a b i l i z i n g  and p r o f i t a b l e  s p e c u l a t i o n " .
A r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  our  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  - 
e q u a t i o n s  ( 3 . 9 )  and (3 . 1 0 )  - t o  r e f l e c t  s p e c u l a t i v e  b e h a v i o u r  
a l l o w s  u s  t o  examine  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  s p e c u l a t i o n  on dynamic 
exchange  r a t e  a d j u s t m e n t  w i t h  no change  a t  a l l  i n  o u r  f o r m a l  
a n a l y s i s .  To s t a r t  w i t h ,  assume t h a t  t h e  gove rnment  does  
n o t  i n t e r v e n e  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t  a t  a l l  and 
m a i n t a i n s  t h e  same b e h a v i o u r  as  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  d e s c r i b e d
29.  See S c h a d l e r  ( 1977 ,  S e c t i o n  1) f o r  a b r i e f  s u r v e y  o f  
t h e  r e l e v a n t  l i t e r a t u r e .
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by t h e  government  b ud g e t  r e s t r a i n t  ( 2 , 1 0 ) .  The a s s e t  
demand f u n c t i o n s  r e f l e c t  t h e  a s s e t  p r e f e r e n c e s  o f  t h e  p r i v ­
a t e  s e c t o r ,  e x c l u d i n g  s p e c u l a t o r s .  The l a t t e r  a r e  assumed 
t o  have  no p r e f e r r e d  m o n e t a r y  h a b i t a t ,  b u t  h o l d  n o n - i n t e r e s t  
b e a r i n g  work ing  b a l a n c e s  i n  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c i e s .  
T h e i r  o n l y  f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  sy s t em i s  t o  p r o v i d e  f o r e i g n
exchange  c o v e r  t o  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  w i s h i n g  t o  r e a l l o c a t e  t h e i r
30p o r t f o l i o s .  They do t h i s ,  by t a k i n g  open  p o s i t i o n s  i n  
d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  a t  a premium.  To f a c i l i t a t e  
ou r  a n a l y s i s  and t o  keep  i t  s y m m e t r i c a l  t o  t h a t  u n d e r  man­
aged  f l o a t i n g ,  we would n o t  impose  any s t o c k  c o n s t r a i n t  on 
s p e c u l a t o r s ,  a l t h o u g h  we w i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
t h e i r  r u n n i n g  o u t  o f  d o m e s t i c  o r  f o r e i g n  money r e s e r v e s .  
S p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  assumed t o  form e x p e c t a t i o n s  a bo u t  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  ( P ( t ) )  i n  t h e  same way as  t h e  
government  does  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g .  They a r e  a l s o  
assumed t o  t a k e  open p o s i t i o n s  i n  f o r e i g n  exchange  de pend ing  
on t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  be tween  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  and 
t h e i r  ’’r e f e r e n c e  r a t e "  f o r  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  p e r i o d  ( -Fg i s  
t h e  i n c r e m e n t  i n  s p e c u l a t i v e  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  
a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t i m e ) . I n  r e t u r n  t h e y  s e l l  d o m e s t i c  
money,  a l l o w i n g  t h e m s e l v e s  a r e a s o n a b l e  p r o f i t  ( exchange  
r a t e  p r e m i u m ) .
By bu y i ng  d o m e s t i c  money when t h e y  e x p e c t  an 
exchange  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  ( P ( t )  > P ( t ) ) ,  s p e c u l a t o r s
30.  In  t h i s  r e s p e c t  o u r  model  i s  d i r e c t l y  a n a l a g o u s  t o  t h a t  
o f  McKinnon ( 1 9 7 6 ) ,  as c i t e d  by S c h a d l e r  ( 1977 ,  s e c t i o n  
I I I )  .
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i n c r e a s e  t h e  e x p e c t e d  r e a l  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  money h o l d i n g s  
a t  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .  ( [ p ( t )  -  P ( t ) ] / P ( t )  = e x ­
change  r a t e  p r e m i u m ) . Given t h e  l a w - o f - o n e - p r i c e  a s s u m p t io n ,  
t h e  r e a l  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  exchange  h o l d i n g s  i s  i n v a r ­
i a n t  t o  exchange  r a t e  c h a n g e s .  S i m i l a r l y ,  when s p e c u l a t o r s  
a n t i c i p a t e  a l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n ,  t h e y  g e t  
o u t  o f  d o m e s t i c  money a c q u i r i n g  more f o r e i g n  exchange ,  m i n i ­
m i z i n g  t h e  e x p e c t e d  l o n g - r u n  r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e i r  r e a l  money 
h o l d i n g s .  To l i q u i d a t e  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t s ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  
u n c o v e r  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s  a t  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  e x ­
c h a n g i n g  d o m e s t i c  money w i t h  f o r e i g n  exchange  o r  v i c e  v e r s a .  
I g n o r i n g ,  f o r  t h e  moment,  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  l i q u i d a t i o n  o f  
p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t s ,  s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t y  p r o d u c e s  e x a c t l y  
t h e  same e f f e c t s  on exchange  r a t e  dynamics  a s  government  
i n t e r v e n t i o n .  To i l l u s t r a t e  t h i s ,  c o n s i d e r  a g a i n  t h e  c a se  
o f  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u .
A l l ow in g  s p e c u l a t o r s  i n i t i a l l y  t o  p o s s e s s  l ong  - 
r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e c t i o n  3 .2  i l l u s ­
t r a t e s  ( f i g .  3 . 6  and 3 . 7 )  t h a t ,  f o r  e i t h e r  e x p e c t a t i o n  
mechanism f o r  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ,  s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t y  
s u c c e e d s  b o t h  i n  m o d e r a t i n g  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  and 
i n  s t a b i l i z i n g  r e a l  w e a l t h  and c o n s u m p t i o n ,  i n  t h e  same way 
as  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  d o e s .  We assume i m p l i c i t l y ,  o f  
c o u r s e ,  t h a t  s p e c u l a t o r s  have  enough r e s e r v e s  t o  c a r r y  o u t  
t h e i r  c o v e r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s .  S p e c u l a t o r s ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  
max imi se  t h e i r  p r o f i t s :  by s e l l i n g  (buy i ng )  d o m es t i c
money when t h e y  e x p e c t  a l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n
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( a p p r e c i a t i o n )  t h e y  maximize  (min imize )  t h e i r  e x p e c t e d  
c a p i t a l  g a i n s  ( l o s s e s ) .
R e l a x i n g  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  o f  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t  and a l l o w i n g  s p e c u l a t i v e  e r r o r s  i n  p r e d i c t i n g  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  we have  an a n a l y s i s  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  s e c t i o n  3.3^ F i g .  3 . 9  and 3 .10  d e s c r i b e  
now t h e  dynamic  exchange  r a t e  r e s p o n s e  t o  an exogenous  f a l l  
i n  u when t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  f orms  i t s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n  an 
a d a p t i v e  p r o c e s s  and s p e c u l a t o r s  u s e  e i t h e r  an o v e r e s t i m a t e  
o r  an u n d e r e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  t r u e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  
a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t i m e .  I n  f i g .  3 . 9 ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  
a c c u m u l a t i n g  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  ov e r  t ime  p a y i n g  i n  
r e t u r n  d o m e s t i c  money.  Given  t h e  e r r o r  l e a r n i n g  mechanism,  
p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  l i k e l y  
outcome o f  t h i s  i n s t a b i l i t y .  As we have  no government  
i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  payment s  i s  a lways  i n  e q u i l i b ­
r i um and i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  " c r i s i s "  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  
we had b e f o r e ,  we now have  a " s p e c u l a t i v e  c r i s i s " .  U n l i k e  
t h e  governmen t  who i s  a b l e  t o  p r i n t  money a t  no c o s t ,  
s p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  d e f e n d  t h e i r  p a r t i c u l a r  e s t i m a t e  
o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  a s  t h e y  a r e  go ing  t o  
r u n  o u t  o f  r e s e r v e s  o f  d o m e s t i c  money.  Th i s  w i l l  f o r c e  
them t o  g i v e  up t h e i r  c o v e r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  o r  a d j u s t  a c c o r d ­
i n g l y  t h e i r  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money s t o c k ,  ( i . e .  
change  a ) .  I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  t h e  sy s t e m  r e t u r n s  f i n a l l y  t o  
t h e  same l o n g - r u n  p o s i t i o n  (PP^) a s  u n d e r  Case I and s p e c u l ­
a t i o n  c e a s e s .  I n  t e r m s  o f  f i g .  3 . 9 ,  up t o  t im e  t ^  s p e c u l ­
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a t o r s  a r e  a c c u m u l a t i n g  d o m e s t i c  money,  a n t i c i p a t i n g  a 
c a p i t a l  g a i n ,  g i v e n  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  a l o n g - r u n  e x ­
change  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n .  In  t h e  i n s t a b i l i t y  r e g i o n ,  
however ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  d e c u m u l a t i n g  d o m e s t i c  money a n t i ­
c i p a t i n g  a c a p i t a l  l o s s ,  s i n c e  t h e y  e x p e c t  now a l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n .  The u l t i m a t e  exchange  r a t e  
a p p r e c i a t i o n ,  as  s p e c u l a t o r s  r u n n i n g  o u t  o f  s t o c k s  o f  
d o m e s t i c  money e i t h e r  a d j u s t  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  o r  a r e  
d r i v e n  o u t  o f  b u s i n e s s ,  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  c a p i t a l  v a l u e  o f  dom­
e s t i c  money and s p e c u l a t o r s  i n c u r  a f i n a n c i a l  l o s s .
In  t h e  c a s e  o f  f i g .  3 . 1 0 ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  i n  t h e  
i n s t a b i l i t y  r e g i o n  a r e  now d e c u m u l a t i n g  f o r e i g n  exchange  
and a c c u m u l a t i n g  d o m e s t i c  money,  e x p e c t i n g  a l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n .  Over  t i m e ,  howeve r ,  t h e y  a r e  
f o r c e d  e i t h e r  t o  g i v e  up s p e c u l a t i o n  o r  t o  a d j u s t  t h e i r  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  as  t h e y  a r e  r u n n i n g  o u t  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  
r e s e r v e s .  The f i n a l  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  c a u s e s  
c a p i t a l  l o s s e s .  I n  b o t h  c a s e s ,  t h e  so o n e r  s p e c u l a t o r s  
a d j u s t  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  exchange  r a t e  i n ­
s t a b i l i t y ,  t h e  l e s s  t h e i r  c a p i t a l  l o s s e s .  P r o l o n g e d  e x ­
change  r a t e  i n s t a b i l i t y ,  however ,  would d r i v e  s p e c u l a t o r s  
ou t  o f  b u s i n e s s  s u f f e r i n g  f i n a n c i a l  l o s s e s .
Under  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  
h o l d e r s  a r e  u n a b l e  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e s e  de v e l o p m e n t s  and 
hence  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r  r e m a i n s  i n v a r i a n t .  Under  l o n g - r u n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  ho we v e r ,  p r i v a t e  a s s e t  h o l d e r s  a r e  a b l e  
t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  s p e c u l a t i v e  e r r o r s  and t h e i r  l i k e l y
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out come,  a d j u s t i n g  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g l y .  U l t i m ­
a t e l y ,  t h e  sy s t e m  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  f u l l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o s i t i o n  o f  Case I ,  a t  which  P ( t )  = P ( t ) ,  i . e .  a = 1 and 
s p e c u l a t i o n  c e a s e s .  The dynamic exchange  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r ,  
however ,  d e p e n d s ,  as  i n  s e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 3 ,  on t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  
r e a c t i o n  (and i t s  t i m i n g )  o f  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  t o  
s p e c u l a t i v e  e r r o r s .
The above  a n a l y s i s  l e a d s  t o  t h e  i n t e r e s t i n g  
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  p r o f i t a b l e  s p e c u l a t i o n  i s  a lways  s t a b i l i z i n g  
and t h a t  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n  l e a d s  t o  f i n a n c i a l  l o s s e s  
and u l t i m a t e l y  d r i v e s  s p e c u l a t o r s  o u t  o f  b u s i n e s s ;  a 
c o n c l u s i o n  t h a t  s u p p o r t s  F r i e d m a n ’s (1953)  a rgument  and 
c a s t s  d o u b t s  on t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  p r o f i t a b l e  and d e s t a b i l ­
i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n .
The u n c o v e r i n g  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s ,  however ,  
t h a t  a l l o w s  s p e c u l a t o r s  t o  t a k e  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  and t o  s u s t a i n  
t h e m s e l v e s  i n  b u s i n e s s ,  d i s t u r b s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o s i t i o n .  The c a s h i n g  i n  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  p r o f i t s  r e p r e s e n t s  
an endogenous  s o u r c e  o f  a s s e t  m a rke t  d i s t u r b a n c e s  t h a t  f o r c e s  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  d e v i a t e  i n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  f rom i t s  l ong  - 
r un  p a t h ,  w i p i n g  o u t  a t  t h e  same t ime  some o f  t h e  s p e c u l a t i v e  
p r o f i t s .  U n l i k e  s p e c u l a t o r s ,  t h e  government  i s  n o t  gov e rn ed  
by any p r o f i t  m a x i m i z a t i o n  o b j e c t i v e s  i n  i t s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
p o l i c y .  In  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  c h o i c e  be tween  gove rnmen t  intervent ion
31.  I f  t h e  g o ve rn m e n t ,  i n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e  exchange  m a rk e t
d e v e l o p m e n t s ,  r e sumes  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o r  a l t e r s  i n  g e n e r a l  
i t s  p o l i c i e s ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  a r e  
c o m p l i c a t e d  even  f u r t h e r .
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and pr iva t e  s p e c u l a t i o n  as  a means o f  m o d e r a t i n g  s h o r t  -run exchange 
r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  depends  on t h r e e  f a c t o r s .  F i r s t ,  on t h e  
a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  gove rnmen t  r e l a t i v e  t o  p r i v a t e  s p e c u l a t o r s  
t o  p r e d i c t  c o r r e c t l y  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  ( P * ( t ) ) .  
Second ,  on t h e  r e l a t i v e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  a d d i t i o n a l  
exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  l i q u i d a t i o n  o f  s p e c u l ­
a t i v e  p r o f i t s  c a u s e s ;  and f i n a l l y ,  on w h e t h e r  s u f f i c i e n t
3 2s p e c u l a t i v e  c a p i t a l  i s  a v a i l a b l e .
3 . 5  C o n c l u d i n g  r e m a rk s
The e x t e n s i o n  o f  ou r  b a s i c  model  t o  t h e  r eg ime  
o f  managed f l o a t i n g  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  some v e r y  i n t e r e s t i n g  
c o n c l u s i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and t h e  
r e s u l t i n g  excha ng e  r a t e  dyna mics .  The s u c c e s s  o f  an i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  g e a r e d  t o w a r d s  m i n i m i z i n g  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  
o f  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  f rom i t s  l o n g - r u n  v a l u e ,  depends  
c r u c i a l l y  on t h e  way t h e  gove rnment  forms i t s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
a b ou t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h .  I f  t h e  government  
p o s s e s s e s  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  i n t e r v e n t i o n  m o d e r a t e s  
exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y ,  s t a b i l i z e s  r e a l  w e a l t h  and c o n ­
su m pt io n  and r e d u c e s  t h e  e x t e n t  o f  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i m b a l ­
a n ce s  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  way t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  f orms  i t s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a bo u t  exchange  r a t e
32.  McKinnon (1976a)  a r g u e s  t h a t  d u r i n g  t h e  c u r r e n t  f l o a t ­
i n g  p e r i o d ,  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  f o r e i g n  exchange  and b a n k in g  
r i s k s ,  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  one " s a f e "  c u r r e n c y  and t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  new gove rnment  r e g u l a t i o n s  have  r e d ­
u c e d  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  c a p i t a l .
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d e p r e c i a t i o n  ( i n f l a t i o n ) . Managed f l o a t i n g  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  
spe ed  o f  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  b u t  s t i l l  a l l o w s  exchange  r a t e  
dynamics  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  o v e r s h o o t i n g .  I n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  
s t i l l  b e n e f i c i a l  even i f  t h e r e  i s  no asymmetry  o f  i n f o r m ­
a t i o n  be t w een  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  and t h e  go ve rnm en t .  To t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’s w e l f a r e  f u n c t i o n  e x p r e s s e s  
s o c i a l  p r e f e r e n c e s ,  i n t e r v e n t i o n  improves  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e  
even  i n  a c o u n t r y  w i t h  no m ar k e t  i m p e r f e c t i o n s .
I f ,  howeve r ,  t h e  gove rnment  i s  u n a b l e  t o  p r e d i c t  
s u c c e s s f u l l y  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
e x a c e r b a t e s  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e s  whenever  
t h e  s p o t  r a t e  f a l l s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  bounded by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 
e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  p a t h  and i t s  t r u e  v a l u e .  The 
r e s u l t i n g  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  and c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  
i m b a l a n c e s  a r e  now g r e a t e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n .  More c r u c i a l l y ,  t ho u gh ,  t h e  sy s t e m  becomes dynam­
i c a l l y  u n s t a b l e  and a ’’c r i s i s ” d e v e l o p s  i n  t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  
paymen ts  a s  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  u n a b l e  t o  d e f e n d  a p a r t i c u l a r  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h  a g a i n s t  m a r k e t  f o r c e s ,  r u n n i n g  o u t  o f  
o r  a c c u m u l a t i n g  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  ov e r  t i m e .  The 
economy,  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g ,  i s  p o i s e d  on a k n i f e - e d g e  
e q u i l i b r i u m :  any d e v i a t i o n  be tween  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e s t ­
ima t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  and i t s  t r u e  v a l u e  
makes t h e  s y s t e m  d y n a m i c a l l y  u n s t a b l e .
Under  an a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  f u n c t i o n  can  be s e en  as  d e s c r i b i n g  s p e c u l a t i v e  
b e h a v i o u r  p r o v i d i n g  f o r e i g n  exchange  c o v e r  t o  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h
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h o l d e r s  w i s h i n g  t o  change  t h e  a l l o c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o s .  
P r i v a t e  s p e c u l a t i o n ,  p r i o r  t o  t h e  c a s h i n g  i n  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  
p r o f i t s ,  e x e r c i s e s  t h e  same i n f l u e n c e  on exchange  r a t e  
dynamics  a s  gove rnment  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  The u n c o v e r i n g  o f  
s p e c u l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s ,  however ,  c r e a t e s  a d d i t i o n a l  s h o r t  - 
r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a t i o n  t h a t  en hances  t h e  i m p o r t a n c e  o f  
t h e  n o n - p r o f i t  n a t u r e  o f  government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  m o d e r a t ­
i ng  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  N o n e t h e l e s s ,  t h e  
main  i s s u e  f o r  t h i s  end i s ,  wh i ch  o f  t h e  two,  t h e  government  
o r  s p e c u l a t o r s ,  i s  b e t t e r  e q u ip pe d  t o  p r e d i c t  s u c c e s s f u l l y  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h .
Th roughou t  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  managed f l o a t i n g  und e r  
Case I ,  i . e .  when t h e  gove rnment  has  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e ­
s i g h t ,  we have  i m p l i c i t l y  assumed t h a t  t h e  gove rnmen t  ha s  
s u f f i c i e n t  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  t o  p e r f o r m  u n i n h i b i t e d l y  
i t s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .  For  any exogenous  shock  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  ha s  e i t h e r  t o  buy o r  s e l l  f o r e i g n  exchange  d u r i n g  t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s .  Hence ,  f o r  t h e  gove rnment  s t o c k  o f  
f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  t o  be r e l a t i v e l y  s t a b l e  o ve r  a 
p a r t i c u l a r  t im e  h o r i z o n ,  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  exogenous  
exchange  r a t e  s h i f t s  ha s  t o  be  symmet r i c  w i t h  a z e r o  mean.
I f  t h e  exogenous  changes  f o r c e  t h e  government  more i n  t h e  
d i r e c t i o n  o f  s e l l i n g  (buy ing )  f o r e i g n  e xc ha n ge ,  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  s t o c k  o f  r e s e r v e s  w i l l  f a l l  ( r i s e ) . I f  t h e  w e l f a r e  
g a i n s  o f  m o d e r a t e d  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  a r e  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  t h e  c o s t s  o f  bo r r o w i n g  f o r e i g n  e x ch a n g e ,  i t  p ays  f o r  
t h e  gove rnmen t  t o  bor row from ab roa d  t o  f i n a n c e  i t s
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i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y .  Under  Case I I ,  i n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  change 
i n  t h e  gove rnmen t  s t o c k  o f  r e s e r v e s  s e r v e s  as  an i n d i c a t o r  
f o r  t h e  p r o p e r  a d j u s t m e n t  o f  t h e  gove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s .
The d e g r e e  o f  r e s e r v e  u s e  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  
can  be g r e a t e r  o r  s m a l l e r  t h a n  u n d e r  f i x e d  exchange  r a t e s ,  
d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  f r e q u e n c y  o f  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e s  u n d e r  
t h e  two r e g i m e s .  The d e g r e e  o f  r e s e r v e  u s e  o v e r  a p a r t i c ­
u l a r  p e r i o d  i s  u s u a l l y  d e f i n e d  a s  t h e  sum o f  t h e  a b s o l u t e  
ch an g es  i n  t h e  gove rnment  s t o c k  o f  r e s e r v e s .  To t h e  e x t e n t  
t h a t  managed f l o a t i n g  i s  more p r o n e  t o  exogenous  d i s t u r b ­
a n c e s  t h a n  f i x e d  r a t e s  a r e ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  r e s e r v e  u se  can 
v e r y  e a s i l y  be  h i g h e r .  Mor eo ve r ,  wheneve r  P ( t )  d e v i a t e s  
f rom i t s  t r u e  v a l u e ,  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c o n t i n u e s  as  l ong  as t h e  
gove rnmen t  i s  w i l l i n g  t o  d e p l e t e  i t s  f o r e i g n  exchange  
r e s e r v e s  ( b e f o r e  t h e  gove rnment  e i t h e r  a d j u s t s  i t s  e s t i m a t e  
o r  g i v e s  up i n t e r v e n i n g  a l t o g e t h e r )  wh ich  may i n v o l v e  a 
s u b s t a n t i a l  r e s e r v e  u s a g e .  W i l l i a m s o n  (1976)  p r o v i d e s  
e m p i r i c a l  e v i d e n c e  t h a t  shows g r e a t e r  r e s e r v e  u s e  f o r  t h e  i n i ­
t i a l  s t a g e s  o f  the c u r r e n t  f l o a t i n g  p e r i o d  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e
33p r e v i o u s  f i x e d  r a t e s  p e r i o d .
The m o d e r a t i o n  o f  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n  and 
t h e  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  r e a l  w e a l t h  and co n su m p t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
c o n s e q u e n t  improvement  i n  s o c i a l  w e l f a r e ,  depends  on t h e  
a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  gove rnmen t  t o  l i m i t  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s  o f  t h e
33.  For  an a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  e x p e c t e d  w o r l d  l i q u i d i t y  e f f e c t s  
o f  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g  r e l a t i v e  t o  f i x e d  exchange  
r a t e s ,  s e e  W i l l i a m s o n  ( 1 9 7 3 ) ,  F l e ming  (1975)  and 
C r o c k e t t  and G o l d s t e i n  (1 9 7 6 ) .
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l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  so t h a t  i t s  t r u e  v a l u e  l i e s  
w i t h i n  t h e  n e u t r a l  zone a rou nd  P ( t )  i n  which  t h e  government  
a b s t a i n s  f rom i n t e r v e n t i o n .  T h i s  a v o i d s  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  
o f  dynamic  i n s t a b i l i t y .  I n f o r m a t i o n  g a t h e r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  
and p e r i o d i c  r e v i s i o n s  o f  t h e  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  p a t h  
i n  t h e  l i g h t  o f  e x p e r i e n c e  w i l l  h e l p  t o  p romo te  such  an 
o b j e c t i v e .  Any f a i l u r e  would n o t  o n l y  e x a c e r b a t e  exchange  
r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y ,  b u t ,  i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  more t h a n  two 
c o u n t r i e s ,  would a l s o  p r o d u c e  an i n c o n s i s t e n t  wor l d  s t r u c t ­
u r e  o f  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  w i t h  u n n e c e s s a r y  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a t  
c r o s s  p u r p o s e s  t h a t  " e x p o r t s "  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  f rom 
one c o u n t r y  t o  a n o t h e r .
I n  t h e  n e x t  c h a p t e r ,  an improvement  o f  ou r  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  g i v e s  r i s e  t o  a g e n e r a l i s e d  government  
r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  a l l o w i n g  a s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  
even i f  t h e  gove rnment  u s e s  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l ong  - 
r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h .
2 0 0
APPENDIX 3
A3.1 S h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g .
(a)  Impac t  e f f e c t s : L i n e a r i s i n g  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
c o n d i t i o n s  ( 3 . 1 1 a )  - ( 3 . l i e )  o f  s e c t i o n  3 . 2 . 1 ,  s t a r t i n g  
from an i n i t i a l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  a t  wh ich  Fg = Mg = 0 ,  
we have :





















( 1  . £) 0 0
M
( l - C y D ) i  -1  0
0  - 1
(A3.2)
w i t h
A? I - - (1 -
p M




p r o v i d e d
M
(1 - —  . £) > 0 o r  Z < —j  (A3.3a)
M p
wh ich  we assume to  be so .
-£ IW - £ lïï - f l u - £ l y
0 0 0
•f- —■^2W P - £ 2W - £ 2ïï - £ 2u - £ 2 y 0 0 0
B,
P
-  £  -  
M
0 0 -a£(M-FgP)L^ - a£  (M-FgP) - a £  (M-FgP) 0 0
y
V U - c / ) i c / ( “  - Fg) 0 - c D
y
1 i




Using C r a m e r ’ s r u l e , t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  
e f f e c t s  on t h e  exchange  r a t e  a r e  as  f o l l o w s :
dP P 












( - )  (+)
(1 ---------------- -  an(M-FgP)L,
M ^
< 0 (A3.8)
(+) ( - )
dP
dY
(1 ---------------- -  a«.(M-FgP)L
M ^  ”
< 0 (A3. 9)
( - )  (+) (+) (+) ( - )
dP







( A 3 . 1 1 }




=  0 (A3.12)
dF
dv 1*3 I
( - )  (+) (+)
> 0 (A3.13)
(+)
dF 3F 3F dP 3F dFg
dir 9tt 9P dir 9Fg dw
( + ) (■) ( + ) ( “ ) ( + )
M
^2tt " ^2W ~1
1 P
  ( 1  .A ) f
P I A3 1 M I tt |A. ^^iTT ^
dF 9F 9F dP 9F dFg
du 9u 9P du 9Fg du
(")  (" )  ( " )  ( " )  C“ )
£
I A3 1 
( - )
a (M-FgP)L^ + l u M
M





u s i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 c ) ;  t h e  s q u a r e  b r a c k e t  i s  p o s i t i v e  
s i n c e




( A 3 . 15a)
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as  t h e  exchange  r a t e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  o v e r s h o o t s  i t s  
l o n g - r u n  v a l u e  ( i . e .  P < P* < P ’ i n  f i g u r e  3 . 1 ) .
dF 1 M
_  = { .  „ , ( M - F g P ) L y f 3 „ ^  .








^ 3  I 
( - )





Com para t i ve  s t a t i c s  e f f e c t s  on Fg
dFg
dM
=  0 (A3.19)
dFg
dv

















g i v e n  (A3 .15a)
dFg £
dY | A . |
M
a(M - Fg P )L y ( l  -  + h y = ? (A3.23)
dFg 1 M
  = -------  a£(M - FgP)Lm(l  -  F-iw)—y < 0
dT I A3 1  ^ V






Com par a t i ve  s t a t i c s  e f f e c t s  on t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e :
dS
dM
= 0 ( A 3 . 2 6 )
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dS a s  a s dP a s dp  a s d Pg
— —  + —  . +
d v a v  ap d v  ap d v  apg dv
( - )  ( + ) ( - )  ( - ) ( + )  ( - ) ( - )
-  [?w  -  (1  - ( - )
D. M
'  ' ' " y  '  •  • T I Ï Ï
(1  “  —
M





Cy ^ , ,  ,
|A.
( + )
= 9 ( A 3 . 2 7 )
d s  a s  a s  dp a s  dp a s  dPg
dïï air aP dTT a F du a p g  dw
(+) (+) (+) ( - )  (?)  ( - )  (+)




n M l  P'
+ ( -  Cy w + C^) "2  • —— - ( + )
P | A J M
(1 -  CyD)i
M l  p
£o_ - foT.—   ( 1 --------







dS 9S 9S dP 9S dF 3S dFg
du 9u 9P du 9 F du 9Fg du
(0 ) ( + ) ( - )  ( - )  ( + ) ( - )  ( - )
D M 1
(-Cy „  + S )  ^ -2
P IA3 I
( 1  i l ) f ,  , -  aü(M-FgP)L
M u ( - )











dS 9S 38 dP 38 dF 38 dFg
--- —  . —  + —  . —  +
dY 9Y 9P dY 3F dY 3Fg dY
( - ) ( + ) ( - ) ( - ) (?) ( - ) (?)
dS as 38 dP 38 dF 38 dFg
— —  + —  +
dT BT 3P dT 3F dT 3Fg dT
(+) ( + ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + ) ( - ) ( + )
= ? (A3.30)
|A.
-  (-Cy°7T + C^) + C l - C y° ) i
c / ^ ( i  -  f iw)
M
^  . ai(M  - FgP)Ly = ? (A3.31)
dS
dG
= -  1 < 0 ( A 3 . 3 2 )
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dS
—  = - i  < 0 
dB
( A 3 . 3 3 )
d e b t  :
C o m p ar a t i v e  s t a t i c s  e f f e c t s  on t h e  i s s u e  o f  new
dB 




dv IW1*3 I 
( - )  (+)
(A3. 3 5)
dB
diT I ttiAjI  
( - )  ( - )
M
m > 0 (A3.36)
dB
du IA3 I 
( - )  (+)
M M
f l u  • ™ ~2 " -  FgP)Ly . m
(+) ( - )
2 ^IW < 0
(+)
( A 3 . 3 7 )
dB
dY










—   ------------ ad(M -  FgP)L„ £ , „  m - 7  -  1 = ? (A3.39)
dT lA,I   ^ p'3 I 
( - ) (+) (+) (+)
dB





= i  > 0 (A3.41)
(3) S h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  ( g e n e r a l  c a s e ) : L i n e a r i s i n g  
t h e  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  ( 3 .1 4 a )  -  ( 3 . 1 4 e )  we have :
dP dF dS dB dFg &= B^ldM dV dTT du dY dT dG dB





~2 0 0 0 1 0P
mS
















-6 0 0 0  ^ 1
w i t h
(A3.43)
1* 4 != ~ 2  ° (A3.44)
- £ IW 0 0 0
■^2W 1 - f IW -£ 2 tt -£ 2u -£ 2y 0 0 0




0 0 0 0 - 1  - i
- 6 0 0 u -aôM^L y 0 0
(A3.45)
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M a t r i x  i s  r e c u r s i v e  and ha s  t h e  same d e t e r m i n a n t  
as  m a t r i x  o f  c h a p t e r  2.  The m a t r i x  o f  c o e f f i c i e n t s  o f  
t h e  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s  i s  e x a c t l y  t h e  same as  , 
e x c e p t  f o r  t h e  l a s t  row e n t r i e s  f o r  u ,  Y and T. I n  s p i t e  o f  
t h a t ,  however ,  b e c a u s e  m a t r i x  A^ i s  r e c u r s i v e ,  f o r  P,  F, S 
and B we g e t  e x a c t l y  t h e  same c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  r e s u l t s  
as  i n  c h a p t e r  2.
The c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  e f f e c t s  on Fg a r e  as
f o l l o w s  :
dFg
— Q = 0 (A3.46)
dM^
dFg dP
— 6 —  —   6 f 2^  ^ 0 (A3.47)
dV dV |A^
( - )  (+)
dFg dP
= 6 —  =     . 6 f ^^  > 0 (A3. 48)
dTT dir IA^
dFg _ 3Fg dP ^ 6 £, < 0 (A3.49)
+ 6 —  u l u
( - )  ( - )  (+)
du 3u du ^^ 4^
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s i n c e ,  i n  t h e  ab se n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  
o v e r s h o o t s  i t s  l o n g - r u n  p a t h .
dFg 9Fg dP q 1
  = -----  + 6  —  = - a6M L +   6 f ,  = ? (A3. 50)
dY 8Y dY y | A , |  l y
( - )  ( - )  (+)
dFg 9Fg dP




  = -----  = 0 (A3. 52)
dG dB
The s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c  e f f e c t s  on V 
a r e  g i v e n  as  t h e  a l g e b r a i c  sum o f  t h e  e f f e c t s  on S,  B and 
Fg.
A3.2  Dynamic s t a b i l i t y
From e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 6 )  o f  t h e  t e x t ,  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  i n  t h e  ab se nc e  o f  s t e r i l i z a t i o n  a r e  e qu a l  t o :
_  M Mg
M = — + —  = —  ( 3 . 6 )  r e p e a t e d
P P P
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H e n c e ,
dM dP
—  =  j  . —  = -------——  > 0 (A3. 53a)
dV dV ( 1 - f i w )
dM M® dP
—    y . —  =  i î —  < 0 ( A 3 .53b)
dTT p dTT
Thus ,  we can w r i t e  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  
augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  i . e .
w i t h
M = 9^(V,  7t ) (A3.54)
. ^ 1 » -
dV ( l - f ^ „ )
dM f ,
6 =  —  =    <  0
dTT ( l - f i % )  ( A 3 .54a)
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T a k i n g  t h e  l o g a r i t h m  o f  ( A 3 . 5 4 )  we h a v e :
o r
X = I n  M = I n  6^ (V, tt) ( A 3 .55a)
X  = g ^  (V, tt)  (A3. 55b)
w i t h
g = ------ —----  > 0 ;  g.  =  —----  < 0 ( A 3 .55c)
e^ (V,  TT) 01 (V, TT)
E q u a t i o n s  (A3.54)  and (A3.55)  a r e  e x a c t l y  i d e n t i c a l  t o  
e q u a t i o n s  ( 2 . 2 6 )  and ( 2 . 2 7 )  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  o f  c h a p t e r  2.
From t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  t h e  
a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  can  a l s o  
be w r i t t e n  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  
and e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( T ab l e  3 . 2 ) ,  i . e .
V = h^(V,  tt) ; h^y < 0 ;  h^^ > 0 (A3.56)
(a)  A d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s : t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  g e n e r a t i o n
mechanism u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  can  be w r i t t e n  a s :
n = g(  —Ç - x -  tt) ;  0 < 3 < !  (A3.5 7)
I T
The r a t e  o f  g ro wth  o f  t h e  n a t i o n a l  money s t o c k  i s  e q ua l  t o
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• S  * *M M+Mg Mg
—q =  = m + —C = m -   q
y r  M M
Fg.P  Fg
= m -  —  
M
( A 3 . 5 8 )
g i v e n  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 1 0 b ) .
From t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  (Tab l e  3 . 2 )  
we can w r i t e  Fg a s  a f u n c t i o n  o f  augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  and e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  i . e .
Fg = Fg(V,  tt) (A3.59)









6f I tt > 0 ( A 3 . 59b)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (A3.59)  and (A3.58)  i n  (A3.57)  we have :
TT =  3
Fg(V,  TT) 
m  -  -------------------------  -  X  -  TT
e ^ ( v ,  TT)
(A3. 5 7a)
w i t h
V
dTT Fg,







+ 1 < 0
( A 3 . 5 7b)
( A 3 . 5 7c )
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s i n c e ,  u n d e r  Case I ,  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  
Fg = 0 .
The dynamics  o f  t h e  sy s tem u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  a r e  d e s c r i b e d  by e q u a t i o n s  (A 3 . 5 7 a ) ,  ( A 3 .55b) and 
(A3.56)  wh ich  form t h e  f o l l o w i n g  sy s t em o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
e q u a t i o n s  :
TT =  3
Fg(V,  TT) . . 
m - --------------- - X  -  TT
e ^ C V ,  tt)
; 0 < 3 < 1, Ey > 0,  < 0
(A3 .60a)
X = gi (V, tt)  ; g^y > 0 ,  < 0
I tt
(A3 .60b)
V = h^ (V, tt)  ; h^y  < 0 ,  h^^ > 0
I tt
(A3 .60c)
L i n e a r i s i n g  a r o u n d  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  we h av e :
TT +  3 X E dTT + E.,dV
TT V (A3 .61a)
0 gl^dTT - dx + g^ydV (A3.61b)
V hi^dTT + h^ydV (A3. 61c)
o r  i n  m a t r i x  n o t a t i o n
1 3 0 TT E
TT
0 dTT
0 0 0 X =
^ I tt
-1 &1V d x (A3.62)
0 0 1 V
^ I T T
0 ^ I V dV
The c h a r a c t e r i s i t c  polyonyum i s :
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(E^ -  A)






w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n :
(1 + + [-^TT ■ h l v ( l  + Ggin) + Bgjv •
( - )  ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  (+) (+)
®TT ■ ^IV ■ ^V^llT °
( - )  ( - )  ( + ) (  + )
(A3.64
S u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  l o c a l  s t a b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  a l l  
c o e f f i c i e n t s  a r e  p o s i t i v e .  T h i s  r e d u c e s  t o :
Itr (A3 .65a)
®TT • ^IV ■ ■ i^TT ^ 0 (A3 .65b)
To d e r i v e  t h e  x = 0 and V = 0 l o c i ,  we t o t a l l y  
d i f f e r e n t i a t e  ( A 3 . 60b) w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t i m e ,  i . e .
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% = Slw " + S IV V ( A 3 . 6 6 )
S u b s t i t u t i n g  tt and V from (A3 .61a) and ( A 3 .61c) 
r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  we have :
(1 + e g j ^ ) x  = (§1^ + g IV d T T
^ ( ^ itt Ey + (A3.67)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  d i T  f rom (A 3 . 61 b ) ,  we g e t  t h e  
e q u a t i o n  o f  t h e  x = 0 l o c u s ,  i . e .
(1 + 6 g i „ ) x  = (Si ^  . + g i u  b i n )    dxI tt * TT ^ I V  I tt
g I tt
(&in ^ ^ i v  ^iv)
g IV
g^^ ^^ I tt ^ tt ^IV ^ I tt^ dV (A3.68)
f rom wh ich  we have :
dx
dx V=cons t
( - )  C-) (+) C+)
^^lir ‘ T^T ^ ^IV ' ^llT^ 
SliT (1 +
( - )  (+)
< 0 (A3.69)
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g i v e n  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n  (A3 .6 5 a ) .  The s l o p e  o f  t h e  
X  = 0 l o c u s  i s  ambiguous  s i n c e
dx
dV
(■*■) (+) (+) ( - )  ( ” ) C“ ) (+) ( “ ) ( “ ) (+)
2 lv(&lV " i^TT ^IV^ &ln(2 lV “ ^ I tt = ?
However ,  u s i n g  e q u a t i o n s  (A 3 .5 3 ) ,  ( A 3 . 5 4 a ) ,  ( A 3 . 59a ) ,  (A 3 .59b 
and ( A 3 . 5 9 c ) ,  t h e  s econ d  b r a c k e t  on t h e  n u m e r a to r  o f  (A3.70) 
i s  e q u a l  t o  - g g^ y  < 0.
Hence ,  when
glV  ^ ( A 3 .70a)
t h e  X = 0 c u r v e  i s  upwards  s l o p i n g ,  b u t  i f  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  
s i g n  i s  r e v e r s e d ,  i t s  s l o p e  can be p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e .
S u b s t i t u t i n g  dir f rom ( A 3 .61b) i n  (A 3 .6 1 c ) ,  we 
g e t  t h e  V = 0 l o c u s ,  i . e .
V = —  dx + —  (— ----- —  -  dV (A3. 71)
^ I tt ^ I tt ^ I tt
f rom wh ich  we hav e :
( ' )  ( - )
dx 
dV
. = ? 0 a s  g , y  ?
(+) (+)





^l ï ï  ' I^TT
x = c o n s t ^lï ï
( - )




> “ IV * % lT T
I tt
(A 3 .72b)
(3)  P e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t : Under  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  e x p e c t a t i o n s
a r e  a lw ays  f u l f i l l e d ,  i . e .
• Fg(V,  IT)
TT =  —  -  X = m - --------------  - X
„ s  e ^ ( v ,  w)
(A3. 73}





dTT = - ---------  dV - X
M
(A3.74)
s i n c e ,  u n d e r  Case I ,  Fg = 0 i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n .  From (A3.74)  
we can  w r i t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  V and x ,  i . e .
TT = w(V, x) (A3.7 5)


















(A 3 .7 5b)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (A3.75)  i n  (A 3 . 55b) and (A3.56)  we have :
X  =  g V, w(V, X ) ( A 3 . 76a)
V = h. V, w(V, x) ; ?• > 0 ( A 3 .7 6b)
w h e r e ,  u s i n g  ( A 3 .5 5 c ) ,  ( A 3 . 54a) and ( A 3 . 75a)
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(+) ( - )  (+)







^*1V I^V ^l¥ ■ “v ’
( - )  (+) (+)
( A 3 .77b)
L i n e a r i s i n g  (A3.76)  a ro u n d  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  we have :
" ^ I tt
. 03. 0 X
-
- 1 g*lV dx (A3.78)
" ^ I T T
. 0)^ 1 V 0 ^*1V dV
w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  polyonyum
( -1  + g i „  • \
h i ^  . X
g IV
( h * i v  - ^)
= 0 (A3.79)
and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n
( - )  ( - )
2 IV • "llT 
(+) (+)
“ i  h * i Y  
( - )  (?)
- i]
( - )  ( - )
+ h * l V  = 0 ( A 3 . 8 0 )
(?)
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Thus a n e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
s a d d l e  p o i n t  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  ( - 4 a y  > 0 ) :
Y = < 0 (A3.81)
E q u a t i o n s  ( A 3 .76a) and ( A 3 .76b) d e s c r i b e  t h e  
X = 0 and V = 0 l o c i  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  From (A3 .76a)  t h e  s l o p e  
o f  t h e  X = 0 c u rv e  i s  p o s i t i v e  and d i s c r e p a n c i e s  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  f rom t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  c u m u l a t i v e ,  
s i n c e
dx
dV x=0 = g*iv > 0
(A3. 82a)
dx
dx V = co ns t . “x
( - )  ( - )
0 (A3. 82b)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( A 3 . 76a) i n  (A 3 . 76b) we have :
h*
g I tt g I tt
IV * ^ l u
I tt
- g IV dV (A3.83)
f rom wh ich  we have :
dx
dV V=0
— ----- —  + g * i v  > 0  as
I tt
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( - )  ( - )  (+)  
h* IV • ®lir 
(+)







- g IV > 0 as
IV * i^TT
I tt
? 8*1V (A3 .84b)
A3.3 Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  to  an exogenous  f a l l  
f a l l  i n  u
(a)  A d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s : I n f l a t i o n a r y  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  r e a l
money b a l a n c e s  and augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  c an  a l l  
be  w r i t t e n  a s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  t i m e ,  i . e .
TT(t) = TT + A ^ e^ l ^  + A20^2^ (A 3 . 85a)
x ( t )  = X  +  B ^ e (A3. 85b)
V ( t )  = V + ^ ( A 3 . 85c)
where  A, B and C a r e  c o n s t a n t s ,  and X 2 a r e  t h e  c h a r a c ­
t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  o f  (A3.64)  and t t ,  x  and V a r e  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y
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s t a t e  v a l u e s  o f  tt , x and V r e s p e c t i v e l y .
For  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u a t  t ime  t  = 0 we have  
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n s :
ÏÏ (0)  = TT^ = TT (A3. 86a)
V(0)  = = v*Q + Fg(o)  ( A 3 . 86b)
where  v*o i s  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .  From (A3.85)  and (A3.86)  and u s i n g  
(A3.63)  we can  s o l v e  f o r  t h e  s i x  c o n s t a n t s  i n  a f a s h i o n  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  s e c t i o n  A3.4 o f  c h a p t e r  2,  i . e .
k,  _  k . k ?  _
A. = -------------------(V^ - V) ;  A_ =  (V^ - V) ( A 3 . 87a)
1 ( k ^ - k z )  °  ( k^ -kz )  °
B = -  2 - V) ;
( k i - k 2 )
B, = k 2 ^IV 1 ( A 3 . 87b)
( k . - k ^ )
k k
C, =     (V„ -  V) ;  Cy =  i - (V„ - V) ( A 3 .87c)
( k ^ - k z )  °   ^ ( k ^ -k z )  °
where
V = h z h v  , V = ( A 3 . 8 7 d )
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and a r e  d i f f e r e n t  f rom ze r o  b e c a u s e  X = i s  n o t
a s o l u t i o n  f o r  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n  ( A 3 . 64 ) .
L e t t i n g  t  = 0 i n  ( A 3 . 85b) and s u b s t i t u t i n g  and B2 f rom 
( A3 .87b) we g e t
X(0) = Xp = X + (Vq - V)
(+)
which  g i v e s  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  on t h e  i mp ac t  o f  
t h e  exogenous  c h a n g e .  From t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  f i g .  3 . 1 ,  f o r  
a p o s i t i v e  Fg (0 )  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  l i e s  be tween  P ’  ^ and P 
i m p ly in g  an exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g ,  i . e .  x^ < x ,  which  
r e q u i r e s  (V^ - V) < 0 .  I f  on t h e  o t h e r  hand (V^ - V) > 0 ,  
Fg(o)  ha s  t o  i n c r e a s e  by more t h a n  (V - v^*)  > o making 
X q  >  X .  But Xg > X i m p l i e s  t h a t  P^ < P,  w h i c h ,  g i v e n  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e ,  r e q u i r e s  a d e c r e a s e  r a t h e r  t h a n  an 
i n c r e a s e  i n  Fg(o)  wh ich  i s  i n c o n s i s t e n t .  T h e r e f o r e ,
(Vo - V) i s  u n a m b i g u o u s l y  n e g a t i v e .
Us ing  e q u a t i o n  (A2.94)  o f  c h a p t e r  2 and  e q u a t i o n  
( A 3 .8 8 ) ,  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  u n d e r  managed (x^^)  and f r e e  (x^^)  f l o a t i n g  a t  t ime  
t  = o i s  a s  f o l l o w s :
(&1V ■ 8v)(Vo* -  Vi*)  + g i v F g ( o )
g j y  • Fg (o )  > 0 (A3.89)
(+) (+)
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s i n c e ,  a t  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  (v*^)  i s  e q ua l  t o  t h e  s t o c k  o f  
augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (V) und e r  managed f l o a t i n g  
and t h a t  g^y = g^-  (A3.89) i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  
u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  i s  r e d u c e d .
Tak ing  t h e  t im e  d e r i v a t i v e s  o f  (A3 .8 5b) and 
(A3 .8 5c) we hav e :
x ( t )  = ( A 3 . 90a)
V ( t )  = ( A 3 . 90b)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  from ( A 3 .8 5 b ) ,  B2 f rom (A3.8 7 b ) ,  f rom 
(A3 .8 5 c ) ,  C2 f rom (A 3 . 87c) and u s i n g  (A3.87d)  we hav e :
x ( t )  = X, ( x ( t )  - x) ( A 3 .91a)
^ 1 .
(VQ-V)e^Zt
V ( t )  = X^(V( t )  -  V) -  ( ^ i - h j v ) ( V Q - V ) e ^ 2 t  ( ^ 3 . 91b)
which  d e s c r i b e  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and 
augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  




x ( t )  = -----------  = DlnM^(t )  - D l n P ( t )
d t
( A 3 . 9 2 )
S u b s t i t u t i n g  i n  (A3.51a )  we have:
D l n P ( t )  = DlnM ( t )  - X ^ ( x ( t )  -  x)




which  g i v e s  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  dynamic exchange  r a t e  p a t h  
BC’ i n  f i g .  3 . 6 .
(3) P e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t : The s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s
and augmen ted  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  can be w r i t t e n  a s :
( A 3 .94a)
V ( t )  = V + (A3 .94b)
where  X^ and X2 a r e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  o f  (A3.80)  
and A and B i s  a new s e t  o f  c o n s t a n t s .  The r o o t s  a r e  r e a l  
and o f  o p p o s i t e  s i g n s  -  s a y  X^ = X < o and X^  > 0 -  so t h a t  
f o r  s t a b i l i t y
A 2  = B2  = 0 ( A 3 . 9 5 )
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wi th ( A 3 . 9 4 )  b e c o m i n g
x ( t )  = X + ( A 3 . 96a)
V ( t )  = V + (A3 .96b)
Under  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  a t  t h e  impact  
o f  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  (A 3 . 86b) 
becomes :
V ’ (o) = V  = v*^ + F ' g ( o )  < V (A3 .8 6 b ’ )
s i n c e  F ’g ( o )  < F g ( o ) .
From (A3.96)  and t h e  i n i t i a l  c o n d i t i o n  (A3 .8 6 b ’ ) 
and u s i n g  (A3.79)  we can  s o l v e  f o r  t h e  two c o n s t a n t s ,  i . e .
g *
A = ------------ — --------  (V' - V) ;  B = (V- - V)
( 1 - g l ,  . w.X)
(A3. 97)
L e t t i n g  t  = o i n  (A 3 . 96a) and s u b s t i t u t i n g  A f rom above ,  
we g e t  t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  
exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  i . e .
g *
x ( o )  = X ’ = X + ------------— -------- (V’ - V) < X (A3.98)
( 1 - g l ,  . w.X) °
( “) ( - )  ( - )
S i n c e  x ’^ < x , we s t i l l  have  o v e r s h o o t i n g .
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The d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  un d e r  managed and f r e e










F ' g ( o )  = ? (A3.99)
( 1 - S l n  • “x^ )
(+) (+)
which  ha s  an ambiguous s i g n .
Tak ing  t h e  t im e  d e r i v a t i v e  o f  (A3.96)  and 
s u b s t i t u t i n g  A and B f rom (A3.97)  we d e r i v e  t h e  accumul ­
a t i o n  r a t e s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and augmented  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  i . e .
x ( t )  = X ( x ( t )  -  x) (A3.100a)
v(t)' = XCV'o - V)e^t (A3 .100b)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  x ( t )  f rom (A3.92)  we g e t  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  B ' C  i n  f i g .  3.7 i . e .
D l n P ( t )  = DlnM^( t )  -  X ( x ( t )  -  x ) ( A 3 . 1 0 1 )
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CHAPTER 4
MANAGED FLOATING WITH A GENERALISED 
GOVERNMENT REACTION FUNCTION
4 . 1  I n t r o d u c t i o n
In c h a p t e r  3 we have s e en  t h a t  any d i s c r e p a n c i e s  
be tw een  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h ,  P ( t ) , and i t s  t r u e  v a l u e ,  P * ( t ) ,  l e a d  t o  dyn­
amic i n s t a b i l i t y .  The r o o t - c a u s e  o f  t h e s e  d e v i a t i o n s  i s  t h e  
u s e  by t h e  government  o f  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  i n  e s t i m a t i n g  i t s  r e f e r e n c e  
r a t e  a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t im e  ( i . e .  a f  1 ) .  Given t h e s e  
p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s  and t h e  s p e c i f i c  f o r m u l a t i o n  o f  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 ) ,  no l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s ,  b e ca us e  
one o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  i s  v i o l a t e d .  
Government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c o n t i n u e s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i n v o l v i n g  
v a r i a b l e  r a t e s  o f  p u r c h a s i n g  o r  s e l l i n g  f o r e i g n  exchange  
(Fg) and d o m e s t i c  money (Mg). As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  r a t e  o f  
g r ow th  o f  t h e  nominal  money s t o c k  v a r i e s  o v e r  t i m e ,  v i o l ­
a t i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n  t h a t  r e q u i r e s  t h a t  
t h e  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i s  c o n s t a n t  and equ a l  
t o  t h e  r a t e  o f  g rowth  o f  t h e  nom ina l  money s t o c k .
On t h e  b a s i s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 1 ) ,  t h e  
gov e rnmen t  p u r c h a s e s  o r  s a l e s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  (Fg) a t  
e v e r y  moment i n  t im e  a r e  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  d i f f e r e n c e
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be tween  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  and t h e  government  r e f e r e n c e  
r a t e .  In  t h e  l o n g - r u n  u n d e r  Case I I ,  t h e s e  two r a t e s  s t i l l  
d i f f e r  f rom each  o t h e r  and as  a r e s u l t ,  a r e a l  v a r i a b l e  o f  
t h e  s y s t e m ,  Fg,  i s  g i v en  a s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  be tween  two 
nom ina l  v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  grow o v e r  t i m e .  In  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  no 
l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  e x i s t s  and s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  a r e  p r o l o n g e d .  I n  s p i t e  o f  t h i s  d e f i c i e n c y  
o f  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e ,  government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  und e r  
Case I l e a d s  t o  a s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  b e c a u s e  i n  
t h e  l o n g - r u n ,  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h e  government  
r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  and Fg i s  a lways  z e r o .
Hence ,  f o r  s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  
i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  w h e t h e r  a e q u a l s  one o r  n o t ,  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
r u l e  n e e d s  t o  be m o d i f i e d .  The d i s c r e p a n c i e s  be tween  t h e  
s p o t  exchange  and t h e  government  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  s h o u l d  be 
d e f l a t e d  by a n o t h e r  nomina l  v a r i a b l e ,  so t h a t  Fg can  be 
c o n s t a n t  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  a t  a n o n - z e r o  l e v e l .  Choos ing  t h e  
nom ina l  money s u p p l y  as  ou r  d e f l a t o r ,  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  
( 3 . 1 )  becomes :
F g ( t n )  = %
P ( t o )  -  PCto)
( 4 . 1 a )
F g ( t q )  = -
Mg( t^)
P ( t „ )
( 4 . 1 b )
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FgCt)  = a
P ( t )  -  P ( t )  
M^( t )
; 6 > 0  ( 4 . 1 c )
Mg(t )
F g ( t )   ---------------; t  % t  (4 .  Id)
p ( t )  °
E q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 1 )  c o n s t i t u t e s  now ou r  new ’’g e n e r a l i s e d  
gove rnment  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n ” . ( 4 . 1 a )  and (4 .1 b )  d e s c r i b e  
t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t  o p e r a t i o n  t h r o u g h  w h i ch ,  t h e  
go ve rnm en t ,  on t h e  impac t  o f  any  exogenous  change  ( t im e  t ^ ) ,  
a l t e r s  d i s c r e t e l y  t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s .  
E q u a t i o n s  ( 4 . 1 c )  and ( 4 . Id )  show how t h e  s t o c k s  o f  Fg and 
Mg a r e  a d j u s t e d  ove r  t i m e .
The gove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  a t  e v e r y  moment 
i n  t i m e ,  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  same e x p r e s s i o n  
a s  i n  c h a p t e r  3,  i . e .
s  1 s
FCt)  = — —  = aMT(t)  —  = aMT(t )L(Y,  u ,  T) ( 4 . 2 a )
M® M*
Ly < 0 ,  < 0 ,  > 0 (4 .2 b )
The i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y ,  as  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
c h a p t e r ,  i s  g e a r e d  t o wa rd s  m i n i m i s i n g  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  o f  
t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  f rom t h e  gove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  
P ( t )  a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t i m e .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 2 a )
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however ,  i n  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 4 . 1 ) ,  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  gov ­
e rnment  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  r e sumes  an a l t e r n a t i v e  i n t u i t i v e  
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n :
M(to) M®
( 4 . 3 a )
P ( t ^ )
( 4 . 3 b )
F g ( t )  = S
M(t) M®
( 4 . 3 c )
F g ( t )  = -
Mg(t )
P ( t )
t a t o (4 .3 d )
s i n c e  P ( t ) / M  ( t )  = M ( t ) . The gove rnment  i n t e r v e n e s  i n  t h e  
f o r e i g n  exchange  m a r k e t  on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  o f  
t h e  i n v e r s e  o f  a c t u a l  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  from t h e  i n v e r s e  
o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  money s t o c k  
(M®). Whenever  a d i f f e r s  f rom u n i t y ,  d e v i a t e s  f rom i t s  
t r u e  v a l u e  M*.
In  t h i s  c h a p t e r  we i n c o r p o r a t e  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  
gove rnmen t  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i n  o u r  b a s i c  model  and we 
compare t h e  r e s u l t i n g  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  t o  t h o s e  u n d e r
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f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  Use o f  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h  (a f  1) c o n s t i t u t e s  an u n i n t e n t i o n a l  
c o m p e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c y  w i t h  c o n s e q u e n t  r e a l  
e f f e c t s .  The f o r m a t  o f  ou r  model  does  n o t  a l l o w  any 
d e l i b e r a t e  c o m p e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s ,  f o r  t h e  
f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c y  p r i c e  o f  d o m e s t i c  o u t p u t  i s  f i x e d  by t h e  
wo r l d  m a r k e t  f o r c e s  ( l aw o f  one p r i c e  and sma l l  c o u n t r y  
a s s u m p t i o n s ) .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h o u g h ,  c o m p e t i t i v e  p o l i c i e s ,  
d e l i b e r a t e  o r  n o t ,  have  t h e  same l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s .  Where 
t h e y  d i f f e r ,  a s  w i l l  be  shown,  i s  on t h e  s p e c i f i c  way t h e  
gove rnmen t  would d e c i d e  t o  s o l v e  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  b a l a n c e  o f  
payment s  c r i s e s .  As i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r ,  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  i s  e i t h e r  h a v i n g  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  i n  p r e d i c t ­
i ng  t h e  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money s t o c k  (a = 1 and P ( t )  = P * ( t ) ) ,  
o r  u s i n g  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h  (a ^ 1 and P ( t )  f  P * ( t ) ) .
As f o r  t h e  l a y o u t  o f  t h i s  c h a p t e r ,  i n  s e c t i o n
4 .2  we p r e s e n t  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  
managed f l o a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  gove rnment  r e a c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n .  I n  s e c t i o n  4 . 3  we a n a l y s e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n ­
a r y  s t a t e ,  w h e r e a s  i n  s e c t i o n  4 .4  we i n v e s t i g a t e  t h e  
dynamic s t a b i l i t y  o f  t h e  s y s t e m .  In  s e c t i o n  4 . 5  we examine 
t h e  dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  to  an exogenous  d i s t ­
u r b a n c e ,  whose i m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  a r e  
d e a l t  w i t h  i n  s e c t i o n  4 . 6 .  I n  s e c t i o n  4 . 7 ,  a r e - i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n  o f  ou r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  a l l o w s  us  t o  c o n s i d e r  
t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  s p e c u l a t i o n  on exchange  r a t e  dynamics .
239
F i n a l l y ,  s e c t i o n  4 .8  p r o v i d e s  ou r  c o n c l u d i n g  r e m a r k s .
4 .2  S h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
The i n c o r p o r a t i o n  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  government  
r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  i n t o  o u r  b a s i c  model  y i e l d s  i n  t h e  s h o r t -  
r u n ,  b a s i c a l l y  t h e  same r e s u l t s  as  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e c t i o n  
3 . 2 . 1  i n  c h a p t e r  3.  I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  we w i l l  b r i e f l y  r e  - 
s t a t e  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  when t h e  new 
i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 4 . 1 )  r e p l a c e s  e q u a t i o n s  ( 3 . 9 )  and (3 .1 0 )  
o f  c h a p t e r  3.  An i l l u s t r a t i o n  o f  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e f f e c t s  o f  
a p a r t i c u l a r  exogenous  shock  i s  p r o v i d e d  i n  s e c t i o n  4 . 5 ,  
where  we examine  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  to  an 
exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  
exchange  r i s k  r e l a t i v e  t o  d o m e s t i c  money.
Assuming t h a t  we s t a r t  f rom an i n i t i a l  l o n g  - 
r un  e q u i l i b r i u m  where  t h e r e  i s  no gove rnment  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
and whe re  Fg and Mg a r e  b o t h  z e r o ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e  impac t  o f  any exogenous  change  a r e  a s  
f o l l o w s :
M
Y ,  ( -  + V )  , i ,  TT, u
P
M
- Fg ( 4 . 4 a )
M
Y, ( -  + v) , i ,  T T ,  u 
p




-  aL(Y,  u ,  T) (4 .4 c )
S = Y -  C
M M
(Y - T + i ( v - F )  -  ÏÏ— + TrFg) , (— +v)
P P
- G + i ( v - F - B ) (4 .4d)
M
G + i B = T + B +  m— - mFg
P
(4 .4 e )
E q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 4 c )  r e p l a c e s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  ( 3 . 9 a )  and i s  
d e r i v e d  by s u b s t i t u t i n g  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 2 a )  i n  ( 4 . 1 a ) .  I t  
d e s c r i b e s  t h e  d i s c r e t e  change  i n  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  augmented  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  t h a t  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  b r i n g s  abo u t  on t h e  impac t  o f  any 
exogenous  c h a n g e .  (M - FgP) i s  e q u a l  t o  t h e  nom ina l  money
Q
s u p p l y  (M ) a t  t im e  t ^  ( impa c t  e f f e c t ) , wh ich  i s  an en d ­
ogenous  v a r i a b l e  a f f e c t e d  by t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  
( -FgP = Mg) . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  o t h e r  e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n d i t i o n s  i s  t h e  same as  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r .  The 
s h o r t - r u n  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  ( i mpac t  e f f e c t )  a r e  P,  F,
Fg,  S and B, w h i l e  M, v ,  i ,  tt , u ,  Y, T,  G, B, m and Z a r e  
e x o g e n o u s .
As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  sy s t em  ( 4 . 4 )  
q u a l i t a t i v e l y  y i e l d s  t h e  same s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s
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r e s u l t s  ( i m p a c t  e f f e c t s )  a s  i t s  r e s p e c t i v e  sy s t em  i n  c h a p t e r  
3 ( summar i s ed  i n  t a b l e  3 . 1 ) .  However ,  whenever  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  u s e s  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h  ( i . e .  a ^ 1 ) ,  t h e  s i g n  o f  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  
e f f e c t s  o f  ch an ge s  i n  Y, u and T ( v a r i a b l e s  t h a t  a f f e c t  t h e  
gov e rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e )  becomes amb iguous ,  d e p en d i ng  
on t h e  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e  o f  a .
The s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  ( 4 . 4 )  
d e s c r i b e  t h e  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t em on t h e  impac t  o f  any 
exogenous  s h o c k s ,  when t h e  gove rnm en t ,  b a s e d  on i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  r u l e s  ( 4 . 1 a )  and ( 4 . 1 b ) ,  ch ang es  d i s c r e t e l y  t h e  
c o m p o s i t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s  c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s l y  w i t h  
t h e  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e s .  S u b s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e  exchange  
r a t e  d e t e r m i n e s  r e c u r s i v e l y  t h e  e v o l u t i o n  o f  b o t h  Fg and 
Mg o v e r  t i m e ,  t h r o u g h  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  ( 4 . 1 c )  and ( 4 . I d ) .  
The s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  t h a t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t em  a t  a l l  p o i n t s  i n  t im e  a r e  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  :
M
Y, (—  + V) , i , u , TT 
P P
( 4 . 5 a )
M
Y, (—  + V) ,  i ,  u ,  ÏÏ 
P
= F = F + Fg ( 4 . 5 b )
Fg = 6
P
—q- - aL (Y, u ,  T) 
M
( 4 . 5 c )
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S = Y -  C
M M
(Y - T + i ( V- F )  - TT— ) ,  (—  + V)
P P
- G  + i C V - F - B ) (4 .5d )
G + iB = T + B +  lîi—
P ( 4 . 5 e )
As i n  c h a p t e r  3,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  r e d e f i n e d  t o  i n c l u d e  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  Mg 
and Fg r e s p e c t i v e l y  ( s e e  e q u a t i o n s  ( 3 . 6 )  and ( 3 . 7 ) ) .  Gov­
e rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  b a s e d  on ( 4 . 5 c ) ,  a f f e c t s  t h e  s t o c k s  
o f  Fg and Mg o n l y  o v e r  t im e  and f o r  a p a r t i c u l a r  s h o r t - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m ,  t h e  s t o c k s  o f  a l l  a s s e t s  a r e  g i v e n  by p a s t
a c c u m u l a t i o n .  The endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  P,  F , S,  B and 
SFg,  w h i l e  M , V, i ,  u ,  i t ,  Y ,  T ,  G,  B, M, m and 5 a r e  exogenous  
As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  
s t a t i c s  o f  sy s t e m  ( 4 . 5 )  y i e l d  e x a c t l y  t h e  same r e s u l t s ,  
b o t h  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  and q u a n t i t a t i v e l y ,  f o r  a l l  endogenous  
v a r i a b l e s  e x c e p t  Fg as  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s  ( summar ised  
i n  t a b l e  3 . 2 ) .  The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  new i n t e r v e n t i o n  
r u l e  c h an g e s  t h e  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e  o f  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  
e f f e c t s  on Fg b u t  n o t  t h e i r  s i g n s .  A g a in ,  wheneve r  a ^ 1,  
t h e  e f f e c t s  on Fg o f  ch ang es  i n  Y, u and T become ambiguous
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4 .3  L o n g - ru n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e
I f  t h e  sy s tem i s  s t a b l e ,  t h e  s equence  o f  s h o r t  
r un  e q u i l i b r i a  w i l l  l e a d  t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  
where  r e a l  w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t ,  h e l d  i n  t h e  d e s i r e d  p r o p ­
o r t i o n s  and where  a l l  nomina l  v a r i a b l e s  grow a t  t h e  same 
r a t e .
For  r e a l  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  t o  be  c o n s t a n t ,  n e t  
p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  ( d e f i n e d  as  g r o s s  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  p l u s  
c a p i t a l  g a i n s )  have t o  be z e r o .  In  t h e  l o n g - r u n ,  i f  
i n f l a t i o n  i s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom z e r o ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  
d e p r e c i a t i n g  o r  a p p r e c i a t i n g  ov e r  t i m e ,  dep end in g  on 
w h e t h e r  i n f l a t i o n  i s  p o s i t i v e  o r  n e g a t i v e  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  
Hence ,  f o r  c o n s t a n t  r e a l  w e a l t h ,  g r o s s  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  
mus t  compe nsa t e  c a p i t a l  l o s s e s  o r  g a i n s ,  i . e .
Sp = Y - T + i (V -F )  - C(Y^, W)
= Y - T + i (V -F )  - Y - T + i (V-F)  - ïïM
= ttM ( 4 . 6 )
s i n c e  co ns um p t io n  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i s  e q u a l  t o  r e a l  d i s p o s a b l e  
i ncome.  I n  t h e  l o n g - r u n ,  e x p e c t e d  i n f l a t i o n  i s  eq u a l  t o  t h e  
a c t u a l  r a t e ,  e q u a l  t o  t h e  r a t e  o f  i n c r e a s e  o f  t h e  nomina l  
money s t o c k ,  i . e .
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P





= m + -'n = m -  —
M
( 4 . 7 )
g i v e n  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . I d ) .
Given t h e  f o r m a t  o f  ou r  model ,  t h e  c u r r e n t  
a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  i s  g i v e n  by t h e  sum o f  g r o s s  p r i v a t e  and 
gove rnmen t  s a v i n g s .  Adding g r o s s  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s ,  e q u a t i o n  
( 4 . 6 ) ,  t o  t h e  b u d g e t  d e f i c i t  and u s i n g  ( 4 . 7 ) ,  we d e r i v e  
t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n ,  i . e .
S = Sp + Sg = ttM  + (-B - mM)
Fg _  •
= (m - — ) M - B - mM 
M
- -B - Fg ( 4 . 8 )
Given e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 8 ) ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n d i t i o n s  un e r  managed f l o a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  
governmen t  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
f ^  [ Ÿ ,  (M + V) , i ,  u ,  tt] ]  = M ( 4 . 9 a )
(M + V) , i ,  u ,  n] = (4 . 9 b )
Fg = 6 -  - aL(Y,  u ,  T) 
M
( 4 . 9 c )
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Y = C (Y - T + i (V- F )  - ttM ) ,  (M + V) + G
- i  (V - F - B) - B - Fg (4 .9 d )
G + i B = T + B +  mM ( 4 . 9 e )
TT = m -
Fg
M
( 4 . 9 £ )
E q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 9 c )  i s  d e r i v e d  from ( 4 . 1 c ) ,  g i v e n  
t h a t  P ( t )  = M^( t ) /M.  Us ing  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 2 a ) ,  ( 4 . 9 c )  becomes
Fg = 6 -  6 (1 - a) — 
M
( 4 . 1 0 )
When t h e  gove rnment  u s e s  t h e  r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  (M^ = M), a e q u a l s  u n i t y  and 
government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c e a s e s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  (Fg = 0 ) .  I n  
t h i s  c a s e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  ( 4 . 9 )  r e d u c e  
t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  
When a i s  g r e a t e r  ( s m a l l e r )  t h a n  u n i t y ,  t h e  government  
u n d e r e s t i m a t e s  ( o v e r e s t i m a t e s )  t h e  t r u e  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  
money s t o c k  and h e n c e ,  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c o n t i n u e s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
Fg i s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom z e r o ,  b u t  c o n s t a n t  o v e r  t i m e .  In  
o t h e r  words ,  wheneve r  t h e  gove rnment  u s e s  t h e  wrong 
e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  ( P ( t )  ^ P * ( t ) ) .
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government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  c o n t i n u e s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n .  Un l i ke  
Case I I  o f  c h a p t e r  3,  t h o u g h ,  now l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  
p o s s i b l e .
For  a n o n - z e r o  Fg (a f  1 ) ,  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  f o r e i g n  
exchange  m a r k e t  o p e r a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  
i n v o l v e s ,  t e n d  t o  c a u s e  a c o n t i n u o u s  r e - a l l o c a t i o n  o f  
p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s .  L on g - ru n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  however ,  r e q u i r e s  
t h a t  p r i v a t e  r e a l  w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t ,  h e l d  i n  t h e  d e s i r e d  
p r o p o r t i o n s .  For  t h i s  t o  h o l d ,  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  have  
t o  o f f s e t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  on t h e  c o m p o s i t i o n  
o f  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o s .  In  p a r t i c u l a r ,  f o r  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
t o  be c o n s t a n t ,  p r i v a t e  g r o s s  s a v i n g s  have  t o  o f f s e t  t h e  
c a p i t a l  l o s s e s  ( g a i n s )  t h a t  a p o s i t i v e  ( n e g a t i v e )  r a t e  o f  
i n f l a t i o n  c a u s e s .  E q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 6 )  shows e x a c t l y  j u s t  t h a t .
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  f o r  a c o n s t a n t  s t o c k  o f  augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  (V = 0 ) ,  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  have  t o  v a r y  t h e i r  
s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  ( i . e .  v ^ 0) t o  o f f s e t  t h e  
change s  i n  t h e i r  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  t h a t  t h e  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  b r i n g s  a b o u t  a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t ime  
( s i n c e  Fg ^ 0 ) .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 4 . 8 )  i n  e q u a t i o n  (3 .1 5 )  o f  
c h a p t e r  3,  i t  t u r n s  o u t  t h a t  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  e x a c t l y  t h e  o p p o s i t e  o f  gove rnment  
s a l e s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  (Fg) , m a i n t a i n i n g  augmented  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  c o n s t a n t ,  i . e .
V = v + F g = S + B + F g  = (-B - Fg)+ B + Fg = 0 (4 .1 1 a )
and V  = - Fg (4 .11b )
I n t u i t i v e l y ,  wha t  i s  ha p p en in g  i s  q u i t e  c l e a r .  In  
t h e  l o n g - r u n ,  t h e  s t o c k  o f  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (V) 
i s  c o n s t a n t ,  h e l d  i n  t h e  d e s i r e d  p r o p o r t i o n s .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  
F and b a r e  b o t h  c o n s t a n t .  I f  Fg i s  p o s i t i v e  ( n e g a t i v e ) ,  t h e
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gove rnment  s e l l s  ( buys )  f o r e i g n  exchange  t o  ( f rom)  t h e  p r i v a t e
s e c t o r  wh ich  i m m e d i a t e l y  a d j u s t s  i t s  co nsumpt ion  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  so
t h a t  i t s  h o l d i n g s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r emain  c o n s t a n t .  T h i s  i s
p o s s i b l e  b e c a u s e  t h e  l ower  ( h i g h e r )  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  a l l o w s  g r o s s
p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  t o  be  l o we r  ( h i g h e r )  and co ns um pt io n  h i g h e r  (lower
Hence ,  f o r  a p o s i t i v e  ( n e g a t i v e )  Fg, t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  b a l a n c e  
f a l l s  ( r i s e s )  by Fg and t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  payments  i s  i n  d e f i c i t  
Surplus) ,  i . e .  B o f  P = -Fg .
The endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  a r e  M, V,F,Fg, it
and B w h i l e  Y,T,G,i,u,M^, B'  ^ 6 and m are exogenous. The l o n g - r u n  equi l ib­
rium under managed f l o a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  gove rnmen t  i react ion
funct ion can be  i l l u s t r a t e d  d i a g r a m a t i c a l l y . F i g u r e  4 .1  p r e s e n t s ,  
i n  t h e  two d i m e n s i o n a l  s p a c e ,  t h e  t h r e e  e q u i l i b r i u m  s c h e d u l e s  
o f  t h e  s y s t e m .  S i n c e ,  t h o u g h ,  we have  s i x  endogenous  
v a r i a b l e s ,  t h e  r e l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s  o f  t h e  t h r e e  s c h e d u l e s  
de pend ,  a p a r t  f rom t h e  exogenous  v a r i a b l e s ,  on endogenous  
v a r i a b l e s  a s  w e l l .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  tt f rom e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 9 f )  
i n t o  t h e  o t h e r  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s ,  l e a v e s  F ,
Fg and B as  t h e  s h i f t i n g  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s .
The MM* s c h e d u l e ,  as  i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r s ,  
shows t h e  c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and  augmented  
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f o r  wh ich  t h e  money m ar ke t  i s  i n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  f u l f i l l e d .  Assuming t h a t  
we s t a r t  f rom an i n i t i a l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  where  t h e r e  i s  
no gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  (Fg = 0 ) ,  t h e  MM* s c h e d u l e  i s  
upwards  s l o p i n g ^  and h a s  t h e  same s l o p e  as  u n d e r  f r e e
S u b s t i t u t i n g  tt f rom e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 9 f )  i n t o  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 9 a ) ,  
we have  :
M
g i v e n  o u r  a s s u m p t i o n  t h a t  we s t a r t  f rom an i n i t i a l . s t a t -  
o n a r y  s t a t e  w i t h  no government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( i . e .  Fg = 0 ) .
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MM* (Fg)
FF*(F,  Fg) 
( + ) ( + )
F i g u r e  4 . 1 .  Long - run  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .
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f l o a t i n g .  An i n c r e a s e  i n  augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  demand f o r  money and r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  have
t o  r i s e  t o  r e s t o r e  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  money m a r k e t .  The
FF* s c h e d u l e  shows t h e  l o c u s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and
augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f o r  which  t h e  f o r e i g n
exchange  m a r k e t  i s  i n  e q u i l i b r i u m  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e
2
f u l f i l l e d .  I t  i s  downwards s l o p i n g  ( t h e  same s l o p e  as 
u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ) ,  f o r  an i n c r e a s e  i n  augmented  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i n c r e a s e s  t h e  demand f o r  f o r e i g n  exchange .  
For  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m ar k e t  t o  be p r e s e r ­
ve d ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  have  t o  f a l l  by t h e  same amount .  
S i m i l a r l y ,  t h e  CC* s c h e d u l e  shows c o m b i n a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  and augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  f o r  
wh ich  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  i s  c o n s t a n t  ( n e t  p r i v a t e  s a v i n g s  a r e  
z e r o )  when e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  r e a l i s e d .  I f  B and Fg a r e  b o t h  
e q u a l  t o  z e r o ,  a l o n g  CC* t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i s  a l s o  i n
2. S u b s t i t u t i n g  e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 9 f )  i n  ( 4 . 9 b ) ,  we have
dM
dV
FF* f  f
_  ^2W _  ^2W _  T
fo.T + fo_ ^  ^2W
M‘2W ^2tt ÏT2
s i n c e  a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  Fg i s  assumed 
t o  be z e r o .
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e q u i l i b r i u m .  The CC* s c h e d u l e  i s  downwards s l o p i n g  , w i t h  
t h e  same s l o p e  as un de r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  An i n c r e a s e  in  
augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  c a u s e s  n e t  p r i v a t e  d i s s a v i n g s  
and f o r  a c o n s t a n t  s t o c k  o f  w e a l t h ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  have  
t o  f a l l  t o  o f f s e t  i t .  In f i g .  4 . 1 ,  f o r  e ach  o f  t h e  e q u i l ­
i b r i u m  s c h e d u l e s  t h e  s h i f t i n g  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  a r e  
shown i n  b r a c k e t s .  The s i g n s  be low t h e  v a r i a b l e s  i n d i c a t e  
t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  s h i f t  o f  t h e  r e l e v a n t  s c h e d u l e . ^




C,v - U  - Cy» ) i
> 0
The n u m e r a t o r  i s  p o s i t i v e  b e c a u s e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n ;  
TT = m i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  and by r e s t r i c t i o n  ( 2 . 9 a ) ,
( - Cy^w + C^) i s  p o s i t i v e .
S u b s t i t u t i n g  ( 4 . 9 f )  i n  e q u a t i o n s  ( 4 . 9 a ) ,  ( 4 . 9b )  and 
( 4 . 9 d ) ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t a b l e  shows how t h e  t h r e e  
e q u i l i b r i u m  s c h e d u l e s  a r e  s h i f t e d  when t h e  s h i f t i n g  
endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  i n c r e a s e .


















The f a c t  t h a t  Fg i s  a s h i f t i n g  v a r i a b l e ,  s u g g e s t s  
t h a t  u n i n t e n t i o n a l  c o m p e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s  ( b e i n g  
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s ) , a p a r t  f rom t h e i r  c o n s e ­
qu e n ce s  on t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  can c a u s e  r e a l  
e f f e c t s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n .  These  e f f e c t s  come a b o u t  t h r o u g h  
t h e  i n f l u e n c e  t h a t  c o n t i n u e d  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  ha s  on 
t h e  l o n g - r u n  i n f l a t i o n  r a t e .  A change  i n  t h e  i n f l a t i o n  
r a t e  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  a f f e c t s  t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
c o s t  o f  h o l d i n g  money and m o d i f i e s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
c o n f i g u r a t i o n  o f  t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t .
To i l l u s t r a t e ,  we w i l l  c o n s i d e r  an exogenous  
f a l l  i n  t h e  s u b j e c t i v e  e s t i m a t e  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r i s k  
r e l a t i v e  t o  d o m e s t i c  money ( u ) . S t a r t i n g  from an i n i t i a l  
l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  w i t h  no gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  (Fg = 0 ) ,  
i n  f i g u r e  4 . 2 ,  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u i n d u c e s  p r i v a t e  
w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  t o  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  new l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
t h e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  r e l a t i v e  
t o  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  i n  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o s .  Under  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g ,  t h e  new l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  shown by p o i n t  
o f  f i g u r e  1 . 2 .  Under  managed f l o a t i n g ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l ­
i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n  depends  on w h e t h e r  t h e  gove rnmen t  u s e s  t h e  
r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  o r  n o t .
Or ,  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  on w h e t h e r  t h e  gove rnmen t  p r e d i c t s  
c o r r e c t l y  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  i . e .  
i t  d ep end s  on a .  When a = 1,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  
i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  s i n c e  a t  t h e  new 












F i g u r e  4 . 2 .  Long - run  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e :  e f f e c t s  o f
exogenous  f a l l  i n  u.
an
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gove rnmen t  u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y  f o l l o w s  a c o m p e t i t i v e  exchange  
r a t e  p o l i c y .
When a i s  l e s s  t h a n  one ,  t h e  government  u n d e r ­
e s t i m a t e s  t h e  t r u e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h .  The c o n t i n ­
ued  gove rnm en t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  (Fg > 0) , 
r e d u c e s  l o n g - r u n  i n f l a t i o n  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  ( s ee  
a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e t a i l s ,  s e c t i o n  A 4 . 2 ) .  As t h e  o p p o r t u n i t y  
c o s t  o f  h o l d i n g  money f a l l s ,  t h e  demand f o r  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  r i s e s  and t h e  demand 
f o r  f o r e i g n  exchange  and bonds  f a l l s .  The l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  
o f  r e a l  w e a l t h  w i l l  a l s o  be a f f e c t e d ;  i f  i t  r i s e s  ( f a l l s )  
t h e  demand f o r  a l l  a s s e t s  w i l l  r i s e  ( f a l l ) .  As i s  shown 
i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  f a l l  i n  a ( s i n c e  we s t a r t  f rom t h e  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  a t  wh ich  a = 1) un am biguous ly  i n c r e a s e s  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and d e c r e a s e s  t h e  i s s u e  o f  government  
d e b t  ( B ) . I t s  e f f e c t s ,  t h o u g h ,  on augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  and  f o r e i g n  excha nge  h o l d i n g s  a r e  ambiguous .  A 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  them t o  be n e g a t i v e  i s  t h a t  t h e  f a l l  
i n  a does  n o t  i n c r e a s e  r e a l  w e a l t h .  S i m i l a r l y ,  when a 
r i s e s  ( i . e .  a > 1 ) ,  i n f l a t i o n  r i s e s  and r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
f a l l  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  A s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  
augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and f o r e i g n  exchange  h o l d i n g s  
t o  r i s e ,  i s  t h a t  r e a l  w e a l t h  does  n o t  f a l l .
D i a g r a m a t i c a l l y ,  f o r  a < 1 t h e  MM*  ^ s c h e d u l e  
s h i f t s  u p w a r d s ,  w h i l e  t h e  n e t  s h i f t s  o f  t h e  o t h e r  two 
s c h e d u l e s  dep end  on t h e  r e l a t i v e  s h i f t i n g  s t r e n g t h s  o f  
ch ang es  i n  F,  Fg and B. F i g u r e  4 . 2 ,  however ,  shows a n e t
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upward s h i f t  i n  a l l  s c h e d u l e s  t h a t  r e s u l t s  i n  a l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n  w i t h  h i g h e r  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and 
l ow er  augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g  p o s i t i o n  ( p o i n t  E2 ) . S i m i l a r l y ,  f o r  a > 1 t h e  
t h r e e  s c h e d u l e s  s h i f t  downwards ,  i n d i c a t i n g  a t  t h e  new 
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  a t  E^,  a l ower  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
and a h i g h e r  s t o c k  o f  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .
Thus ,  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  f a l l  i n  u depend c r i t ­
i c a l l y  on t h e  v a l u e  o f  a ( i . e .  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e c i s i o n  o f  
t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h ) .  As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  w h i l e  r e a l  money b a l ­
an ce s  f a l l  and t h e  i s s u e  o f  gove rnmen t  bonds  r i s e s  unam­
b i g u o u s l y ,  t h e  e f f e c t s  on t h e  o t h e r  endogenous  v a r i a b l e s  
a r e  ambiguous .
However ,  wheneve r  Fg i s  d i f f e r e n t  f rom z e r o  
(a ^ 1 ) ,  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  e i t h e r  a c c u m u l a t i n g  ( b a l a n c e  o f  
payment s  s u r p l u s )  o r  d e c u m u l a t i n g  ( b a l a n c e  o f  payments  
d e f i c i t )  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  o v e r  t i m e ,  d e p e n d i n g  on 
w h e t h e r  Fg i s  n e g a t i v e  o r  p o s i t i v e  r e s p e c t i v e l y .  E v i d e n t l y ,  
t h e  gove rnmen t  c a n n o t  p u r s u e  t h i s  p o l i c y  f o r  e v e r ,  f o r  i t  
would e i t h e r  a c c u m u l a t e  t oo  much o r  r un  o u t  o f  f o r e i g n  
exchange  r e s e r v e s .  The gove rnmen t  w i l l  be f o r c e d  e i t h e r  
t o  mo d i f y  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  
( a d j u s t  a)  o r  even t o  g i v e  up i n t e r v e n t i o n .  The l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i a  a t  E2 and  E^ c a n n o t  be s u s t a i n e d  f o r  e v e r  and ,  
u l t i m a t e l y ,  t h e  s y s t e m  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  l o n g - r u n
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p o s i t i o n  a t  E^.  We w i l l  r e t u r n  t o  t h i s  i s s u e  i n  s e c t i o n  
4 . 6 ,  where  we examine  i n  more d e t a i l  t h e  dynamic exchange  
r a t e  r e s p o n s e  t o  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u .
4 . 4  Dynamic s t a b i l i t y
Changes  i n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  augmented  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and  p r i v a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  move t h e  s y s t e m  
o v e r  t i m e .  Dynamic s t a b i l i t y  r e q u i r e s  c o n v e r g e n c e  o f  t h e  
s equ enc e  o f  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  
s t a t e ,  where  r e a l  w e a l t h  i s  s t a b i l i z e d  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  a r e  
c o n s t a n t  and  f u l l y  r e a l i s e d .  The a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  and augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (V) a r e  b o t h  
z e r o .  As e q u a t i o n  ( 4 .1 1b )  shows,  however ,  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  
o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (v) i s  n o t  zero  wheneve r  gove rnment  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  c o n t i n u e s  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  (Fg f  0)  .
The dynamic  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t em i s  c o n s i d ­
e r e d  u n d e r  two a l t e r n a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  p r i v a t e  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s .  M o re ove r ,  t h e  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  dynamic s t a b i l i t y  a r e  
i n v e s t i g a t e d  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  w h e t h e r  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  u s i n g  
t h e  r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  o r  n o t ,  
i . e .  Fg can  be d i f f e r e n t  f rom ze ro  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n .
(a)  A d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s : As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x
( s e c t i o n  A 4 . 3 ( a ) ) ,  t h e  dynamic  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t e m  in  
t h i s  c a s e  i s  d e s c r i b e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  sy s t em o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  
e q u a t i o n s  :
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ïï = 3
Fg2(V,  Ti) 
m  -    —  -  X -  TT
SzCv, T)
0 < 6 < 1, E2y = ?, E2^ = ? ( 4 . 1 2 a )
X = g , ( V ,  TT) ; > 0 ,  g , ^  < 0Ztt ( 4 . 1 2b )
V = h? (V ,  t t )  ; < 0 ,  > 02tt ( 4 . 1 2 c )
The s i g n s  o f  b o t h  E^y  and a r e  now ambiguous
b e c a u s e  Fg i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  may be d i f f e r e n t  f rom z e r o .  As 
i s  p r o v e d  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  f o r  a l o c a l l y  s t a b l e  s t a t i o n a r y  
s t a t e ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  r e q u i r e d :
( - )
< 1 ( 4 . 1 3 a )
^2tt ®^2tt ®2V " ^ 2 v ( l  * 
(?) (+) (+) ( - )  (+)
( 4 . 1 3b )
^2tt ^2V " ®2V ^ 2 tt ^ °
(?)  ( - )  (?) (+)
( 4 . 1 3 c )
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When Fg > 0 ( i . e .  when a < 1 ) ,  t h e  s i g n s  o f
and E2y  become un am bi gu o us ly  n e g a t i v e  and p o s i t i v e  
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  T h u s , c o n d i t i o n  (4 .13b )  i s  s a t i s f i e d  and t h e  
o t h e r  two a r e  e x a c t l y  t h e  same as  i n  Case I o f  c h a p t e r  3.
The s e n s i v i t y  o f  t h e  r a t e  o f  change  o f  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  (fr) t o  ch an ge s  i n  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and i n  augmented  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  i s  s t r e n g t h e n e d  when Fg i s  p o s i t i v e  and
5
weakened when Fg i s  n e g a t i v e .  T h i s  i s  s o ,  b e c a u s e ,  g i v e n  
e q u a t i o n  ( 4 . 9 f ) ,  i n  t h e  f o r m e r  ca se  l o n g - r u n  i n f l a t i o n  i s  
l ower  and i n  t h e  l a t t e r  i s  h i g h e r ,  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g .
The s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  un de r  managed f l o a t i n g  
a r e  more s t r i n g e n t  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h o s e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  
b e c a u s e  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  a f f e c t s  t h e  r a t e  o f  g rowth  
o f  t h e  no m in a l  money s t o c k .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h r o u g h  t h e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechan ism,  t h e  r e v i s i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
(fr) i s  a f f e c t e d  as  w e l l .
F i g u r e  4 . 3  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  ph a se  d i ag r a m  u n d e r
5. From s e c t i o n  A 4 . 3 ( a )  o f  t h e  app end ix  we hav e :
( - )  (?) (+)
. . 4  -  - ,
(+) (?)  ( - )  
Fgz^-M-Fg.e^^  ^ ^
H2M
When Fg i s  p o s i t i v e  ( n e g a t i v e )  b o t h  E2y and E2^ 


























Figure 4.3. Phase diagram under adaptive expectation.
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a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h e  x = 0 
and V = 0 l o c i  i s  t h e  same as  b e f o r e .  The s l o p e s  o f  b o t h  
c u r v e s  and t h e  d i r e c t i o n  o f  t h e  h o r i z o n t a l  and v e r t i c a l  
a r ro w s  i s  ambiguous  ( s e e  a p p e n d i x  f o r  d e r i v a t i o n ) :
dx
dV
( + ) ( + ) (  + ) ( - ) ( - )  ( - ) ( + )  
^2V^^2V^2ir " ^2ir^2V^ " ^^2tt^ 2V
x=0
=  ?
+ g2 7 7  2 77  
( - ) ( ? )  ( +) ( +)




( - ) ( ? )  (+ ) (+ )
* S2V^2it^
( - )  (+)





( - ) ( - )
^2V^277
V=0
+ ggy > 0 as  g^.r >2V
'2 7 7 2 77
(+) (+)
(+)
_  ^2 ti 





( 4 . 1 5 a )
g 0  a s  g ^ v  <
2V&2W
Z TT
( 4 . 1 5 b )
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When < 0 ,  i . e .  when a  ^ 1 so t h a t  Fg % 0 ,  t h e  ph a se
d i a g r a m  a n a l y s i s  i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  o f  f i g u r e  3 .3  i n  
c h a p t e r  3 (shown by d i ag ra m s  (a)  - (e)  o f  f i g u r e  4 . 3 ) .
When a > 1,  Fg i s  n e g a t i v e  and m igh t  be p o s i t i v e .  I f  
E^^ i s  p o s i t i v e  enough t o  make t h e  n u m e r a t o r  o f  ( 4 . 1 4b )  
n e g a t i v e ,  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  f rom t h e i r  
l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  become c u m u l a t i v e .  Diagrams ( f )  - ( i )  o f  
f i g u r e  4 . 3  show t h e  f u l l  r a n g e  o f  p o s s i b i l i t i e s  u n d e r  t h i s  
c a s e .  The s u b - c a s e s  o f  d i a g ra m s  ( f ) ,  (h) and ( i ) , howeve r ,  
s h o u l d  be  d i s m i s s e d  b e c a u s e  t h e y  a r e  i n c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a 
s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .
(0) P e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t : Under  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  e x p e c t a t i o n s
a r e  a lw ay s  f u l f i l l e d  and hence
m"
TT = - g  - X = o)2 (V, x) ; CÛ2Y = ? ,  ^2^^ = ? ( 4 . 1 6 )
M
The s i g n s  o f  o)2y ^.nd ^ 2^^  a r e  now ambiguous  b e c a u s e  Fg may be 
d i f f e r e n t  f rom z e r o  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n .  S u b s t i t u t i n g  e x p e c t ­
a t i o n s  f rom ( 4 . 1 6 )  i n t o  e q u a t i o n s  (4 .1 2b )  and ( 4 . 1 2 c ) ,  we 
d e r i v e  a s y s t e m  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  t h a t  d e s c r i b e  t h e  
dynamic  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t em  u n d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  i . e
X  = g, V, i»2 (V, x) ; g 2*y = ? ,  § 2^ < 0 ( 4 . 1 7 a )
V = CÜ2 (V, x ) 1 ;  h 2*y = ? ,  h 2n > 0 ( 4 . 1 7 b )
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where  %2*Y ^ + (3x/8TT)a)2y and h^*^  = (8V/3V) +
(BV/97r)ü)2y As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  
s t a t e  i s  a s a d d l e  p o i n t  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  p r o v i d e d :
h 2*y < 0 ( 4 . 1 8 a )
(jÜ2j^  < 0  ( 4 . 18b )
When a < 1,  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  Fg % 0 and (^2y  
^2x become p o s i t i v e  and n e g a t i v e  r e s p e c t i v e l y , ^  making t h e  
s e co n d  c o n d i t i o n  r e d u n d a n t .  C o n d i t i o n  ( 4 . 1 8 a )  i s  i d e n t i c a l  
t o  t h e  s a d d l e  p o i n t  e q u i l i b r i u m  r e q u i r e m e n t ,  e q u a t i o n  ( 3 . 2 3 ) ,  
o f  c h a p t e r  3.  Use by t h e  gove rnment  o f  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  
o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  (a 1) a f f e c t s  t h e  
dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  t h r o u g h  t h e  i n f l u e n c e  o f  a 
n o n - z e r o  Fg on e x p e c t a t i o n s  ( t h e  a b s o l u t e  v a l u e  o f  W2y  and 
^2±  c h a n g e s ) . As i s  shown i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  t h e  r e q u i r e m e n t
6. From s e c t i o n  A 4 . 3 (b )  o f  t h e  a p pe nd i x  we have :
( - )  ( ? ) ( + )
2V “  "b-" 2V , _— - —— :---------——Ï--------  and -__ _
M:+Fg2^.M.Fg.e M^+Fg^^.M-Fg.e
(+) (?) (-)  (+) (?) (-)
when Fg i s  p o s i t i v e ,  tJ^ 2x become p o s i t i v e  and
n e g a t i v e  r e s p e c t i v e l y .
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t h a t  i s  n e g a t i v e  i m p l i e s  t h a t  g * 2y  i s  unambiguous ly
p o s i t i v e  ( g * 2v i s  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  x = 0 l o c u s ) .
The p h a s e  d i a g r a m  a n a l y s i s  u n d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  
i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  o f  s e c t i o n  3 . 2 . 3 ( b )  o f  c h a p t e r  3. The 
o n l y  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  t h e  s u b s c r i p t s  o f  t h e  w, h and g 
f u n c t i o n s  change  f rom 1 t o  2.
The a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  dynamic  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  
sy s t e m  shows t h a t ,  f o r  b o t h  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechani sms ,  t h e  
i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  gove rnmen t  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  
c o r r e c t s  t h e  main s h o r t c o m i n g  o f  t h e  s i m p l e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  
r u l e  employed i n  c h a p t e r  3.  The economy i s  no l o n g e r  p o i s e d  
on a k n i f e - e d g e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n ,  t h a t  c a u s e s  dynamic 
i n s t a b i l i t y  wheneve r  a d e v i a t e s  f rom u n i t y .  P r o v i d e d  t h e  
s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  h o l d ,  t h e  s y s t e m  i s  now d y n a m i c a l l y  
s t a b l e ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  w h e t h e r  t h e  gove rnment  u s e s  t h e  
r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  o r  n o t .
4 . 5  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  to  an exogenous  change
The dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m ,  l i k e  t h e  
s t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s ,  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  u n d e r  two a l t e r n a t i v e  
f o r m u l a t i o n s  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechanism.
F i g u r e  4 . 4  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  
t h e  s y s t e m  t o  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  b o t h  un d e r  f r e e  and 
managed f l o a t i n g ,  when t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  has  a d a p t i v e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s .  I n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n ,  t h e  exogenous  










1 1 1 II I  FF
0 VJi VJ VJjj
F i g u r e  4 . 4 .  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  to  an exogenous  
f a l l  i n  u ( a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ) .
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c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  a r e d u c e d  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and 
an i n c r e a s e d  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h .  On t h e  impact  
o f  t h e  f a l l  i n  u ,  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  o v e r s h o o t  t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  
v a l u e  (Ag) and o v e r  t i m e ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t
p a t h ,  f a l l  i n i t i a l l y  even f u r t h e r  and i n c r e a s e  a f t e r w a r d s  
u n t i l  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  Th roughou t  
t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  
m o n o t o n i c a l l y  i n c r e a s i n g  t o w a r d s  i t s  l o n g - r u n  v a l u e  ( i n  
c h a p t e r  3 ,  p o i n t  A^ was assumed t o  l i e  below t h e  V = 0 and 
above t h e  x = 0 l o c i ) .
Under  managed f l o a t i n g ,  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  
t h e  sy s t em  i s  d i r e c t l y  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e c i s i o n  
w i t h  which  t h e  gove rnmen t  e s t i m a t e s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h  ( o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e c i s i o n  i n  
e s t i m a t i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ) ,  i . e .  
i t  d epends  on a .  We can  d i s t i n g u i s h  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  s u b ­
c a s e s ,  d ep en d i n g  on  w h e t h e r  a i s  e q u a l ,  s m a l l e r  o r  g r e a t e r  
t h a n  one .  In  s u b c a s e  I (a = 1) , t h e  government  i s  u s i n g  
t h e  r i g h t  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  and 
t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  c o i n c i d e s  
w i t h  t h e  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  p o s i t i o n  ( E j ) . I n  
s u b c a s e  I I  (a < 1 ) ,  t h e  gove rnmen t  u n d e r e s t i m a t e s  t h e  l o n g -  
r un  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  P ( t )  < P * ( t ) ,  and i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a r e  h i g h e r  and augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l
7
w e a l t h  l o w e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n
7. As we have  s e e n  i n  s e c t i o n  4 . 3 ,  t h e  e f f e c t  o f  a f a l l  i n  
a on augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  i s  ambiguous .  A 
s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  i t  t o  be p o s i t i v e  i s  t h a t  
p r i v a t e  r e a l  w e a l t h  a t  E j j  i s  l ower  o r  e qu a l  t o  t h a t  a t
E i .
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In s u b c a s e  I I I  (a < 1 ) ,  t h e  gove rnment  o v e r e s t i m a t e s  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  ex change  r a t e  p a t h ,  P ( t )  > P * ( t ) ,  and t h e  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  s h i f t s  t o  E j j j  where  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  a r e  l o w e r
g
and augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  h i g h e r .
The impa c t  e f f e c t s  o f  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u 
depend  on t h e  v a l u e  o f  a a s  w e l l .  In  su b c a s e  I ,  g i v e n  t h e  
s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  ( i mpac t  e f f e c t s ) , t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  s t e p s  i n  t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  mar ke t  s e l l i n g  f o r e i g n  
exchange  (Fgj  (o) > 0)  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  d o m e s t i c  money. T h i s  
a l l e v i a t e s  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r ’ s e x c e s s  demand f o r  r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and e x c e s s  s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .
The ex cha nge  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  i s  m o de r a t e d  and h e n c e ,  r e a l  
money b a l a n c e s  and  augmen ted  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  b o t h  
h i g h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  ( p o i n t  A j ) .
When a d e v i a t e s  f rom u n i t y ,  t h e  magn i tude  and n a t u r e  
( i . e .  w h e t h e r  p u r c h a s e s  o r  s a l e s )  o f  t h e  exchange  m a r k e t  
o p e r a t i o n s  on t h e  i m p a c t  o f  t h e  exogenous  chang e ,  v a r y  
a c c o r d i n g l y .  I n  s u b c a s e  I I ,  g i v e n  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e ,  
t h e  d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  s p o t  exchange  r a t e  f rom i t s  r e f e r e n c e  
r a t e  P j j ( o )  i n c r e a s e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  s u b c a s e  I (as  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  u n d e r e s t i m a t e s  t h e  t r u e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e )  and h e n c e ,  t h e  
impa c t  gov e rnmen t  s a l e s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  a r e
8. A s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r   ^ V*^,  i s  t h a t  p r i v a t e
r e a l  w e a l t h  a t  E j j j  i s  e i t h e r  g r e a t e r  o r  e q u a l  t o  t h a t  
a t  E j .
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g r e a t e r  ( F g j j ( o )  > F g j ( o ) ) .  Real  money b a l a n c e s  a t  A j j  
a r e  g r e a t e r  t h a t  b e c a u s e  t h e  i n c r e a s e d  s t o c k  o f  a u g ­
mented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  (V > V t) i n c r e a s e s  t h eo i l  01
demand f o r  money.
9. F o r m a l l y ,  g i v e n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  ( im pa c t  
e f f e c t s ) , when a = 1 t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u i n c r e a s e s  
Fg,  s i n c e :




( - ) (+) (+)















> F g j ( o )
(+) ( - )
10.  F o r m a l l y ,
“ XgCA^) ^^11 ” g 2Y (Fg j  j  (o ) “ Fg j  (o) ) +
(+)  (+)  (+)
CVi* -  > 0
(+)
where  ^ j j  -  lnFI*j j  and = InM*
267
I n  s u b c a s e  I I I ,  t h e  impac t  d e v i a t i o n  o f  t h e  s p o t  
exchange  r a t e  f rom i t s  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  P j j j ( o )  d e c r e a s e s  
r e l a t i v e  t o  s u b c a s e  I and i t  can  even be n e g a t i v e ,  as  t h e  
governmen t  o v e r e s t i m a t e s  t h e  t r u e  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e .  Assuming ,  
w i t h  no l o s s  o f  g e n e r a l i t y ,  t h a t  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  r e m a in s  p o s ­
i t i v e ,  on t h e  impa c t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change  t h e  government
s a l e s  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  ^.nd t h e  s t o c k  o f  r e a l
11money b a l a n c e s  a r e  b o t h  l ower  t h a n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  l e v e l s
i n  s u b c a s e  1. Real  money b a l a n c e s  a t  however ,  can
even be l e s s  t h a n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  v a l u e  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,
d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  r e l a t i v e  t o  t h e  d i f f -
12e r e n c e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  a s s e t s  a t  Ej  and N e v e r t h e l e s s
11.  F o r m a l l y ,





C + ) ( - )
p r o v i d e d  t h e  d e v i a t i o n  be tween  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  and P j j j ( o )
2 S p o s i t i v e .  Rea l  money b a l a n c e s  a t  A j j j  a r e  l e s s  t h a n  
s i n c eo l
%o(^ l )  " ^0^^111^ " ^ ^ I ' ^ l l l ^  &2V
(+) (+) (+)
+ (V’ 111 - V*j)  
( + )
> 0
12.  F o r m a l l y ,  we have
( - )  (+) (+) ( - )  
F i g u r e  4 . 4 ,  t h o u g h ,  shows t h a t  ^ q ^'^III^  ” ^o^^o^ ^ 0
.]=
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i n  a l l  s u b c a s e s ,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  on t h e  impa c t  o f  t h e
exogenous  c h a n g e ,  s t i l l  o v e r s h o o t  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  l o n g -  
13run  v a l u e s .  T a b l e  4 . 1  be low ,  summar i ses  t h e  impac t  and 
l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u f o r  t h e  t h r e e  
s u b c a s e s .
I n  s u b c a s e  I ,  gove rnment  i n t e r v e n t i o n  w i t h  t h e  
g e n e r a l i s e d  go ve rnme n t  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  una mb ig uou s ly  
r e d u c e s  t h e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  on t h e  
impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e .  I n  a l l  t h r e e  s u b c a s e s  
( p r o v i d e d  , t h e  s t o c k  o f  p r i v a t e  r e a l  w e a l t h
and c o n s u m p t i o n  a r e  h i g h e r  t h a n  i n  t h e  ab se nc e  o f  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  and t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  im ba l ance  i s  r e d u c e d .  
However ,  t h e  m o d e r a t i n g  e f f e c t s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  on t h e  
impac t  o f  any s h oc k s  i n  t h e  sy s t em depend on t h e  r e l a t i v e  
d e g re e  o f  p r e c i s i o n  w i t h  wh ich  t h e  government  c an  p r e d i c t  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  i n  f o rm in g  i t s  
e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  ( a ) . E x c e s s i v e  
p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s  c o u l d  e x a c e r b a t e  t h e  impac t  e f f e c t s  o f  
exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e s .  I f ,  i n  t h e  p a r t i c u l a r  example  o f  
f i g u r e  4 . 4 ,  a i s  t o o  h i g h  (a > 1) i n  s u b c a s e  I I I  so t h a t
13. We s t i l l  h ave  o v e r s h o o t i n g ,  f o r
X q C A P  =  X .  + gzyCVoj - V*j )  < X .  
(+) ( - )  
where  j = I ,  I I ,  I I I .
TABLE 4 . 1
Impac t  and l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s  o f  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u
Subcase s
Impac t  e f f e c t s L on g - ru n  e f f e c t s
Fg(o) Vo "o Fg P/P V* M*
0:£ree f l oa t ing - v'o «0 - m v*i M*j.
I: a = 1 Fgj(o) > 0 > «0 Fgj= 0 VT M*j
I I :  0 < a < 1 Fgll(o)>Fgj(o) fgi iX) (p)ij<m v*ii<v*j
I I I :  a > 1 0<Fgjii(o)<Fgi(o) Fgij i<0 M*iii<M*i
K)o\
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F g i i i ( o )  < G, t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  augments  t h e  impact  
e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  f a l l  i n  u .  The go ve rnme n t ,  by p u r c h a s i n g  
r a t h e r  t h a n  s e l l i n g  f o r e i g n  excha nge ,  e x a c e r b a t e s  t h e  
e x c e s s  demand f o r  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and t h e  e x c e s s  
s u p p l y  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  I n  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  o v e r ­
s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  i s  i n c r e a s e d  r e l a t i v e  t o  
f r e e  f l o a t i n g .
Dur in g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  s y s t e m  moves 
a l o n g  t h e  AjE^ (j  = I ,  I I ,  I I I )  p a t h s ,  t i l l  t h e  new s t a t i o n ­
a r y  s t a t e  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  As i n  c h a p t e r s  2 and 3,  t h e  n a t u r e  
o f  t h e s e  p a t h s  depends  on two c o u n t e r a c t i n g  f o r c e s :  F i r s t ,
on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h e  e r r o r - l e a r n i n g  mechan ism,  t h e  i n i t i a l  
exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  i n d u c e s  e x p e c t a t i o n s  f o r  f u r t h e r  
p r i c e  r i s e s  ( tt i n c r e a s e s )  , wh i ch ,  g i ve n  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  comp­
a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s ,  t e n d  t o  r e d u c e  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  even 
f u r t h e r  ( t h e  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t e s )  . On t h e  o t h e r  hand,  
i f  on t h e  exogenous  f a l l  i n  u t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  moves 
i n t o  s u r p l u s  ( dS /du  = ? ) ,  t h e  s t o c k  o f  augmen ted  r e a l  f i n ­
a n c i a l  w e a l t h  w i l l  i n c r e a s e ,  a p p r e c i a t i n g  t h e  exchange  r a t e  
and i n c r e a s i n g  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  The AjEj  t r a j e c t o r i e s  
i n  f i g u r e  4 . 4  assume t h a t  t h e  f i r s t  e f f e c t  p r e v a i l s  o v e r  
t h e  s e c o n d ,  o r  a l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  t h a t  p o i n t s  Aj l i e  be low t h e  
V = 0 and  above  t h e  x = 0 l o c i  o f  f i g u r e  4 . 3 .  F o r m a l l y ,  
t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  r a t e s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and  augmented 
r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  a r e  
g i v en  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s :
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Xj ( t )  = (Xj ( t )  -  Xj)
( - 3 ( - )
( - )
®2tt
*-^lj '  *-^2j '  ^2V^ * ®2V*-^lj ~ *^ 2V^
2tt
(+) (?) (?) (+) (?)
(Voj -  V * . ) e ^ 2 j  
( - )
. t
( 4 . 1 9 a )
V j ( t )  = X i j ( V j C t )  -  Vj*)  -  (Xi j  -  h2y ) ( Vo j  -  V j * ) e
: t
( - ) ( - ) (?) ( - )
( 4 . 19b )
where  j = I ,  I I ,  I I I .  For  e ach  p a t h ,  t h e  i n i t i a l  and l o n g -  
r un  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  g i v e n  by t a b l e  4 . 1 .  The 
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  r o o t s  (X’ s)  v a r y  from c a s e  t o  c a s e  b e c a u s e  
t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n s  a r e  d i f f e r e n t .
P r o v i d e d  A- l i e  be low t h e  V = 0 and above t h e  
1 '
X = 0 s c h e d u l e s ,  t h e  p h a se  d i ag r am  a n a l y s i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t ,  
a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  ( s m a l l  v a l u e s  
f o r  t )  t h e  s q u a r e  b r a c k e t  i n  ( 4 . 1 9 a )  i s  n e g a t i v e  and t h a t  
t h e  s e c o n d  t e rm  more t h a n  o f f s e t s  t h e  f i r s t .  As a r e s u l t ,  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  f a l l  even f u r t h e r  t h a n  a t  t h e  impac t  
e f f e c t .  Over  t i m e ,  as  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  c a t c h  up w i t h
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t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  r e a l  b a l a n c e s  s t a r t  r i s i n g .  S ince  Aj 
a r e  assumed be low t h e  V = 0 l o c u s ,  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  
w e a l t h  i s  i n c r e a s i n g  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  t h r o u g h o u t  t h e  a d j u s t ­
ment  p r o c e s s .
The n a t u r e  o f  t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  
however ,  changes  c o n s i d e r a b l y  when,  i n s t e a d  o f  a d a p t i v e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  ha s  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e ­
s i g h t .  On t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  d i s t u r b a n c e ,  p r i v a t e  
w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  a d j u s t  t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  so 
t h a t  t h e  sy s t e m  i s  s h i f t e d  t o  t h e  e q u i l i b r a t i n g  t r a j e c t o r y  
t h a t  l e a d s  t o  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e .  F i g u r e  4 .5  be low,  
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sy s t em  t o  t h e  e xo ­
genous  f a l l  i n  u ,  b o t h  u n de r  f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g  
when t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  e q u ip p e d  w i t h  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  
f o r e s i g h t .  E j ,  E j j  and E j j j  show t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
p o s i t i o n s  i n  t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  s u b c a s e s .  A and A E^ show ^ o o 1
t h e  i mp ac t  e f f e c t  and t h e  dynamic a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  u n d e r  f r e e  
f l o a t i n g .
Under  managed f l o a t i n g ,  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  
e x e r t s  t h e  same q u a l i t a t i v e  (b u t  n o t  q u a n t i t a t i v e )  e f f e c t s  
on t h e  s y s t e m ,  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change ,  as  i n  
t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  f i g u r e  4 .4  above .  The s t o c k s  o f  r e a l  money 
b a l a n c e s  and augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  h i g h e r ,  
r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  I n t e r v e n t i o n  r e d u c e s  t h e  o v e r ­
s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and m o d e r a t e s  t h e  f l u c t u a ­
t i o n s  i n  r e a l  w e a l t h ,  p r i v a t e  co ns um pt io n  and c u r r e n t  







F i g u r e  4 . 5 .  Dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  sys tem to  an exogenous  
f a l l  i n  u ( l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ) .
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p o l i c y  depend  on t h e  v a l u e  o f  a ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e c i s i o n  
w i t h  wh ich  t h e  government  p r e d i c t s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h .  In  s u b c a s e  I I I  where  a > 1,  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
on t h e  impa c t  o f  t h e  exogenous  change ( a t  A j j j )  may even  be 
l ower  t h a n  t h e i r  r e s p e c t i v e  l e v e l  un de r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g ,  
dep en d i n g  on t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  A j j j  t r a j e c t o r y .  T ab l e
4 .1  summar i se s  t h e  impa c t  and l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s  o f  t h e  e x o ­
genous f a l l  i n  u f o r  t h e  t h r e e  d i f f e r e n t  s u b c a s e s .  U n l i k e  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s ,  t h e  impact  e f f e c t s  u n d e r  l o n g - r u n  
p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  a r e  q u a n t i t a t i v e l y  d i f f e r e n t  f rom t h o s e  
u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  In a l l  s u b c a s e s ,  o v e r  t im e  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  and augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  a r e  
m o n o t o n i c a l l y  i n c r e a s i n g  a l o n g  t h e  e q u i l i b r a t i n g  a d j u s t m e n t  
p a t h s  Aj Ej (j = I ,  I I ,  I I I ) ,  t i l l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  
e s t a b l i s h e d .  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  a c c u m u l a t i o n  r a t e s  o f  t h e  two 
a s s e t s  d u r i n g  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s :
X j ( t )  = A j ( X j ( t )  - Xj) ( 4 . 2 0 a )
( - )  ( - )
V . ( t )  = À.(V . - V . * ) e ^ j t  ( 4 . 2 0 b )
3 3 oj  J ^
( - )  ( - )
(j  = I ,  I I ,  I I I ) ,  wh i ch  a r e  b o t h  una mb ig uo us l y  p o s i t i v e .
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4 . 6  Exchange  r a t e  dynamics
The g e n e r a l i s e d  government  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n ,  as 
an improvement  o v e r  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  employed i n  
c h a p t e r  3,  a l l o w s  a s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  even i f  
t h e  go ve rnme n t  u s e s  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h .  I n  c o n s e q u e n c e ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  e x ­
change  r a t e  dynamics  when a d e v i a t e s  f rom u n i t y ,  assumes 
p a r t i c u l a r  i m p o r t a n c e .
F i g u r e  4 . 6  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  
t h e  ex ch an g e  r a t e  t o  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u ,  b o t h  u n d e r  
f r e e  and managed f l o a t i n g ,  when t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  has  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  PP^* i s  t h e  i n i t i a l  l o n g - r u n  e x ­
change  r a t e  p a t h  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  and PP^* i s  t h e  new 
one ,  c o n s i s t e n t  w i t h  t h e  l ower  v a l u e  f o r  u .  ABC i s  t h e  fam­
i l i a r  dynamic  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e ,  i n  t h e  
a b s e n c e  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  Under  managed f l o a t i n g  t h e  dyn­
amic b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  exchange  r a t e  depends  on t h e  v a l u e  o f  
ol; i n  f i g u r e  4 . 6 ,  t h e  t h r e e  s u b c a s e s  a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  s e p ­
a r a t e l y .
I n  s u b c a s e  I ,  gove rnment  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r e d u c e s  t h e  
o v e r s h o o t i n g  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  on t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  
exogenous  c h a n g e .  As a r e s u l t ,  t h e  impac t  exchange  r a t e  
o v e r s h o o t i n g  i s  m o d e r a t e d .  Given t h e  dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  o v e r  t i m e ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t e s  
even f u r t h e r  and  a p p r e c i a t e s  a f t e r w a r d s ,  t i l l  t h e  l o n g - r u n  





exchange  r a t e  i s  a lways  l ower  t h a n  i t s  c o r r e s p o n d i n g  v a l u e  
u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  ( t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p a t h  Aj Ej  i n  f i g u r e
4 .4  l i e s  above A ^ E j ) . PP^ i s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h  un d e r  managed f l o a t i n g .  I t  l i e s  be low PP^ * , b e c a u s e  
t h e  f o r e i g n  exchange  m ar ke t  o p e r a t i o n s  on t h e  impact  o f  t h e  
exogenous  ch an g e ,  r e d u c e  t h e  i n i t i a l  nomina l  money s t o c k .
Dur ing  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  gove rnment  r e f e r e n c e  
r a t e  grows a t  a v a r i a b l e  r a t e ,  dom ina t ed  by t h e  e v o l u t i o n  
o f  nomina l  money b a l a n c e s .  From p o i n t  C  onwards ,  however ,
P ( t )  c o i n c i d e s  w i t h  t h e  a c t u a l  exchange  r a t e ,  g rowing  b o t h  
a t  t h e  same r a t e .  PP^ and PP^* a r e  p a r a l l e l  t o  each  o t h e r ,  
f o r  l o n g - r u n  i n f l a t i o n  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g  i s  t h e  same 
as  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .
The dynamic exchange  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r  i n  t h i s  
s u b c a s e  i s  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  c a s e  I ( a d a p t i v e  
e x p e c t a t i o n s )  o f  c h a p t e r  3.  S h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
f l u c t u a t i o n s  a r e  m o d e r a t e d  and t h e  p r o c e s s  o f  dynamic a d ­
j u s t m e n t  i s  spe ede d  u p ,  as  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  augments  
t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  i n  p r i v a t e  p o r t f o l i o s .
In  s u b c a s e  I I ,  t h e  m o d e r a t i o n  i n  t h e  impac t  e x ­
change  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  i n  any o t h e r  
s u b c a s e ,  b e c a u s e  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a t  p o i n t  A j j  i n  f i g u r e
4 .4  a r e  h i g h e r .  Over  t i m e ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  i n i t i a l l y  
d e p r e c i a t i n g  even f u r t h e r  and a p p r e c i a t i n g  a f t e r w a r d s ,  t i l l  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  r e a c h e d  a t  C ’ . The n a t u r e  o f  
t h e  dynamic  p a t h  B’C’ depends  on t h e  dynamic r e s p o n s e  o f
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  From some p o i n t  E ( a t  which  P ( t )  = P * ( t ) )
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on wa rds ,  t h e  s p o t  r a t e  f a l l s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  be tween  P * ( t )
- wh ich  shows t h e  gove rnmen t  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  when a = 1 - 
and P ( t ) ,  i n  wh i ch  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  and t h e  marke t  
f o r c e s  work  a t  c r o s s  p u r p o s e s .  Under  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  
gove rnmen t  r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n ,  however ,  and c o n t r a r y  t o  t he  
r e s u l t s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e c t i o n  3 . 3 . 3  o f  c h a p t e r  3,  
t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  j u s t  o f f s e t s  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  ma rke t  
f o r c e s ,  so t h a t  a s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  
Dur ing  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  as  i n  s u b c a s e  I ,  t h e  g o v e r n ­
ment  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e  P j j ( b )  grows a t  a v a r i a b l e  r a t e .  From 
p o i n t  D o n w a r d s ,  t h o u g h ,  i t  i n c r e a s e s  a t  t h e  same c o n s t a n t  
r a t e  a s  t h e  a c t u a l  exchange  r a t e .  The l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g ,  PP^,  l i e s  be tween  P P j j  
and t h e  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  PP^*.
Both PP^ and  P P j j  a r e  f l a t t e r  t h a n  PP^*,  f o r  l o n g - r u n  
i n f l a t i o n  i n  s u b c a s e  I I  i s  l e s s  t h a n  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .
The r e d u c t i o n  i n  t h e  impac t  exchange  r a t e  o v e r ­
s h o o t i n g  i n  s u b c a s e  I I I  i s  much l e s s  t h a n  i n  t h e  o t h e r  two 
s u b c a s e s .  I f  a i s  h i g h  enough,  so t h a t  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  
a t  p o i n t  A j j j  o f  f i g u r e  4 . 4  a r e  l e s s  t h a n  , government  
i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  s u b c a s e  I I I  e x a c e r b a t e s  t h e  impa c t  exchange  
r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g .  Dur ing  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  
e xchange  r a t e  f o l l o w s  a s i m i l a r  p a t t e r n  o f  movements as  i n  
t h e  o t h e r  two s u b c a s e s . A s  i n  s u b c a s e  I I ,  f rom some
14.  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  s l o p e s  o f  t h e  B’C’ p a t h s  i n  f i g u r e  4 . 6  
a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s :
D l n P j ( t )  = DlnM^j ( t )  -  (x^ ( t )  -  x^ )
C") ( “ )
^ c o n t i n u e d  on n e x t  page)
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p o i n t  E ( a t  wh ich  now P ( t )  = P ( t ) )  onwa rd s ,  t h e  s p o t  e x ­
change  r a t e  f a l l s  i n  t h e  r e g i o n  where  t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  
c o u n t e r a c t s  t h e  m a r k e t  f o r c e s .  Along PP^,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g ,  m a rk e t  f o r c e s  
e x a c t l y  o f f s e t  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and t h e  sy s t em 
i s  s t a b i l i s e d .  At  t h e  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  P ( t )  and P j j j C ' t )  
grow a t  t h e  same r a t e ,  equa l  t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i n f l a t i o n .
T h e i r  p a t h s  a r e  s t e e p e r  t h a n  PP^*,  b e c a u s e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
i n f l a t i o n  r a t e  i s  g r e a t e r  t h a n  m. I n  n e i t h e r  o f  s u b c a s e s  
I I  and I I I ,  t h o u g h ,  i s  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  excha ng e  r a t e  p a t h  e q u a l  t o  t h e  a c t u a l  one .
F i g u r e  4 .7  be low ,  i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  dynamic exchange  
r a t e  r e s p o n s e  when p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  a r e  e qu ip p e d  w i t h  
l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t . A B C  i s  t h e  dynamic  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h  u n d e r  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  On t h e  im p a c t  o f  t h e  exogenous  
ch ang e ,  t h e  ex change  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t s  i t s  l o n g - r u n  v a l u e  
and o v e r  t i m e ,  i t  a p p r e c i a t e s  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  t o w a rd s  i t s  l o n g -  
r un  p a t h .
F o o t n o t e  14 c o n t i n u e d
r ( - )
Ao-n-
2ir
(+) (?)  (?)  (+) (?) ( - )
where  j = I ,  I I ,  I I I .  Given t h e  dynamic  r e s p o n s e  o f  
r e a l  money b a l a n c e s ,  a t  t h e  i n i t i a l  s t a g e s  o f  t h e  
a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  t h e  f i r s t  and t h i r d  t e rm s  o u t w e ig h  
t h e  s e c o n d ,  f o r c i n g  t h e  exchange  r a t e  t o  d e p r e c i a t e  
even f u r t h e r .
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I n P ( t )
PP
PP
I n P * (0) 
I n P . (0)
Subcase
I n P * (0)
t ime
PP
I n P ( t )
PP
PP
I n P * (0)
l n P* (0 )
Subcase  I I :  0<a<l
t ime
PP I I II n P ( t ) PI
PP
PP
Subcase  I I I
t imet0 tt
F i g u r e  4 . 7 .  Exchange r a t e  dynamics  ( l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t )
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Under  managed f l o a t i n g ,  f o r  a l l  s u b c a s e s  t h e  l o n g -  
r u n  e f f e c t s  a r e  t h e  same a s  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .  On 
t h e  impac t  o f  t h e  exogenous  c ha ng e ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r ­
s h o o t i n g  i s  r e d u c e d  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g .  T h i s  r e d ­
u c t i o n  i s  h i g h e r  i n  s u b c a s e  I I ,  l e s s  i n  sub c as e  I and i n  
s u b c a s e  I I I  t h e  exchange  r a t e  o v e r s h o o t i n g  may even be 
e x a c e r b a t e d  i f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  a t  p o i n t  A j j j  o f  f i g u r e
4 . 5  a r e  l e s s  t h a n  . Over  t i m e ,  c o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  ca s e  o f  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e  exchange  r a t e  i s  m o n o t o n i c a l l y  
a p p r e c i a t i n g ^ ^  (growing  a t  a r a t e  l e s s  t h a n  l o n g - r u n  
i n f l a t i o n )  t i l l  t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .
Tha a n a l y s i s  so f a r ,  howeve r ,  t a c i t l y  assumes 
t h a t  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  gove rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
( s u b c a s e s  I I  and I I I )  does  n o t  a f f e c t  i n  any way w e a l t h  
h o l d e r s ’ e x p e c t a t i o n s  o r  i n d u c e  t h e  gove rnment  t o  modi fy  i t s  
p o l i c y .  I n  s u b c a s e  I I ,  b o t h  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  and r a t i o n a l  
e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  un de r  managed 
f l o a t i n g ,  PP^,  l i e s  above  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ' s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  PP j j*  Given t h e  i n t e r v e n t i o n
15.  F o r m a l l y ,  t h e  s l o p e s  o f  t h e  B’C’ p a t h s  i n  f i g u r e  4 .7  
a r e  g i v e n  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  e x p r e s s i o n s :
D l n P j ( t )  = DlnM^^. ( t )  -  X. (x^ ( t )  - x p
( - )  ( - )
where  j = I ,  I I ,  I I I .  Th roughou t  t h e  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s  
t h e  exchange  r a t e  grows a t  a l ower  r a t e  t h a n  t h e  nomina l  
money s t o c k ,  so t h a t  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  r i s e .
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r u l e ,  t h i s  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  d e c u m u l a t i n g  
f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  o v e r  t i m e .  S i m i l a r l y  i n  s u b c a s e  
I I I ,  t h e  c o n t i n u e d  gove rnm en t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
i n v o l v e s  a c o n t i n u o u s  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  
r e s e r v e s .  I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  t h e  government  c a n n o t  s u s t a i n  
i t s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  p o l i c y  f o r  e v e r .  Because  o f  t h e  c o n s t r a i n t s  
on i t s  a c t i o n s ,  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  u n a b l e  t o  d e f e n d  a p a r t i c ­
u l a r  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  and a " c r i s i s ” d e v e l o p s  i n  
t h e  b a l a n c e  o f  pa ym en t s .
As was a l r e a d y  a s su me d ,  t h e  gove rnment  ha s  no 
i n t e r e s t  i n  d e l i b e r a t e  ex cha nge  r a t e  p o l i c i e s .  Hence ,  t h e  
l o n g - r u n  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i n  s u b c a s e s  I I  and I I I  
a r e  unwelcomed by t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ,  f o r  t h e y  i n v o l v e  c o n t i n ­
uous  a c c u m u l a t i o n  o r  d e c u m u l a t i o n  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s ­
e r v e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  d o m e s t i c  i n f l a t i o n  i s  l ower  and h i g h e r  
r e s p e c t i v e l y  r e l a t i v e  t o  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  and t h e  a s s e t  m a r k e t  
e q u i l i b r i u m  i s  a f f e c t e d  a n a l a g o u s l y .
* The government  w i l l  be  f o r c e d ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  e i t h e r  
t o  mod i fy  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money s t o c k  
( i . e .  a d j u s t  a ) ,  r e v i s i n g  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  o r  g i v e  up i n t e r v e n t i o n  a l t o g e t h e r .  A 
s t a b i l i z e d  d o m e s t i c  i n f l a t i o n  w i t h  a c o n s t a n t  and n o n - z e r o  
Fg i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  u s i n g  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  
o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  ( i . e .  a ^ 1 ) .  Mor eo ve r ,  
t h e  r a t e  o f  change  o f  t h e  go ve rnme n t  s t o c k  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  
r e s e r v e s  s u g g e s t s  t h e  d i r e c t i o n  i n  wh ich  a s h o u l d  be a d j u s t e d  
so t h a t  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s  a r e  m i n i m i z e d .  C o n s e q u e n t l y ,  t h e
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l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i a  o f  s u b c a s e s  I I  and I I I  a r e  i n t e r m e d i a r y  
s t a g e s  o f  a more g e n e r a l  a d j u s t m e n t  p r o c e s s ,  which u l t i m a t e l y  
l e a d s  t o  a f u l l  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  where  a = 1 ( s u b c a s e  
I ) ,  t h e  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  l o n g - r u n  p o s i t i o n .
Of p a r t i c u l a r  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  exchange  
r a t e  dynamics  i s  t h e  p o s s i b l e  a b i l i t y  o f  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  
h o l d e r s  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e f f e c t s  o f  government  
p o l i c y  and t o  a d j u s t  t h e i r  b e h a v i o u r  a c c o r d i n g l y .  Under  
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  u n a b l e  t o  p r e ­
d i c t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  government  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  
Long - ru n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  however ,  p r o v i d e s  t h i s  i n f o r m ­
a t i o n  and a l l o w s  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  t o  a d j u s t  t h e i r  
e x p e c t a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g l y ,  even  w e l l  b e f o r e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
p o s i t i o n s  i n  s u b c a s e s  I I  and I I I  a r e  r e a c h e d .  The r e s u l t i n g  
exchange  r a t e  dynamics  w i l l ,  o f  c o u r s e ,  be v e r y  d i f f e r e n t  
f rom t h o s e  u n d e r  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s .
4 .7  S p e c u l a t i o n  and e xch an ge  r a t e  dynamics
A r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  ou r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  
( 4 . 7 ) ,  a l o n g  t h e  l i n e s  o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e c t i o n  3 .4  o f  
c h a p t e r  3,  a l l o w s  u s  t o  examine  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  s p e c u l a t i o n  
on t h e  dynamic exchange  r a t e  a d j u s t m e n t  w i t h  no ch an g es  i n  
ou r  f o rm a l  a n a l y s i s .
S p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  assumed t o  have  no p r e f e r r e d  
m o n e t a r y  h a b i t a t ,  b u t  h o l d  n o n - i n t e r e s t  b e a r i n g  work i ng  
b a l a n c e s  i n  d o m e s t i c  and f o r e i g n  c u r r e n c i e s .  T h e i r
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s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  p r o v i d e  f o r e i g n  exchange  co ve r  t o  
w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  w i s h i n g  t o  r e - a l l o c a t e  t h e i r  p o r t f o l i o s .
They form e x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
p a t h  P ( t )  i n  t h e  same way as  government  does  u n d e r  managed 
f l o a t i n g .  S p e c u l a t o r s  t a k e  open p o s i t i o n s  i n  f o r e i g n  c u r r ­
ency d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  d i s c r e p a n c i e s  be tween  t h e  s p o t  exchange  
r a t e  and t h e i r  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e ,  a t  e v e r y  moment i n  t i m e .
Through t h e i r  c o v e r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  maximize  t h e  
e x p e c t e d  l o n g - r u n  v a l u e  o f  t h e i r  r e a l  w e a l t h ;  t h e y  buy ( s e l l )  
d o m e s t i c  money when t h e y  e x p e c t  a l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  
d e p r e c i a t i o n  ( a p p r e c i a t i o n ) ,  i n  r e t u r n  f o r  f o r e i g n  excha ng e .
At t h e  new s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  t a k e  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  
by u n c o v e r i n g  t h e i r  p o s i t i o n s .
As i n  c h a p t e r  3 ,  s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t y ,  p r i o r  t o  
t h e  l i q u i d a t i o n  o f  p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t s ,  p r o d u c e s  e x a c t l y  t h e  
same e f f e c t s  on exchange  r a t e  dynamics  a s  government  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n .  To i l l u s t r a t e ,  c o n s i d e r  a g a i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  an e x o g ­
enous  f a l l  i n  u :  t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  s p e c u l a t i o n  on t h e  r e s u l t i n g
exchange  r a t e  dynamics  d e p e n d ,  a s  u n d e r  managed f l o a t i n g ,  on 
a ,  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  p r e c i s i o n  w i t h  which  s p e c u l a t o r s  p r e d i c t  
t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t o c k  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s .  I n  sub c as e  I 
(a = 1 ) ,  i r r e s p e c t i v e  o f  t h e  p r i v a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechan i sms ,  
s p e c u l a t i o n  l e a d s  t o  an  unambiguous  m o d e r a t i o n  i n  s h o r t - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  and t o  s t a b i l i z a t i o n  o f  p r i v a t e  
r e a l  w e a l t h  and c o n s u m p t i o n  and o f  t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o un t  im­
b a l a n c e s  ( f i g u r e s  4 . 6 ( a )  and  4 . 7 ( a ) ) .  I n  r e t u r n ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  
maximize  t h e i r  p o t e n t i a l  p r o f i t s .
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When a d e v i a t e s  f rom u n i t y ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  make 
m i s t a k e s  i n  p r e d i c t i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h .  
F i g u r e s  4 . 6  and 4 .7  i l l u s t r a t e  t h e  exchange  r a t e  dynamics  
un d e r  t h e  two e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechani sms .  I n  s u b c a s e  I I  
(a < 1 ) ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  u n d e r e s t i m a t e  t h e  t r u e  l o n g - r u n  e x ­
change  r a t e  p a t h .  T h i s  l e a d s  t o  a l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o s i t i o n  a t  wh ich  s p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  d e c u m u l a t i n g  f o r e i g n  e x ­
change  r e s e r v e s  o v e r  t i m e .  I n  r e t u r n ,  t h e y  buy d o m e s t i c  
money,  a n t i c i p a t i n g  an exchange  r a t e  a p p r e c i a t i o n  
( P ( t )  > P j j ( t ) ) .  The n e a r  d e p l e t i o n  o f  t h e i r  f o r e i g n  e x ­
change  h o l d i n g s  w i l l  f o r c e  them e i t h e r  t o  m o d i f y  t h e i r  e s t ­
ima t e  o f  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  ( i . e .  a d j u s t  a ) ,  
r e v i s i n g  t h e i r  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  
o r  t o  g i v e  up t h e i r  c o v e r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s ,  d r i v e n  o u t  o f  
b u s i n e s s .  I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  t h e  sy s tem r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n  o f  s u b c a s e  I ,  where  a = 1 ( f r e e  f l o a t i n g  
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ) . The exchange  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t e s  and s p e c ­
u l a t o r s  i n c u r  a f i n a n c i a l  l o s s  on t h e i r  h o l d i n g s  o f  d o m e s t i c  
money.
A s i m i l a r  " s p e c u l a t i v e  c r i s i s "  o c c u r s  when s p e c ­
u l a t o r s  o v e r e s t i m a t e  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  ( s u b ­
c a s e  I I I ,  a  > 1 ) .  S p e c u l a t o r s  a r e  now a c c u m u l a t i n g  f o r e i g n  
exchange  s e l l i n g  d o m e s t i c  money ( i n  t h e  l o n g - r u n ) , as  t h e y  
ex p ec t  an excha ng e  r a t e  d e p r e c i a t i o n  ( P ( t )  < P ^ j j ( t ) ) .  The 
r u n n i n g  down o f  t h e i r  s t o c k  o f  do m e s t i c  money w i l l  f o r c e  
them a g a i n  t o  r e v i s e  t h e i r  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h  ( i . e .  a d j u s t  a )  o r  t o  g i v e  up s p e c u l a t i o n .  The
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sy s t e m  w i l l  r e t u r n  f i n a l l y  t o  t h e  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n  ( s u b c a s e  I ) . The exchange  r a t e  a p p ­
r e c i a t e s  r e l a t i v e  t o  P P j j j  and s p e c u l a t o r s  s u f f e r  f i n a n c i a l  
l o s s e s .  The p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  t h e  d o m e s t i c  money t h e y  have  
u s e d  i n  t h e i r  c o v e r i n g  a c t i v i t i e s  s u p p o r t i n g  P P ^ ^ ^ , i s  
g r e a t e r  t h a n  t h e  v a l u e  o f  f o r e i g n  exchange  t h e y  have  a c q u i r e d  
i n  r e t u r n .  I n  b o t h  s u b c a s e s ,  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  exchange  r a t e  
dynamics  a r e  f u r t h e r  i n f l u e n c e d  by a p o s s i b l e  r e a c t i o n  o f  
p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s .  Under  a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s ,  t h e  
p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  u n a b l e  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  i m p l i c ­
a t i o n s  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t i e s  and h e n c e ,  i t s  b e h a v i o u r  
r e m a in s  i n v a r i a n t .  Under  l o n g - r u n  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  
however ,  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s  a r e  a b l e  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  t h e  
s p e c u l a t i v e  e r r o r s  and t h e i r  l i k e l y  ou t come ,  a d j u s t i n g  
t h e i r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a c c o r d i n g l y .
T h e r e f o r e ,  t o  t h e  e x t e n t  t h a t  t h e  s p e c u l a t o r s ’ 
e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  i s  l i k e l y  t o  
d e v i a t e  s i g n i f i c a n t l y  f rom i t s  t r u e  v a l u e ,  s p e c u l a t i o n  w i l l  
e x a c e r b a t e  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  I n  add ­
i t i o n ,  t h e  v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  and c o n s u m p t i o n  
and t h e  c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i m b a l a n c e s  w i l l  be i n c r e a s e d  as  
w e l l .
C o n t r a r y  t o  t h e  a n a l y s i s  o f  s e c t i o n  3 . 4  o f  c h a p t e r  
3,  u s e  o f  t h e  wrong e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  excha nge  r a t e  
p a t h ,  l e a d s  t o  a t e m p o r a r i l y  s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
( s u b c a s e s  I I  and I I I ) .  To s u s t a i n  t h i s  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  how­
e v e r ,  s p e c u l a t o r s  have  t o  be w i l l i n g  t o  t o l e r a t e  a g r a d u a l
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d e c u m u l a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  r e s e r v e s  o f  d o m e s t i c  money o r  f o r e i g n  
ex ch a ng e .  I n  t h i s  r e s p e c t ,  d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n  l e a d s ,  
f o r  a t  l e a s t  some t i m e ,  t o  a l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n  
o t h e r  t h a n  t h e  one t h a t  would p r e v a i l  i n  t h e  a b s e n c e  o f  any 
s p e c u l a t i v e  a c t i v i t y .  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a s  i n  c h a p t e r  3 ,  
d e s t a b i l i z i n g  s p e c u l a t i o n  i s  u n p r o f i t a b l e  and w i l l  e i t h e r  
d r i v e  s p e c u l a t o r s  o u t  o f  b u s i n e s s ,  o r  w i l l  f o r c e  them to  
mod i fy  t h e i r  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s .
T a c i t l y  i m p l i e d  i n  our  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  
enough s p e c u l a t i v e  c a p i t a l  a v a i l a b l e ;  a p r e r e q u i s i t e  
c o n d i t i o n  f o r  any s p e c u l a t i o n ,  s t a b i l i z i n g  o r  o t h e r w i s e .
The u n c o v e r i n g  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  p o s i t i o n s ,  howeve r ,  
t h a t  a l l o w s  s p e c u l a t o r s  t o  t a k e  t h e i r  p r o f i t s  and t o  s u s t a i n  
t h e m s e l v e s  i n  b u s i n e s s ,  d i s t u r b s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o s i t i o n .  The c a s h i n g  i n  o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  p r o f i t s  r e p r e s e n t s  
an endogenous  s o u r c e  o f  a s s e t  ma r ke t  d i s t u r b a n c e s ,  c r e a t i n g  
a d d i t i o n a l  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  t h a t  w ipe s  
o u t  some o f  t h e  s p e c u l a t i v e  p r o f i t s .
4 . 8  C o n c lu d i n g  r emarks
The i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  gove rnmen t  
r e a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  c o r r e c t s  t h e  main s h o r t c o m i n g s  o f  t h e  
s i m p l e  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  o f  c h a p t e r  3.  The economy i s  no 
l o n g e r  p o i s e d  on a k n i f e - e d g e  e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n ,  t h a t  
c a u s e s  dynamic  i n s t a b i l i t y  wheneve r  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t ’ s e s t ­
im a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  r e a l  money s t o c k  d e v i a t e s  f rom i t s
288
t r u e  v a l u e .  Managed f l o a t i n g  w i t h  t h e  g e n e r a l i s e d  i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n  r u l e  l e a d s  t o  a s t a b l e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m ,  even 
i f  t h e  go v e rn m e n t ,  due t o  p r e d i c t i o n  e r r o r s ,  f o l l o w s  comp­
e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s .
To s u s t a i n  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  i n  t h e s e  c a s e s ,  
t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  r e q u i r e d  t o  a c c u m u l a t e  o r  t o  d ecu m ul a t e  
f o r e i g n  exchange  r e s e r v e s  f o r  e v e r .  I n  t h e  f a c e  o f  t h e s e  
b a l a n c e  o f  payment s  c r i s e s ,  t h e  gove rnmen t  i s  f o r c e d  e i t h e r  
t o  r e v i s e  i t s  e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h  
o r  t o  g i v e  up i n t e r v e n t i o n  a l t o g e t h e r .  I n  e i t h e r  c a s e ,  t h e  
s y s t e m  r e t u r n s  t o  t h e  f r e e  f l o a t i n g  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  
p o s i t i o n .  Of p a r t i c u l a r  i m p o r t a n c e  t o  t h e  dynamic  r e s p o n s e  
o f  t h e  sy s t e m  and t h e  dynamic exchange  r a t e  b e h a v i o u r  i n  
p a r t i c u l a r  i s  t h e  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  h o l d e r s ’ a b i l i t y  t o  p r e d i c t  
t h e  e f f e c t s  o f  gove rnment  p o l i c i e s  and t o  a d j u s t  t h e i r  
b e h a v i o u r  a c c o r d i n g l y .
Government  i n t e r v e n t i o n  i s  an e f f i c i e n t  p o l i c y  
o f  m o d e r a t i n g  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y  so l ong  
as  t h e  gove rnment  u s e s  an e s t i m a t e  o f  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  p a t h  c l o s e  enough t o  i t s  t r u e  v a l u e .  E x c e s s i v e  p r e ­
d i c t i o n  e r r o r s  e x a c e r b a t e  r a t h e r  t h a n  d i m i n i s h  s h o r t - r u n  
exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s .  In  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e y  magn i fy  t h e  
v a r i a b i l i t y  o f  p r i v a t e  w e a l t h  and co n su m p t i o n  and o f  t h e  
c u r r e n t  a c c o u n t  i m b a l a n c e s .
A r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  o u r  i n t e r v e n t i o n  r u l e  t o  
r e f l e c t  s p e c u l a t i v e  b e h a v i o u r  y i e l d s  r e s u l t s  s i m i l a r  t o  
t h o s e  o f  gove rnment  i n t e r v e n t i o n .  One f e a t u r e ,  t h o u g h ,  o f
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s p e c u l a t i o n  r e p r e s e n t s  an endogenous  s o u r c e  o f  a s s e t  ma rke t  
d i s t u r b a n c e s .  U n l i k e  t h e  government ,  s p e c u l a t o r s , d r i v e n  by 
t h e i r  p r o f i t  m ax im i s in g  b e h a v i o u r ,  need  t o  u n c o v e r  t h e i r  
p o s i t i o n s  and t a k e  t h e i r  s p e c u l a t i v e  p r o f i t s ,  i f  t h e y  a r e  
t o  r e m a i n  i n  b u s i n e s s .  An a c t i o n  t h a t  d i s t u r b s  t h e  l o n g - r u n  
e q u i l i b r i u m  p o s i t i o n ,  c a u s i n g  a d d i t i o n a l  s h o r t - r u n  exchange  
r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .  I f  s p e c u l a t o r s  were  t o  have  enough s p e c ­
u l a t i v e  c a p i t a l  and e x a c t l y  t h e  same i n f o r m a t i o n  a s  t h e  
go ve rnme n t  t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  t h e  
gove rnmen t  would seem t o  be i n  a b e t t e r  p o s i t i o n  t o  mo de r a t e  
s h o r t - r u n  ex change  r a t e  v a r i a b i l i t y .  T h i s  i s  s o ,  b e c a u s e  
gov e rnmen t  a c t i o n s  a r e  n o t  d o m in a t ed  by any p r o f i t  maxim­
i s i n g  o b j e c t i v e s .  I n  g e n e r a l ,  howeve r ,  t h e  c h o i c e  be tween  
gov e rnmen t  i n t e r v e n t i o n  and  p r i v a t e  s p e c u l a t i o n  depends  on 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f a c t o r s :  t h e  r e l a t i v e  a b i l i t y  o f  s p e c u l a t o r s
t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  l o n g - r u n  exchange  r a t e  p a t h ,  t h e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  
o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  c a p i t a l  and t h e  r e l a t i v e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e  
a d d i t i o n a l  exchange  r a t e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  t h a t  t h e  l i q u i d a t i o n  
o f  s p e c u l a t i v e  p r o f i t s  c a u s e s .
P u r s u a n c e  o f  c o m p e t i t i v e  exchange  r a t e  p o l i c i e s  
l e a d s  t o  a c o n s i d e r a b l e  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  d e g r e e  o f  r e s e r v e  
u s e .  More i n t e r e s t i n g l y ,  however ,  t h e s e  p o l i c i e s  i n c r e a s e  
t h e  demand f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  l i q u i d i t y  and i n  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
o f  more t h a n  two c o u n t r i e s ,  p r o d u c e  an i n c o n s i s t e n t  w or ld  
s t r u c t u r e  o f  r e f e r e n c e  r a t e s  t h a t  c a u s e s  i n t e r v e n t i o n  a t  
c r o s s  p u r p o s e s .  The p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  su ch  p ro b l em s  a r i s i n g  
i n c r e a s e s  t h e  need  f o r  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  s u r v e i l l a n c e  o f  n a t ­
i o n a l  ex change  r a t e  p o l i c i e s .
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APPENDIX 4
A4.1  S h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s
(a)  Impac t  e f f e c t s : L i n e a r i s i n g  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m
c o n d i t i o n s  ( 4 . 4 a )  - ( 4 . 4 c )  o f  s e c t i o n  4 .2  we have :


















D ^  D D(-Cy - ( l - C y O ) i  -CyO" -1 0
0 -1
(A4.2)
w i t h
M I
A I = - ( 1  - £— ) ( 1 - £ , J  
 ^ M2
< 0 (A4.3)
s i n c e  (1 -  I — ) > , g i v e n  e q u a t i o n  (A3 .3a)  o f  c h a p t e r  3.
- £ IW -  £ lïï
- £  —^2W P -  £ 2W -  £ 2tt -  f 2 u  - f 2y  0 0 0
B
M‘
0 0 -a£L^ -a&Ly -a&L^ 0 0 (A4.4)
(-Cy ÏÏ + C^)p 'W ( 1 - 0  i CyO(^-Fg) 0 ( 1 - c / ) - c.
D
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0 0 0 0 -1 -1
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M a t r i c e s  and Bg a r e  v e r y  s i m i l a r  t o  m a t r i c e s  
Ag and o f  c h a p t e r  3.  The o n l y  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  some 
c o e f f i c i e n t s  change  t h e i r  n u m e r i c a l  v a l u e  b u t  t h e y  r e t a i n
p2 p2
t h e i r  s i g n s .  I n  p a r t i c u l a r ,  (1 -  & becomes (1 -  
and -a&(M - FgP)L^ becomes - a £ L ^ ,  f o r  i  = u ,  Y and T.
Given t h e s e  c h a n g e s ,  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  
r e s u l t s  ( im pa c t  e f f e c t s )  a r e  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  t h e  same as  i n  
t h e  p r e v i o u s  c h a p t e r .  Whenever  a ^ 1,  t h e  s i g n  o f  t h e  
e f f e c t s  o f  ch anges  i n  u ,  Y and T become ambiguous ,  de p en d i n g  
on t h e  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e  o f  a .
(3) S h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  ( g e n e r a l  c a s e ) : 
L i n e a r i s i n g  t h e  s h o r t - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  ( 4 . 5 a )  -  
( 4 . 5 e ) , we have  :






























































w i t h
mS
^ 6 1 = - Cl -  f i „ )  -  < 0 (A4.8
which  i s  e x a c t l y  t h e  same as  | A ^ | .
The c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  r e s u l t s  f o r  P ,  F,  S and 
B a r e  e x a c t l y  t h e  same as  i n  c h a p t e r s  2 and 3.  The e f f e c t s  
on Fg,  t ho u g h  q u a l i t a t i v e l y  t h e  same as i n  t h e  p r e v i o u s  
c h a p t e r ,  d i f f e r  i n  a b s o l u t e  t e r m s .  Because  o f  t h e i r  imp­
o r t a n c e  f o r  t h e  s t a b i l i t y  a n a l y s i s ,  a r e  r e p e a t e d  a g a i n  
be low :
dFg
— q = 0 (A4.9)
dM
dFg
dV |A^|  M
( - )  (+)
GflW - - S -   ^ 0 (A4.10)
dFg
diT |A^|  M
( - )  (")
6 f i n  — g -  > 0 (A4.11)
dFg 3Fg dP 1 1
—  = -----  + 6 —  = - a6L +---------  6 f , —Ç- = ? (A4.12)
du 3u du "  |Ag|  1"
(+) ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  (+)
d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  r e l a t i v e  v a l u e  o f  a (a > 0) .
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dFg 3Fg dP 1
  — ------  +6 —  = — (xôL +--------
dY 3Y dY \A,
(A4.13)
( + ) ( " )  ( - )  ( - )  ( + )
dFg 9Fg dP
  =   + 6—  = - aôL™ + 0 < 0







A4.2 L o n g - ru n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s
L i n e a r i s i n g  t h e  l o n g - r u n  e q u i l i b r i u m  c o n d i t i o n s  
( 4 . 9 a )  - ( 4 . 9 f ) ,  we hav e :
dM = . ■ - l u 0
dV ■^2u 0
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Assuming t h a t  we s t a r t  f rom an i n i t i a l  l o n g - r u n  
s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  where  Fg = 0 ,  t h e  d e t e r m i n a n t  o f  Ay i s  
p o s i t i v e ,  s i n c e
y
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(A4.18)
Th us ,  t h e  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  e f f e c t s  o f  a change 
i n  u , a r e  a s  f o l l o w s :
dM 1 - 1
Cw -  (1 -  c / » ]
(+3 ( -3 (+3 (+3 (-3 (+3




-  (1 -  CyD)i
( + )
+ (1 -  C y ° ) i ( £ ^ ^ f 2 „  - f z u f i w ) }  > 0 




l u « -  (1 -  CyO) + ( - C y ^  + C„)
1 4
a6L u (1 -  + C„)
+ ( f i w  -  u
C^Zu^ln - f l u^Z n)
^ ^ ^ ^ U  ^ ^ 2 tT ^^IW ” ^ 1 -n - ^7 w )1 tt^ 2W'
= 9 ( A 4 . 2 0 )
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dF 1
du | A . |
Da ô L ^ { - £ 2 w ( l  -  C ) + m
M
Cw -  (1 -  CyD)i ^iTT^ZW " ^Zir^^lW "
1 1 D.
+ <5 _ ^ { ( 1  Cy ) ( f iw^ 2u  " ^lu^ZW^
lAyl R:
M
C^ - (1 -  CyO) i ( f l u ^ Z n  ■ f l w ^ Z u ) )  = *
(A4.21)
dFg 9Fg 9Fg dM
  =    +    .  —
du 3u 3M du
(+) ( - )  (+)
IA7
a6Lu{-£iw( -Cy°™ + m + C^)
3 0 0
-  (1 - C y ° ) i - f z w f l  -  CyD) i }
|Ay
- £l u c% - (1 -  O i l  }/ > i ] (A4.22)
dTT 1 dFg ^











C o m p ara t i v e  s t a t i c s  e f f e c t s  o f  c h a n g e s  i n  a :
dM 1
da |A^|  M 
(+)
'y  ^ IW lTr|_W '' y
(+) (+) ( - )  (+)
-  (1 - C y ° ) i ( f i w f 2 v  -  flw^2w) ) < 0 (A4.25)
(+) ( + ) ( + )  ( - ) ( + )
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dV 1 1 n D -
«L —  { - f i ^C-C/TT  + m + 0%) + (1 - C / ) M ( £ ^ ^  -  1 
Mda |Ay|  
(+)
I tt '' y 
( - )  (+) (+) (+)
+ (1 - C y ° ) i
(+) (+) ( - )
1tt^ 2W
( - ] ( + )
} = ? (A4. 2 6)
have  :
From t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  r e a l  w e a l t h ,  however ,  we
dW dM dV
da da da
( - )  (?)
(A4.27)
I f  r e a l  w e a l t h  r i s e s  o r  r em a in s  t h e  same a f t e r  
a r i s e  i n  a ,  augmented  r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  una mbi gu ous ly  
r i s e s .  I f  r e a l  w e a l t h  f a l l s ,  dV/dFg r em a in s  ambiguous .
dF 1 1 .  _
«L —  { - fzwCl  -  Cy^)M




+  (  C y  TT +  m  +  C j j )  ( f i i f f 2 7 T  '
( + ) (■*■) ( + ) ( + ] (■)
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-  (1 -  C y ° ) i
(+) (+) ( - )
2W nr
( + ) ( - )
} = ?
(A4.28)
A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,  f rom e q u a t i o n  (4 .9 b )  we have :
dF




(+) (?)  (+) (+)
I f  r e a l  w e a l t h  r i s e s  o r  r em a ins  t h e  same,  F 




6L { ( f iM -  1) 
( - )
C„ -  (1 - C y ° ) i
( + ) (+) (+)











—  = - m —  = > 0 (A4.32)
da da
C-)
A4 .3 Dynamic s t a b i l i t y
From t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  ( g e n e r a l  
c a s e ) , we ca n  w r i t e  M and V a s  f u n c t i o n s  o f  e x p e c t a t i o n s  
and augmented r e a l  f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h ,  i . e .
M = 02 (V, 7t) (A4. 33)
w i t h
= .............   > 0 (A4. 33a)
dV (1 -
V = h2(V,  tt) ;  h2y < 0 ,  h2.^ > 0 (A4.34)
Tak in g  t h e  l o g s  o f  ( A 4 . 3 3 ) ,  we have :
X = I n  M = l n 0 2  (V,  ît)  ( A 4 . 3 6 )
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o r  X = g .  (V,  tt) ( A 4 . 3 6 )
> 0 ;  g -  =   < 0 ( A 4 .36a)
8_,(V, TT) ’ *2 (V ,  TT)
E q u a t i o n s  (A4.33)  and (A4.34)  a r e  i d e n t i c a l  t o  
t h e  r e s p e c t i v e  e x p r e s s i o n s  o f  c h a p t e r s  2 and 3 b e c a u s e  t h e  
c o m p a r a t i v e  s t a t i c s  e f f e c t s  on P a r e  i d e n t i c a l .
The dynamic  p r o c e s s ,  as  b e f o r e ,  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  
u n d e r  two a l t e r n a t i v e  s p e c i f i c a t i o n s  o f  p r i v a t e  e x p e c t a t i o n s
(a)  A d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s : From t h e  s h o r t - r u n  c o m p a r a t i v e
s t a t i c s  Fg can  be w r i t t e n  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  augmented r e a l  
f i n a n c i a l  w e a l t h  and e x p e c t a t i o n s :
Fg = Fg2 (V, tt)  (A4.37)
dFg 6£ 1
F g 2v  = --- = ------------------ - - g  ' - g  < 0 ( A 4 . 37a)
dV r ^M_ M'
,2(1 -
dFg 6£ 1
Fg?n = --- = ---------------—------c • - c  > 0 (A4. 37b)
^  dir r
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m  -  ---------------------------  -  X  -  TTe 2(V,  TT)
; 0 < 3 < 1 (A4.38)




%2V = - -  = -  G
(?) (+)
Fg2v . M - Fg . 
M"




_(+] (?)  ( - )  
Fg2^ . M - Fg . 02^
M
+ 1 = ? (A4 .38b)
In  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  a r o u n d  which  
e q u a t i o n  (A4.38)  i s  l i n e a r i s e d ,  Fg can  be p o s i t i v e ,  n e g a t i v e
or  z e r o ,  d e p e n d i n g  on w h e t h e r  a i s  s m a l l e r ,  g r e a t e r  o r  z e r o ,
r e s p e c t i v e l y .  When Fg % 0 ,  '^2^  > 0 and '^2^ < 0 and when 
Fg < 0 ,  E2Y and E2^ a r e  b o t h  ambiguous .
The dynamic  b e h a v i o u r  o f  t h e  sy s t e m  un de r
a d a p t i v e  e x p e c t a t i o n s  i s  d e s c r i b e d  by e q u a t i o n s  (A 4 .3 8 ) ,
(A4.35)  and ( A 4 . 3 4 ) ,  i . e .
TT =  3
F g g C V ,  tt)
m - ----------------- -  X -TTe2 ( V ,  tt)
0  < 3 < 1 , = 2v  = ^ ^ 2 ti ’ ( A 4 . 3 9 a )
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X = g 2  CV, tt)  ; g ^ y  > 0 ,  g 2 ^ < 0 ( A 4 . 3 9 b )
V -  hz (V, tt) ; "2V '  “ 2tt< 0 ,  > 0 (A4 .39c)
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n  o f  (A4.39)  i s  as
f o l l o w s  :
(1 + Bg2„)X^ + 
( - )
■^2it ■ ^2^(1  * ®*^2it^2V
(?)  ( - )  ( - )  ( + ) ( + )
* ®2ir’^ 2V ■ ^2V^2n ®
( ? ) ( - )  ( ? ) ( + )
(A4.40)
N e c e s s a r y  and s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  l o c a l  
s t a b i l i t y  i s  t h a t  a l l  c o e f f i c i e n t s  a r e  p o s i t i v e .  Th i s  
r e d u c e s  t o
(1 + ^ °  |B ' g2nl   ^ (A4 .41a)
(A4 .41b)
^ 2 it^2V " ^ 2 V ^ 2 tt  ^ ^ ( A 4 . 4 1 c )
3 0 7
When Fg  ^ G, £ 2^ and £ 2^  become n e g a t i v e  and 
p o s i t i v e  r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  and t h e  s t a b i l i t y  c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  
i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h o s e  un d e r  c a s e  I o f  c h a p t e r  3.
To d e r i v e  t h e  x = 0 and V = 0 s c h e d u l e s ,  we 
t o t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t i a t e  e q u a t i o n  (A4 .39b) w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  
t i m e ,  i . e .
X = + g2yV (A4.42)
S u b s t i t u t i n g  dir f rom t h e  l i n e a r i s e d  form o f  ( A 4 . 39b) 
i n t o  t h e  l i n e a r i s e d  forms  o f  (A4 .39a)  and (A4 .3 9 c ) ,  and 
t h e n  s u b s t i t u t i n g  fr and V i n  ( A 4 . 4 2 ) ,  we d e r i v e  t h e  e q u a t i o n  
o f  t h e  X = 0 c u r v e :
1
(1 + Bgzw)* = (g2TT®2TT + g2V^2ir^ -----
^2tt
^7V 1
^^2tt^ 2V &2V^2V) (&2w^2n ^2V^27t^
^2 tt
(A4.43)
f rom wh ich  we have:
dx
dx
C-) (?)  (+) (+)
(S2n • ^2ir * ^2V ' ^2ir^
V= co n s t .  §2^(1 - Bg2ir^
( - )  (+)




( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  ( + ) (?) ( - )  (?)
^2 tt ~ ^2tt ' ^2tt^ ^2V ' ^2 tt ~ ^2tt ^2V)
*=0 (S2w Ezm + SZV hzn)
( - )  (?) ( + ) ( + )
(A4.45)
Us in g  e q u a t i o n s  (A4 .3 3 a ) ,  (A 4 .3 3 b ) ,  (A4 .3 6 a ) ,  (A4 .3 7 a ) ,
( A 4 .3 7 b ) ,  (A4 .38a)  and (A4 .38b) t h e  s econd  b r a c k e t  on t h e  
n u m e r a t o r  o f  (A4.45)  becomes
(&2V * ^2 tt " ^2 tt * ^2V^ ^ “ ^^2V ^ ^ (A4.46)
(+) (?) ( - )  (?) (+)
Hence ,  (A4.45)  becomes :
dx
dV
( + ) ( + ) ( + ) ( - )  ( - )  ( - )  ( + )
^2V*-^2V • ^2-n ~ ^2ir ~ ^^2it ' ^2V
( 82w ®27t + 82V ^2^)
( - )  (?)  (+) ( + )
= ? (A4.4 5a)
The n u m e r a t o r  o f  (A 4 . 4 4 ) ,  which  i s  eq u a l  t o  t h e  
d e n o m i n a t o r  o f  (A 4 . 4 5 ) ,  i s  amb iguous ,  d e p e n d i n g  on t h e  r e l ­
a t i v e  v a l u e  o f  Eg . I f  Eg i s  n e g a t i v e ,  t h e  n u m e r a to r  i sZtt 2n ^ '
p o s i t i v e  so t h a t  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  from 
t h e i r  l o n g - r u n  l e v e l  a r e  s e l f - c o r r e c t i n g .  However ,  i f  E^^ 
i s  p o s i t i v e ,  d e v i a t i o n s  o f  r e a l  money b a l a n c e s  migh t  be 
c u m u l a t i v e .
S i m i l a r l y ,  by s u b s t i t u t i n g  dir f rom t h e  l i n e a r i s e d
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f orm o f  ( A 4 . 39b) i n t o  t h e  l i n e a r i s e d  form o f  ( A 4 . 3 9 c ) ,  we 
d e r i v e  t h e  e q u a t i o n  o f  t h e  V = 0 l o c u s ,  i . e .
g 2tt g Ztt




f rom wh ich  we have :
dx
dV V=0
C-) ( - )









dV ^Z tt ^2V * ^Z tt







( A 4 . 4 8 b )
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(3) P e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t : Under  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  e x p e c t a t i o n s
a r e  a lways  f u l f i l l e d ,  i . e .
Pg2(V,  TT) 
82 (V,  t t )
-  X (A4.49)
L i n e a r i s i n g  a rou nd  t h e  l o n g - r u n  s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e ,  we h av e :
1 + 2tt ÏT2M
(A4.50)
From ( A 4 .5 0 ) ,  e x p e c t a t i o n s  can  be w r i t t e n  as  a f u n c t i o n  o f  
V and X ,  i . e .
w i t h
77 = o)2 (V, x) (A4.51)
2V
( - )  ( ? ) (  + )
d iT  ^ F g j y  M -  Fg e^y
dV + Fg2n M -  Fg
(+) (?) ( - }
= ? ( A 4 . 51a)
“ 2 i  =
d77
dx + FgZn . M -  Fg . 6 2 ,
= 9 ( A 4 .  51b;
( + ) (?) ( - )
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The s i g n s  o f  b o t h  p a r t i a l  d e r i v a t i v e s  i s  ambiguous be c a u s e  
Fg i s  amb iguous .  When Fg % 0 ,  t h o u g h ,  > 0 and ^ 2^ < 0 .
S u b s t i t u t i n g  (A4.51)  i n  e q u a t i o n s  (A4.34)  and (A 4 .3 6 ) ,  we 
d e r i v e  a sy s t em  o f  d i f f e r e n t i a l  e q u a t i o n s  t h a t  d e s c r i b e s  
t h e  dynamics  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  u n d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t ,  i . e .
X  =  2 2  [ y ,  W z C V ,  x ) J  ;  g * 2y  =  ? ,  2 2 ^  <  °  ( A 4 . 5 2 a )




S 2V -2V ^277 • ^2V ^2+ . M - Fg . 0 2^
( + ) ( - )  (?)  ( + ) (?)  ( - )
( A 4 .53a)
^ 2V ^2V ^ ^ 2 tt * ^2V  ^ (A 4 . 53b)
( - )  ( + ) (?)
g i v e n  e q u a t i o n s  ( A 4 . 3 3 a ) ,  (A 4 . 3 3 b ) ,  (A4 .36a)  and (A4 .5 1a ) .
The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  e q u a t i o n  o f  t h e  l i n e a r i s e d  form o f  (A4.52)  
i s  as  f o l l o w s :
®27t • “ 2x * X + h * 2 v  = 0& * 2 V  ^ 2 tt ^ 2 x  “  h * 2 V  ^ 2 tt ^ 2 x  '  ^
( - )  (?)  (?)  ( + ) (?)  (?) ( - )  (?) (?)
( A 4 . 5 4 )
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The s t a t i o n a r y  s t a t e  i s  a s a d d l e  p o i n t  e q u i l i b r i u m
p r o v i d e d  :
< 0 (A4. 55a)
h*2Y < 0 ( A 4 . 55b)
For  Fg  ^ 0 ,  i s  u n a m b i g u o u s l y  n e g a t i v e .  S t a b i l i t y
c o n d i t i o n  ( A 4 .55b) i s  t h e  same as  i n  c h a p t e r  3.  Given 
e q u a t i o n  ( A 4 . 51 b ) ,  c o n d i t i o n  ( A 4 .55a) i m p l i e s  t h a t
+ ^%2-n • M -  Fg . ©2^ > 0 (A4. 56)
(+) (?) ( -)
and g i v e n  e q u a t i o n  ( A 4 . 53a) makes g* 2y una mbi gu ous ly  p o s i t -  
*i v e  (g 2y  i s  t h e  s l o p e  o f  t h e  x = 0 l o c u s ) .
The p h a s e  d i a g r a m  a n a l y s i s  un d e r  p e r f e c t  f o r e s i g h t  
i s  i d e n t i c a l  t o  t h a t  o f  s e c t i o n  A 3 . 2(b)  o f  c h a p t e r  3.  , The 
o n l y  d i f f e r e n c e  i s  t h a t  t h e  s u b s c r i p t s  o f  t h e  h ,  w and g 
f u n c t i o n s  change  f rom 1 t o  2.
For  b o t h  e x p e c t a t i o n s  mechan i sms ,  t h e  dynamic  
r e s p o n s e  o f  t h e  s y s t e m  t o  an exogenous  f a l l  i n  u i s  v e r y  
s i m i l a r  t o  t h a t  o f  s e c t i o n  3 ( s e c t i o n  A3.3)  and need  n o t  be 
r e p e a t e d  h e r e .
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